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SUMMARY
Traditionally, the focus of specification mechanism has been on improving its ability to
cover a wider range of problems more accurately, while the effectiveness of verification is left to
the underlying provers. In this thesis, we attempt a novel approach, where the focus is on deter-
mining a good specification mechanism to achieve better expressivity (the specification should
capture more accurately and concisely the functionality and applicability of the corresponding
code) and verifiability (the verification process should succeed in more scenarios than the cor-
responding verification without the specification enhancements, with better or at least similar
performance). In particular, we develop three new specification mechanisms, which, besides
improving the specification, are meant to assist during the verification process itself.
We begin by investigating the benefits of immutability annotations in the specification for
allowing more flexible handling of aliasing, as well as more precise and concise specifications.
Our approach supports finer levels of control that can localize and mark parts of a data struc-
ture as being immutable through the use of annotations on predicate and data declarations. By
using such annotations to encode immutability guarantees, we expect to obtain better specifica-
tions that can more accurately describe the intentions, as well as prohibitions, of the method.
Ultimately, our goal is improving the precision of the verification process. We have designed
and implemented a new entailment procedure to formally and automatically reason about im-
mutability enhanced specifications. We have also formalised the soundness for our new pro-
cedure through an operational semantics with mutability assertions on the heap. Additionally,
we have carried out a set of experiments to both validate and affirm the utility of our current
proposal on immutability enhanced specification mechanism.
Secondly, we notice that, often, a user has an intuition about the proving process. This the-
sis provides the necessary utensils for integrating this intuition in the specification. Instead of
writing a flat (unstructured) specification, the user can use insights about the proof for writing
a structured specification that will trigger different techniques during the proving process: (i)
case analysis can be invoked to take advantage of disjointness conditions in the logic. (ii) early,
x TABLE OF CONTENTS
as opposed to late, instantiation can minimise on the use of existential quantification. (iii) for-
mulae that are staged provide better reuse of the verification process. Initial experiments have
shown that structured specifications can lead to more precise verification without incurring any
performance overhead.
Lastly, we observe that one major issue about writing specifications for object-oriented (OO)
programs is the fact that such specifications must adhere to behavioral subtyping in support of
class inheritance and method overriding. However, this requirement inherently weakens the
specifications of overridden methods in superclasses, leading to imprecision in program rea-
soning. To address this, we advocate for two types of specifications, one type that caters to
calls with static dispatching, and one for calls with dynamic dispatching. We formulate a novel
specification subsumption that can avoid code re-verification, where possible. Using a predicate
mechanism, we propose a flexible scheme for supporting class invariant and lossless casting.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Computer programs (software) are present everywhere in our day to day life, and it is crucial
for them to be dependable, especially in critical environments (aeronautics, automotive indus-
try, banking, etc.). In 2002, the US Department of Commerce estimated that the cost to the US
economy of avoidable software errors is between 20 and 60 billion dollars every year [117].
Consequently, a great effort has been put into software verification, in order to prove that soft-
ware fully satisfies the expected requirements.
Software verification appears in two flavors, static and dynamic [38]. Dynamic verification
(analysis) works by inspecting the executions of a given program. Examples of standard dy-
namic analysis are testing and profiling. The disadvantage of dynamic analysis is that it might
not generalize to all the possible runs. The fact that the program has been found to behave in a
certain manner for a set of possible inputs, might not signify that the behavior can be generalized
for all the possible inputs.
While dynamic verification requires the running code, static verification (analysis) works at
the program code level in order to reason about all possible behaviors that might arise at run
time, regardless of the inputs provided or of the environment in which the program is being run
[91, 48]. Hence, it can be applied earlier in development. One example of static analysis are
the compiler optimizations. In order to cover all the possible execution paths, static analysis
typically uses an abstracted model of the program state, which might lose some information.
Consequently, the result of the analysis, while sound, might be less precise, providing false pos-
itives (issues which are reported but are not really defects). The goal of the research community
is constructing a program verifier, which by using logical proof, can give an automatic check of
the correctness of programs submitted to it [117, 54].
First formulations of the usage of logic for program verification were given by Floyd [43],
and Hoare [53]. The main feature of Hoare logic is the Hoare triple, {p}c{q}, describing how
the execution of a command c changes the state of the program from p to q. A problem faced
by Hoare logic is establishing the correctness of programs that mutate data structures. These
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programs typically require a storage that persists outside the call stack, namely the heap, and
their correctness usually depends upon complex restrictions on the sharing in the data structures.
As Hoare logic has to explicitly handle all the possible aliasing on the heap, scalability issues
are likely to arise [107].
In order to deal with this shortcoming, Ishtiaq and O’Hearn [56] and Reynolds [107] de-
signed separation logic, an extension to Hoare logic for reasoning about shared mutable data
structures, i.e. data structures with updatable fields that can be referenced from more than one
point. Separation logic assertions describe states, which contain both the store (stack) and the
heap. In order to simplify the aliasing issue, separation logic adds two new logical connectives,
interpreted as follows:
• p1 ∗ p2, where ∗ represents the separating conjunction, and denotes the fact that the heap
can be split into two disjoint parts such that p1 holds for one part and p2 holds for the
other. Basically, the separating conjunction has the non-aliasing information built in.
• p1 −−∗p2, where −−∗ represents the separating implication for denoting the fact that if the
heap is extended with a disjoint part in which p1 holds, then p2 holds for the extended
heap.
For illustration, if we compare p1∗p2 and p1∧p2, the novelty introduced by the separat-
ing conjunction over the logical conjunction is the fact that, in the former case, p1 and p2 are
required to point to disjoint pieces of heap. Thus, there is no need to explicitly consider the
aliasing between them. On the other hand, in the latter case, p1 and p2 can be either aliased, or
disjoint.
By using the separating conjunction, local specifications can be extended, as illustrated by
the frame rule:
{p}c{q}
{p ∗ r}c{q ∗ r}
where no variable occurring free in r is modified by c.
With the help of the frame rule, a local specification can be extended with arbitrary predi-
cates about variables and heap cells that are not modified by command c. By local specification
we mean a specification involving only the variables and heap cells that are actually used by
the command c (the footprint of c). Basically, the frame rule says that in order to understand
how a program works, the specification should only refer to the cells that the program actually
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accesses. All the other heap cells automatically remain unchanged. Through this frame rule, a
specification of the heap being used by c can be arbitrarily extended as long as free variables of
the extended part are not modified by c.
By the use of separation logic, the heap memory assertions can be made more precise (with
the help of must-aliases implied by the separating conjunction) and concise (with the help of
frame conditions).
From the moment when separation logic was proposed, lots of automated reasoning tools
based on this logic were developed [8, 45, 92, 57]. The use of the separation logic formalism
has been further extended for termination proofs [15], concurrency [119, 120, 47, 46], interpro-
cedural shape analysis [45, 18, 109], verifying overlapping structures [76, 52], Java verification
[35, 101, 35].
1.1 About This Thesis
The current thesis applies to the area of static program verification, and makes use of the for-
malism of separation logic in order to verify properties of mutable data structures. The starting
point of this thesis is the automated verification system proposed in [92]. As opposed to other
works [7, 33], which have designed specialised solvers that work for a fixed set of predicates
(e.g. the predicate lseg to describe a segment of linked-list nodes), the approach in [92] de-
scribes a verifier that works for user-defined shape predicates. Shape predicates are predicates
specifying data structure shapes, as well as certain numerical properties of data structures, such
as size and reachability.
The main concern of the current thesis is improving the precision and expressivity of the
verification process. We start from the remark that most efforts on improving the verification
process have been confined to the verification technology, an approach that may lead to more
reliance on clever heuristics from the verification tools, and also more complex implementation
for the verification tools themselves. In this thesis, we shall propose a novel approach towards
improving the verification process that focuses on enhancing the specification mechanism in-
stead. In particular, we advocate for enhancing the specification in order to capture the intention
of the corresponding code in a more precise and concise manner:
• a more precise specification should capture more accurately the functionality and appli-
cability of the corresponding code.
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• more concise specification should be shorter than the specification prior to the enhance-
ment.
This specification restructuring is not meant to only increase the readability of the specifica-
tions, but it should assist in the verification process. Correspondingly, the results in the current
thesis provide evidence that, when put to good use, a more precise and concise specification
mechanism leads to a more precise and more efficient verification:
• more precise verification means that it should succeed in more scenarios than the corre-
sponding verification without the specification enhancements.
• more efficient verification means that it should be faster.
Next, we will illustrate the specification enhancements proposed by the current thesis through
a running example, which verifies properties of an AVL tree. An AVL tree is a binary search
tree such that, for each of its nodes, the balance factor is between -1 and 1 (the balance factor of
a node is the difference between the height of its right subtree and the height of its left subtree).
We first define a data node node2, as follows:
data node2 { int val; int height; node2 right; node2 left; }
Each node is used to store the actual data in the val field, the maximum height of its subtrees
in the height field, and references to the right and left subtrees in the right and left fields,
respectively. Next, we provide a shape predicate for the AVL tree. The first version of this
shape predicate conforms to the approach in [92], and it is given below. Subsequently, we will
enhance this specification according to the directions pursued in the current thesis. The name
of the predicate is avl and it captures the size property via s, the height via h, and the balance
factor via b.
root::avl〈h, s, b〉 ≡ root=null ∧ h=0 ∧ s=0 ∧ b=0
∨ root::node2〈 , h, r, l〉∗r::avl〈h1, s1, b1〉∗l::avl〈h2, s2, b2〉 ∧ h=max(h1, h2)+1
∧ s=s1+s2+1 ∧ h1=h2+1 ∧ b=−1
∨ root::node2〈 , h, r, l〉∗r::avl〈h1, s1, b1〉∗l::avl〈h2, s2, b2〉 ∧ h=max(h1, h2)+1
∧ s=s1+s2+1 ∧ h1+1=h2 ∧ b=1
∨ root::node2〈 , h, r, l〉∗r::avl〈h1, s1, b1〉∗l::avl〈h2, s2, b2〉 ∧ h=max(h1, h2)+1
∧ s=s1+s2+1 ∧ h1=h2 ∧ b=0
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Formula p::c〈v∗〉 may denote either a points-to fact of the heap where c is a data node, or
a shape (heap) predicate where c is a named, parameterized assertion over the heap. For both
cases, v∗ denotes the arguments, and denotes an anonymous variable. For each shape predicate
and data node, we distinguish the first parameter root, denoting a pointer to the specified data
structure that guides data traversal.
The aforementioned inductive definition of the AVL tree consists of a base case correspond-
ing to the situation when the tree is null (root=null∧h=0∧s=0∧b=0), and an inductive case
consisting of the last three disjuncts in the definition. The constraints b=0, b=1, and b= − 1
state that the tree is balanced, while constraints s=s1+s2+1 and h=max(h1, h2)+1 compute
the size and height of the tree pointed by root, respectively. The ∗ connector ensures that the
head node, the right and left subtrees reside in disjoint heaps. Existential quantifiers for local
values and pointers, such as r, l, h1, h2, s1, s2 are implicitly assumed.
Let us first address the issue of the lack of structure of the aforementioned specification (this
reaserch direction is pursued in more detail in Chapter 5). With a closer inspection, the reader
might notice that the specification contains significant redundancy. More specifically, the only
part changing between the last three disjuncts is the relation between the heights of the left and
right subtrees, and, consequently, the balance factor (the underlined formula). Everything else
is left unchanged. In order to remove the redundancy, the user may rewrite the same inductive
definition as follows:
root::avl〈h, s, b〉 ≡ case
{root=null⇒ h=0 ∧ s=0 ∧ b=0;
root6=null⇒ root::node2〈 , h, r, l〉∗r::avl〈h1, s1, b1〉∗l::avl〈h2, s2, b2〉
∧ h=max(h1, h2)+1 ∧ s=s1+s2+1 then
case {h1=h2+1⇒ b=1;
h1+1=h2 ⇒ b=− 1;
h1=h2 ⇒ b=0}}
In the latter definition for the AVL tree, the following constructs proposed by the current
thesis are being used:
• case constructs (denoted by the keyword case): employed in order to highlight the
disjointedness conditions root=null and root6=null, and h1=h2+1, h1+1=h2, and
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h1=h2, respectively.
• staged formula (denoted by the keyword then ): ensures the reuse of the logical formula
before the keyword,
root::node2〈 , h, r, l〉∗r::avl〈h1, s1, b1〉∗l::avl〈h2, s2, b2〉
∧h=max(h1, h2)+1 ∧ s=s1+s2+1,
between the three branches corresponding to h1=h2+1, h1+1=h2 and h1=h2, respec-
tively.
Take note that, at this point, we only highlight the syntactic implications of the new con-
structs in making the specification more readable and minimizing the redundancy. In Chapter 5,
we will explain how the new constructs assist in obtaining a better verification from the point
of efficiency and precision. Additionally, in Chapter 5, we will explain the third specification
structuring enhancement, which provides a way for the user to specify the type of instantiation
to be used for a given logical variable.
Another contribution of this thesis relies on the observation that, while the shape predicates
in the specifications denote resources that can be always consumed, some data structures are
only being read from (direction pursued in Chapter 4). Hence, we enhance the specification
mechanism for capturing the immutability property of data structures and investigate how the
verification process can take advantage of this knowledge. Consequently, our approach enables
a more restricted access to data structures. Assuming one of the aforementioned definitions of
the AVL tree, let us try to specify a method which computes the balance factor of the head node
of an AVL tree. For this purpose, we define two methods:
• get height, which returns the height of the AVL tree received as argument.
• get balance, which computes the balance factor.
Note that the keyword requires introduces the method’s precondition (the program state
that must hold prior to the method’s execution), whereas ensures precedes the method’s post-
condition (the program state that must hold just after the method’s execution). Additionally, res
is a special identifier used in the postcondition to denote the result of a method.
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int get height(node2 x)
requires x::avl〈h, s, b〉
ensures x::avl〈h, s, b〉 ∧ res=h ;
{ int lh, rh;
if (x==null) then return 0;
else {rh=get height(x.right);
lh=get height(x.left);
{ if (rh≥lh) then return 1+rh else return 1+lh}}
int get balance(node2 x)
requires x::avl〈h, s, b〉
ensures x::avl〈h, s, b〉 ∧ res=b ∧ −1≤b≤1;
{ return get height(x.right)−get height(x.left)}
The precondition of both get height and get balance assume an AVL tree of height
h, size s, and balance factor b. The same predicate, x::avl〈h, s, b〉, is also present in their
postconditions, which suggests that an AVL tree of the same height, size and balance factor is
being preserved by both methods. However, as these methods do not mutate the input tree, we
would want to express a stronger property stating that exactly the same tree from the method’s
entry is being preserved at the method’s exit. We propose to use an immutability annotation of
the form @I to annotate the specification of the AVL tree in order to indicate that the tree pointed
by x is not mutated by its method:
int get height(node2 x)
requires x::avl〈h, s, b〉@I
ensures res=h ;
int get balance(node2 x)
requires x::avl〈h, s, b〉@I
ensures res=b ∧ −1≤b≤1;
Each precondition states that the AVL tree pointed by x will only be read by the correspond-
ing method. This indirectly ensures the preservation of the input AVL tree, which does not
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need to be re-proven in the postcondition. The latter specifications given for get height and
get balance methods are:
• more concise (or shorter) since there are fewer predicate in the postconditions.
• more precise (or accurate) since they capture the total preservation of the input AVL tree
without resorting to the use of a more complex predicate.
As the final research direction of this thesis, we investigate the specification mechanism in an
object oriented (OO) setting (direction pursued in Chapter 6). One major issue to consider when
verifying OO programs is how to design a specification for a method that may be overridden by
another method down the class hierarchy (a subclass might provide a specific implementation
of the method), such that it conforms to behavioral subtyping. According to the behavioral
subtyping requirement, an object of a subclass can always be passed to a location where an
object of its superclass is expected, as the object from each subclass must subsume the entire set
of behaviors from its superclass [80]. This requirement may lead to imprecision during program
reasoning.
For illustration, let us define the AVL tree in our running example in an OO setting. For this
purpose, we will provide three classes:
• a class Node2 denoting an element of the tree. This class has three fields: val representing
the value stored in the node, and right and left for denoting the references to the right
and left subtrees, respectively.
• a class BinaryTree with four fields: root denoting the reference to the head node, h
representing the height of the tree, s for denoting the size of the tree, and b for denoting
the balance factor of the head node. The class also provides a method get balance,
which returns the balance factor of the head node.









int h, s, b;
BinaryTree(){
root=null; h=0; s=0; b=0;
}
int get balance() {
return b;
}}
Next, we design the specification of the get balance method in class BinaryTree without
worrying about any potential subclass that might override it. The this variable denotes the
receiver of the method.
int BinaryTree.get balance()
requires this::BinaryTree〈h, s, b〉
ensures this::BinaryTree〈h, s, b〉 ∧ res=b;
This specification is very precise as it was considered statically on a per method basis with-
out concern for method overriding, and can be used whenever the actual type of the receiver is
known (static dispatch). Now, let us assume we have a subclass AVLTree extending BinaryTree,
which inherits method get balance, but adds an additional constraint in its specification in or-
der to make sure that the balance factor is between −1 and 1.
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class AVLTree extends BinaryTree {
int get balance()
requires this::AVLTree〈h, s, b〉
ensures this::AVLTree〈h, s, b〉 ∧ res=b ∧ −1≤b≤1;
}}
Getting back to the specification of get balance in class BinaryTree, if we take into
account the overriding of the get balance method by its corresponding method in the AVLTree
subclass, in order to adhere to behavioral subtyping, we may have to weaken the postcondition
of BinaryTree.get balance by adding the constraint −1≤b≤1.
void BinaryTree.get balance()
requires this::BinaryTree〈s, h, b〉
ensures this::BinaryTree〈s, h, b〉 ∧ res=b ∧ −1≤b≤1;
Such changes make the specifications of the methods in superclasses less precise, and are
carried out to ensure behavioral subtyping in order to handle calls with dynamic dispatch. Fur-
thermore, these specifications must also cater to potential modifications that may occur in the
extra fields of the subclasses. To address this, we advocate a new specification mechanism for
the OO setting that focuses on the distinction and relation between specifications that cater to
calls with static dispatching from those for calls with dynamic dispatching.
1.2 Contributions of the Thesis
After providing a short description of the research directions pursued by the current thesis, we
highlight its contributions:
• Immutability enhanced specifications (Chapter 4, first proposed in [28]). We provide
a more concise and precise specification mechanism that allows immutability annotations
and heap sharing. We show how our proposal enables better precision and applicability
of the specifications, as well as preservation of cut-points in support of modular analysis.
In order to support and make use the immutability enhanced specifications, we make the
following related contributions:
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– Immutability Guarantees We discuss several immutability guarantees that can be
enforced through our approach. Among them, we differentiate between total im-
mutability and partial immutability.
– Entailment Procedure We have designed a new entailment procedure to automati-
cally reason about immutability enhanced specifications and have carried out exper-
iments for validating the proposal.
• Structured specifications (Chapter 5, first proposed in [44]). We propose to add new
structures to specifications to achieve a better outcome for the verification of pointer-based
programs. We have designed and implemented a new entailment procedure to formally
and automatically reason about our enhanced specifications. The three new specification
mechanisms that we propose are described next:
The experimental results have shown that our proposal can lead to more precise verifica-
tion with a performance gain.
– Case constructs allow capturing different contexts of use by highlighting disjoint-
edness conditions. Case analysis is conventionally captured as part of the proving
process. The user typically indicates the program location where case analysis is to
be performed [123]. This corresponds to performing a case analysis on some pro-
gram state (or antecedent) of the proving process. In our approach, we provide a
case construct to distinguish the input states of pre/post specifications instead. This
richer specification can be directly used to guide the verification process.
– Staged formulae allow the specification to be made more concise through sharing
of common sub-formulae. Apart from better sharing, this also allows verification
to be carried out incrementally over multiple (smaller) stages, instead of a single
(larger) stage.
– Early vs. late instantiations denote different types of bindings for the logical vari-
ables (of consequent) during the entailment proving process. Early instantiation
is an instantiation that occurs at the first occurrence of its logical variable, while
late instantiation occurs at the last occurrence of its logical variable. While late in-
stantiation can be more accurate for variables that are constructed from inequality
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constraints, early instantiation can typically be done with fewer existential quanti-
fiers since instantiation converts these existential logical variables to quantifier-free
form at an earlier point. We propose to use early instantiation, by default, and only
to resort to late instantiation when explicitly requested by the programmer.
• Static and dynamic specifications (Chapter 6, first proposed in [22]). We advocate
for the coexistence of static and dynamic specifications, with an emphasis on the former.
This technique is important as the majority of method dispatch operations (71%) are in-
deed statically known [3]. We impose an important subsumption relation between the
static and the dynamic specifications. This principle allows for improved precision, while
keeping code re-verifications to a minimum. While building up the necessary framework
for the use of static and dynamic specifications, the following related contributions were
achieved:
– Enhanced Specification Subsumption : We improve on a classical specification
subsumption relation. Apart from the usual checking for contravariance on pre-
conditions and covariance on postconditions, we allow postcondition checking to
be strengthened with the residual heap state from precondition checking. This en-
hancement is courtesy of the frame rule from separation logic which can improve
modularity.
– Lossless Casting : We use a new object format that allows lossless casting to be
performed. This format supports both partial views and full views for objects of
classes that are suitable for static and dynamic specifications, respectively.
– Statically-Inherited Methods : New specifications may be given for inherited
methods but must typically be re-verified. To avoid the need for re-verification,
we propose for specification subsumption to be checked between each new static
specification of the inherited method in a subclass against the static specification of
the original method in the superclass. We identify a special category of statically-
inherited methods that can safely avoid code re-verification for static specifications.
– Deriving Specifications : We propose techniques to derive dynamic specifications
from static specifications, and show how refinement can be carried out to ensure
behavioral subtyping.
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1.3 Thesis Overview
After introducing some background notions in Chapter 2, the subsequent chapters will describe
our specification enhancements, as follows:
• Chapter 3 presents a summary of the most relevant related works.
• Chapter 4 investigates the benefits of immutability annotations for allowing more flexible
handling of aliasing, as well as more precise and concise specifications;
• Chapter 5 presents our work on introducing structured specifications;
• Chapter 6 describes our distinction between static and dynamic specifications.
Note that we consider the programming language in Sec 2.1, the specification language in
Sec 2.2, the forward verification rules in Sec 2.3, and entailment checking rules in Sec 2.4 as a
reference for the verification techniques developed in this thesis. Accordingly, the correspond-
ing sections of Chapters 4, 5, and 6 will only present the differences/enhancements from this
reference point.




In the current chapter, we provide a summary of the relevant technical background. We assume
the reader is familiar with first-order logic, Presburger arithmetic, bag theory. More specifically,
we explain some of the technical notions that we use in the current dissertation:
• the programming language.
• the specification language, with an emphasis on user-defined predicates.
• the forward verification procedure.
• the entailment checking procedure.
• semantic issues, including the storage model, the semantic model, and the dynamic se-
mantics.
2.1 Programming Language
In this section, we introduce a core imperative language, which is given in Figure 2.1.
For simplicity, we shall assume that programs and specification formulas we use are well-
typed. To simplify the presentation but without loss of expressiveness, we allow only one-
level field access like v.f (rather than v.f1.f2...), and we allow only boolean variables (but not
expressions) to be used as the test conditions for conditionals. The language supports data type
declaration via datat, and shape predicate definition via spred. The syntax for shape predicates
is given in the next section.
The following data node declarations can be expressed in our language and will be used as
examples throughout this chapter. Note that they are recursive data declarations with different
numbers of fields.
data node { int val; node next }
data node2 { int val; node2 prev; node2 next }
data node3 { int val; node3 left; node3 right; node3 parent }
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P ::= tdecl∗ meth∗
tdecl ::= datat | spred
datat ::= data c { field∗ }
field ::= t v
t ::= c | τ
τ ::= int | bool | float | void
meth ::= t mn ((ref t v)∗, (t v)∗) mspec {e}
e ::= null | kτ | v | v.f | v:=e | v1.f :=v2 | new c(v∗)
| e1; e2 | t v; e | mn(v∗) | if v then e1 else e2 | return e
Figure 2.1: A Core Imperative Language
Each method meth is associated with a pre/post specification mspec, the syntax of which will
be given in the next section. For simplicity, we assume that variable names declared inside each
method are all distinct.
Pass-by-reference parameters are marked with ref. In a pass-by-reference evaluation, a
method receives a reference to a variable used as argument, rather than a copy of its value. For
formalization convenience, all the pass-by-reference parameters are grouped together. As an
example of pass-by-reference parameters, the following function allows the actual parameters
of {x, y} to be swapped at its callers’ sites.
void swap(ref node2 x, ref node2 y)
· · ·
{ node2 z:=x; x:=y; y:=z }
Furthermore, these parameters allow each iterative loop to be directly converted to an equivalent
tail-recursive method, where mutation on parameters are made visible to the caller via pass-by-
reference. This technique of translating away iterative loops is standard and is helpful in further
minimising our core language. Note that we use an expression-oriented language where the last
subexpression (e.g. e2 from e1;e2) denotes the result of an expression. The missing method
specifications, denoted by mspec, are described in the next section.
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The standard insertion sort algorithm can be written in our language as follows:
node insert(node x, node vn)
{ if (vn.val≤x.val)
then { vn.next:=x; return vn }
else if (x.next=null) then
{ x.next:=vn; vn.next:=null; return x }
else { x.next:=insert(x.next, vn); return x }}
node insertion sort(node y)




The insert method takes a sorted list x and a node vn that is to be inserted in the correct
location of its sorted list. The insertion sort method recursively applies itself (sorting) to
the tail of its input list, namely y.next, before inserting the first node, namely y, into its now
sorted tail.
2.2 Specification Language
A program P consists of declarations tdecl and methodsmeth. Declarations can be shape pred-
icates spred or object types objt. Each method is decorated with the specification
{requires Φipr ensures Φipo}pi=1, which is made up of a collection of pre- and post-condition
pairs. The reason for supporting multiple pre- and post-conditions is that, given the rich variety
of shapes that can be specified, there are often multiple ways of viewing a methods behaviour.
The intended meaning is that whenever the method is called in a program state satisfying pre-
condition Φipr and if the method terminates, the resulting state will satisfy the corresponding
postcondition Φipo. We handle while loop in a similar way. Other constructs are standard.
Primed notation is used to capture the latest value of local variables and may appear in the
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Shape pred. spred ::= c〈v∗〉 ≡ Φ inv pi




Pure formula pi ::= γ∧φ
Ptr. equality/disequality γ ::= v1=v2 | v=null | v1 6=v2 | v 6=null | γ1∧γ2
Heap formula κ ::= emp | v::c〈v∗〉 | κ1 ∗ κ2
∆ ::= Φ |∆1∨∆2 |∆∧pi | ∆1∗∆2 | ∃v·∆
φ ::= ϕ | b | a | φ1∧φ2 | φ1∨φ2 | ¬φ | ∃v · φ | ∀v · φ
b ::=true | false | v | b1 =b2
a ::=s1=s2 | s1≤s2
Presburger arith. s ::= kint | v | kint×s | s1+s2 | −s
| max(s1,s2) | min(s1,s2) | |B|
Bag constraint ϕ ::= v∈B | B1=B2 | B1@B2 | ∀v∈B·φ | ∃v∈B·φ
B ::= B1unionsqB2 | B1uB2 | B1−B2 | {} | {v}
Figure 2.2: The Specification Language
postcondition of loops. For example :
while x<0
requires true
ensures (x>0∧x′=x) ∨ (x≤0∧x′=0);
do { x:=x+1 }
Here x and x′ denote the old and new values of variable x at the entry and exit of the loop,
respectively.
The separation formulas we use are in a disjunctive normal form (eg. Φ, Φpr, Φpo in Fig-
ure 2.2). Each disjunct consists of a ∗-separated heap constraint κ, referred to as heap part,
and a heap-independent formula pi, referred to as pure part. The pure part does not contain any
heap nodes and is presently restricted to pointer equality/disequality γ, Presburger arithmetic
s, φ ([105]) and bag constraint ϕ, φ. Furthermore, ∆ denotes a composite formula that could
always be safely translated into the Φ form which captures a disjunct of heap states, denoted
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by κ, that are in separation conjunction.1 The constraint domains φ for properties are currently
chosen, due to the availability of the corresponding solvers.
2.2.1 User-defined Predicates
In order to verify properties of the linked data structures handled by a program, we must have
a description/specification of those properties. A shape predicate is such a possibly inductive
definition of the consistency and correctness properties of a data structure. Throughout the thesis
we might refer to a shape predicate as a heap predicate, or simply a predicate.
Some automated reasoning systems [7, 10] are designed to work with only a small set of
fixed predicates. However, it is impossible to provide specifications for all possible data struc-
tures. In our approach, we allow users to define their own specifications for data structures.
User-definable shape predicates provide us with more flexibility than other automated reason-
ing systems [7, 10] as users can capture multiple aspects of linked data structures, such as their
shapes, their numerical constraints and their contents constraints.
We provide below the predicate for an acyclic linked list (that terminates with a null refer-
ence):
root::ll〈n〉 ≡ (root=null∧n=0)∨
(∃i, m, q · root::node〈i, q〉∗q::ll〈m〉∧n=m+1)
inv n≥0
From the notation point of view, in separation logic [107, 56], the formula p7→[val : 3, next : l]
represents a singleton heap referred to by p, where [val : 3, next : l] is a data record containing
fields val and next. On the other hand, separation logic also uses predicate formulas to denote
more complicated shapes, e.g. lseg(p, q) represents list segments from p to q. In our system,
we unify these two different representations into one form: p::c〈v∗〉. When c is a data type
name, p::c〈v∗〉 stands for a singleton heap p7→[(f:v)∗] where f∗ are fields of data declaration
c. When c is a predicate name, p::c〈v∗〉 stands for the predicate formula c(p, v∗) . The reason
we distinguish the first parameter from the rest is that each predicate has an implicit parameter
root as its first parameter. Effectively, this is a “root” pointer to the specified data structure that
guides data traversal and facilitates the definition of well-founded predicates (given in Sec 2.2).
Getting back to the shape predicate root::ll〈n〉, the parameter n captures a derived value
1This translation is elaborated later in Figure 2.4.
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that denotes the length of the acyclic list starting from root pointer. The above definition asserts
that an ll list can be empty (the base case root=null) or consists of a head data node (specified
by root::node〈i, q〉) and a separate tail data structure which is also an ll list (q::ll〈m〉). The
∗ connector ensures that the head node and the tail reside in disjoint heaps. We also specify
a default invariant n≥0 that holds for all ll lists. (This invariant can be verified by checking
that each disjunctive branch of the predicate definition always implies its stated invariant. In
the case of ll predicate, the disjunctive branch with n = 0 implies the given invariant n≥0.
Similarly, the n = m + 1 branch together with m≥0 from the invariant of q::ll〈m〉 also implies
the given invariant n≥0.) Our predicate uses existential quantifiers for local values and pointers,
such as i, m, q. The syntax for inductive shape predicates is given in Figure 2.2. For each shape
definition spred, the heap-independent invariant pi over the parameters {root, v∗} holds for each
instance of the predicate. Types need not be given in our specification as we have an inference
algorithm to automatically infer non-empty types for specifications that are well-typed. For the
ll predicate, our type inference can determine that m, n, i are of int type, while root, q are of
the node type. As the construction of type inference algorithm is quite standard for a language
without polymorphism, its description is omitted in the current thesis.
Regarding the notation, in the rest of the thesis we use underscore to denote an anonymous
variable. Non-parameter variables (including anonymous variables) in the RHS of the shape
definition, such as q, are existentially quantified. Furthermore, terms may be directly written as
arguments of shape predicate or data node, while the root parameter on the LHS can be omitted
as it is an implicit parameter that must be present for each of our predicate definitions. By using
these conventions, a more complex shape, doubly linked-list with length n, is described by:
dll〈p, n〉 ≡ (root=null∧n=0)∨(root::node2〈 , p, q〉∗q::dll〈root, n−1〉)
inv n≥0
The dll shape predicate has a parameter p that represents the prev field of the first node of the
doubly linked-list. It captures a chain of nodes that are to be traversed via the next field starting
from the current node root. The nodes accessible via the prev field of the root node are not
part of the dll list. This example also highlights some shortcuts we may use to make shape
specifications shorter. Our shape predicates can describe not only the shape of data structures,
but also their size and bag properties. (Examples with bag properties will be described later in
Sec 2.2.3.) This capability enables many applications, including those requiring the support for
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data structures with more complex invariants. For example, we may define a non-empty sorted
list as below. The predicate also tracks the length, the minimum and maximum elements of the
list.
sortl〈n, min, max〉 ≡ (root::node〈min, null〉 ∧ min=max ∧ n=1)
∨ (root::node〈min, q〉 ∗ q::sortl〈n−1, k, max〉 ∧ min≤k)
inv min≤max ∧ n≥1
The constraint min≤k guarantees that sortedness property is adhered between any two adjacent
nodes in the list. We may now specify (and then verify) the insertion sort algorithm mentioned
earlier (see Sec 2.1 for the code) :
node insert(node x, node vn) where
requires x::sortl〈n, mi, ma〉 ∗ vn::node〈v, 〉
ensures res::sortl〈n+1, min(v, mi), max(v, ma)〉;
node insertion sort(node y)
requires y::ll〈n〉 ∧ n>0
ensures res::sortl〈n, , 〉;
A special identifier res is used in the postcondition to denote the result of a method. The
postcondition of insertion sort shows that the output list is sorted and has the same number
of nodes as the input list.
In this chapter, we use only separation conjunction, as we focus on only forward reason-
ing. This extension can help support more precise and concise reasoning for heap memory,
as it can easily support must-aliasing and local reasoning. For example, when we specify that
x::node〈3, y〉∗y::node〈5, x〉 to be a precondition of some method, we can immediately deter-
mine that x, y are non-aliased, namely x6=y due to the use of the separation conjunction, while
x.next = y and y.next = x are must-aliases for the two fields from the heap formula. In con-
trast, if we had used the formula x::node〈3, y〉∧y::node〈5, x〉, we may not be able to determine
if x, y are aliased with each other, or not, Furthermore, due to the use of local reasoning, we can
assume that only the heap memory specified in the precondition of each method is ever possibly
modified by its method’s body. This makes specifications using separation logic shorter by omit-
ting the need to write modifies clauses that are necessary in traditional specification languages,
such as JML [71] or Spec][5]. In Chapter 4 we will relax the explicit aliasing requirement in
order to allow arbitrary aliasing. Consequently, the use of ∧ in the heap description will be
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allowed for some cases.
2.2.2 Well-formedness Notions
As we have already seen, separation formulas are used in pre/post conditions and shape defini-
tions. In order to handle them correctly without running into unmatched residual heap nodes,
we require each separation constraint to be well-formed, as given by the following definitions:
Definition 2.2.1 (Accessible). A variable is accessible if it is a method parameter, or it is a
special variable, either root or res.
Definition 2.2.2 (Reachable). Given a heap constraint κ and a pointer constraint γ, the set of
heap nodes in κ that are reachable from a set of pointers S can be computed by the following
function.
reach(κ, γ, S) =df p::c〈v∗〉∗reach(κ−(p::c〈v∗〉), γ, S∪{v|v ∈ {v∗}, IsPtr(v)})
if ∃q ∈ S · (γ =⇒ p=q) ∧ p::c〈v∗〉 ∈ κ
reach(κ, γ, S) =df emp, otherwise
Note that κ−(p::c〈v∗〉) removes a term p::c〈v∗〉 from κ, while IsPtr(v) determines if v is of
pointer type.
Definition 2.2.3 (Well-Formed Formulas). A separation formula is well-formed if
• it is in a disjunctive normal form ∨(∃v∗ · κi ∧ γi ∧ φi)∗ where κi is for heap formula,
and γi ∧ φi is for pure, i.e. heap-independent, formula, and
• all occurrences of heap nodes are reachable from its accessible variables, S. That is, we
have ∀i · κi = reach(κi, γi, S), modulo associativity and commutativity of the separation
conjunction ∗.
We also ensure that root can appear only in predicate bodies, res in postconditions. The
primary significance of the well-formed condition is that all heap nodes of a heap constraint are
reachable from accessible variables. This allows the entailment checking procedure to correctly
match nodes from the consequent with nodes from the antecedent of an entailment relation.
Arbitrary recursive shape relations can lead to non-termination in unfold/fold reasoning. To
avoid that problem, we propose to use only well-founded shape predicates in our framework.
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Definition 2.2.4 (Well-Founded Predicates). A shape predicate is said to be well-founded if it
satisfies the following conditions:
• its body is a well-formed formula,
• for all heap nodes p::c〈v∗〉 occurring in the body, c is a data type name iff p = root.
Note that the definitions above are syntactic and can easily be enforced. An example of
well-founded shape predicates is avl - binary tree with near balanced heights, as follows :
avl〈n, h〉 ≡ (root=null ∧ n=0 ∧ h=0)
∨ (root::node2〈 , p, q〉 ∗ p::avl〈n1, h1〉∗q::avl〈n2, h2〉
∧n=1+n1+n2∧ h=1+max(h1, h2) ∧ −1≤h1−h2≤1) inv n, h≥0;
In contrast, the following three shape definitions are not well-founded.
foo〈n〉 ≡ root::foo〈m〉 ∧ n=m+1
goo〈〉 ≡ root::node〈 , 〉 ∗ q::goo〈〉
too〈〉 ≡ root::node〈 , q〉 ∗ q::node〈 , 〉
For foo, the root identifier is bound to a shape predicate. For goo, the heap node pointed by q
is not reachable from variable root. For too, an extra data node is bound to a non-root vari-
able. The first example may cause infinite unfolding, while the second example captures an
unreachable (junk) heap that cannot be located by our entailment procedure. The last example
illustrates the syntactic restriction imposed to facilitate termination of proof reasoning, which
can be easily overcome by introducing intermediate predicates. For example, we may use:
too〈〉 ≡ root::node〈 , q〉 ∗ q::tmp〈〉
tmp〈〉 ≡ root::node〈 , 〉
where tmp is the intermediate predicate added to satisfy our well-founded condition.
Our specification language allows bag/multiset properties to be specified in shape predicates
and method specifications. This extra expressivity will be illustrated in Sec 2.2.3 by some
examples.
2.2.3 Bag of Values/Addresses
The earlier specification of sorting from Sec 2.2 captures neither the in-situ reuse of memory
cells nor the fact that all the elements of the list are preserved by sorting. The reason is that the
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shape predicate captures only pointers and numbers but does not capture the set of reachable
nodes in a heap predicate. A possible solution to this problem is to extend our specification
mechanism to capture either a set or a bag of values. For generality and simplicity, we propose
to only use the bag (or multi-set) notation that permits duplicates, though set notation could also
be supported. In the rest of the thesis, we will use the following bag operators: bag union unionsq,
bag intersection u, bag subsumption @, and bag cardinality |B|. The shape specifications from
the previous section are revised as follows:
ll2〈n, B〉 ≡ (root=null∧n=0∧B={})
∨(root::node〈 , q〉∗q::ll2〈n−1, B1〉∧B=B1unionsq{root})
inv n≥0∧|B|=n;
sortl2〈B, mi, ma〉 ≡ (root::node〈mi, null〉∧mi=ma∧B={root})
∨ (root::node〈mi, q〉∗q::sortl2〈B1, k, ma〉∧B=B1unionsq{root} ∧ mi≤k)
inv mi≤ma ∧ B 6={};
Each predicate of the form ll2〈n, B〉 or sortl2〈B, mi, ma〉 now captures a bag of addresses
B for all the data nodes of its data structure (or heap predicate).With this extension, we can
provide a more comprehensive specification for in-situ sorting, as follows :
node insert(node x, node vn) where
requires x::sortl2〈B, mi, ma〉 ∗ vn::node〈v, 〉
ensures res::sortl2〈Bunionsq{vn}, min(v, mi), max(v, ma)〉;
{· · · }
node insertion sort(node y) where
requires y::ll2〈n, B〉 ∧ B6={}
ensures res::sortl2〈B, , 〉;
{· · · }
We stress that this bag mechanism to capture the reachable nodes in a shape predicate is quite
general. For example, instead of heap addresses, we may also revise our linked list view to
capture a bag of reachable values, and its length, as follows:
ll3〈n, B〉 ≡ (root=null∧n=0∧B={})∨
(root::node〈a, q〉∗q::ll3〈n−1, B1〉∧B=B1unionsq{a})
inv n≥0 ∧ |B|=n;
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Capturing a bag of values allows us to reason about the collection of values in a data structure,
and permits relevant properties to be specified and automatically verified (when equipped with
an appropriate constraint solver), as highlighted by two examples below:
data pair{node v1; node v2}
pair partition(node x, int p)
requires x::ll3〈n, A〉
ensures res::pair〈r1, r2〉 ∗ r1::ll3〈n1, B1〉∗r2::ll3〈n2, B2〉
∧A=B1unionsqB2 ∧ n=n1 + n2 ∧ (∀a∈B1·a≤p)∧(∀a∈B2·a>p);
{ if (x=null) then new pair(null, null)
else { pair t; t:=partition(x.next, p);
if (x.val≤p) then { x.next:=t.v1; t.v1:=x }
else { x.next:=t.v2; t.v2:=x };
t } }
bool allPos(node x) where
requires x::ll3〈n, B〉
ensures x::ll3〈n, B〉 ∧ ((∀a∈B·a≥0)∧res ∨ (∃a∈B·a<0)∧¬res);
{ if (x=null) then true
else if (x.val<0) then false else allPos(x.next) }
Note that both universal and existential properties over bags can be expressed. The first ex-
ample returns a pair of lists that have been partitioned from a single input list according to an
integer pivot. This partition function and its pre/post specification can be used to prove the total
correctness of the quicksort algorithm. The second example uses existentially and universally
quantified formulae to determine if at least one negative number is present in an input list, or
not. These specifications are somewhat expressive, but can be easily handled by our separation
logic prover in conjunction with relevant classical provers, such as MONA [95] and Isabelle
[64].
2.3 Forward Verification
The front-end of the system is a standard Hoare-style forward verifier, which invokes the entail-
ment prover. In this section, we present the forward verifier which comprises a set of forward
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verification rules to systematically check that the precondition is satisfied at each call site, and
that the declared postcondition is successfully verified (assuming the given precondition) for
each method definition. The back-end entailment prover will be given in Sec 2.4.
Program verification is typically formalised using Hoare triples of form {pre}code{post},
where pre and post are the initial and final states of the program code in some logic (separation
logic in our case). We use P to denote the program being checked. With pre/post conditions
declared for each method in P , we can now apply modular verification to its body using Hoare-
style triples ` {∆1} e {∆2}. These are forward verification rules as we expect ∆1 to be given
before computing ∆2. To capture proof search, we generalize the forward rule to the form
` {∆1} e {S} where S is a set of heap states, discovered by a search-based verification process.
When S is empty, the forward verification is said to have failed for ∆ as prestate.
For convenience, we also provide lifted variant of the forward verifier to take a set of
prestates. Verification in such a case succeeds if any of the prestates gives rise to a success-
ful verification, that is if at least one of the Si is non-empty. This rule is useful when the for-
ward verifier has processed at least one subexpression, potentially giving rise to a set of residual
states.
∀i ∈ 1..n · {∆i} code {Si}
` {{∆1, ..,∆n}} code {
⋃n
i=1 Si}
Verification of a method starts with each precondition, and proves that the corresponding




∀i = 1, .., p · ( ` {Φipr∧nochange(V )} e {Si1}
(∃W·Si1)`Φipo ∗Si2 Si2 6={})
` t0 mn((ref tj vj)m−1j=1 , (tj vj)nj=m) {requires Φipr ensures Φipo}pi=1 {e}
The function prime(V) returns {v′ | v ∈ V }. The predicate nochange(V) returns∧v∈V (v = v′).
If V = {}, nochange(V)=true. ∃W · S returns {∃W · Si|Si ∈ S}. The entailment (∃W·Si1)`Φipo ∗Si2
is discharged by the entailment prover described in the next subsection.
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At a method call, each of the method’s precondition is checked. The combination of the
residue Si and the postcondition is added to the poststate. If a precondition is not entailed by
the program state ∆, the corresponding residue is not added to the set of states. The test S 6={}
ensures that at least one precondition is satisfied.
[FV−CALL]
t0 mn((ref tj vj)m−1j=1 , (tj vj)
n
j=m) {requires Φipr ensures Φipo}pi=1 {e} ∈ P
ρ=[v′j/vj ]
n
j=m ∆`ρΦipr ∗Si ∀i=1, .., p
S =
⋃p
i=1 Si ∗ Φipo S 6= {}
` {∆}m(v1..vn) {S}
Note that the verification rule also invokes the entailment prover to discharge ∆`ρΦipr ∗Si,
where ρ represents a substitution of vj by v′j , for all j = 1, .., n.. The lifted separation conjunc-
tion ∗ over a set (i.e., Si ∗ Φipo) is defined in Fig. 2.4.
Our verifier also ensures that each field access is safe from null dereferencing. This is shown
in the field access rules in Fig. 2.3 which also includes other forward verification rules for the
language. The verification rules attempt to track heap states, as accurately as possible, with
path-sensitivity captured by [FV−IF] rule, flow-sensitivity by [FV−SEQ] rule and context sen-
sitivity by the [FV−CALL] rule. In a nutshell, verification is carried out at three places. For
each call site, the [FV−CALL] rule (mentioned earlier) ensures that at least one of its method’s
preconditions is satisfied. At each method definition, the [FV−METH] rule checks that every
postcondition holds for the method body assuming its respective precondition. At each shape
definition, [FV−SPRED] checks that its given invariant piinv is sound w.r.t. (i.e. semantic con-
sequence of) the well-formed heap formula Φ. (The rule for while loop is omitted but is es-
sentially similar to the mechanics for handling tail-recursive methods.) The function XPure0(Φ)
generates a sound and heap-independent approximation of the heap constraint Φ. For instance,
XPure0(x::node〈 , 〉) ≡ x > 0
XPure0(x::node〈 , 〉 ∗ y::node〈 , 〉) ≡ x>0∧y>0∧x6=y
XPure0(x::lseg〈p, n〉) ≡ n ≥ 0
For the shape predicate case above, we can get a more precise approximation by unrolling the
predicate definition once, for example:
XPure1(x::lseg〈p, n〉) ≡ (x=p∧n=0 ∨ x>0∧n>0)
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[FV−SPRED]
XPure0(Φ) =⇒ [0/null](piinv )
` c〈v∗〉 ≡ Φ inv piinv
[FV−VAR]
S={∆∧res=v′}
` {∆} v {S}
[FV−CONST]
S = {∆∧eqτ (res, k)}
` {∆} kτ {S}
[FV−LOCAL]
` {∆} e {S}
` {∆} {t v; e} {∃ v, v′·S}
[FV−IF]
` {∆∧v′} e1 {S1} ` {∆∧¬v′} e2 {S2}
` {∆} if v then e1 else e2 {S1∨S2}
[FV−NEW]
S={∆ ∗ res::c〈v′1, .., v′n〉}
` {∆} new c(v1, .., vn) {S}
[FV−SEQ]
` {∆} e1 {S1} ` {S1} e2 {S2}
` {∆} e1; e2 {S2}
[FV−ASSIGN]
` {∆} e {S1}
S2=∃res·(S1∧{v}v′=res)
` {∆} v:=e {S2}
[FV−FIELD−READ]
∆`v′::c〈v1..n〉 ∗S1 S1 6={} fresh v1..vn
S2 = ∃v1..vn·(S1 ∗ v′::c〈v1..n〉∧res=vi)
` {∆} v.fi {S2}
[FV−FIELD−UPDATE]
∆`v′::c〈v1..n〉 ∗S1 S1 6={} fresh v1..vn
S2 = ∃v1..vn·(S1 ∗ v′::[v′0/vi]c〈v1..n〉)
` {∆} v.fi:=v0 {S2}
Figure 2.3: Forward Verification Rules with Non-Determinism
The definition for the general approximation procedure XPuren(Φ) (also used in the entailment
prover) can be found in Sec 2.4.4, where n denotes the number of unrollings done on the shape
predicates.
The operators ∧{v} (in assignment rule) and ∗W (in while rule) are composition with up-
date operators. Given a state ∆1, a state change ∆2, and a set o‘f variables to be updated
X={x1, .., xn}, the composition operator ⊕X is defined as:
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∆1 ⊕X ∆2 =df ∃ r1..rn · ρ1 ∆1 ⊕ ρ2 ∆2





i=1 ; ρ2 = [ri/xi]
n
i=1
Note that ρ1 and ρ2 are substitutions that link each latest value of x′i in ∆1 with the cor-
responding initial value xi in ∆2 via a fresh variable ri. The binary operator ⊕ is either ∧ or
∗.
Normalization rules for separation constraints and lifted operators over sets of states are
given in Fig. 2.4. Note that the separation conjunction operator ∗ is commutative, associative,
and distributive over disjunction. In separation logic, the separation conjunction between a for-
mula and a pure (i.e. heap independent) formula is logically equivalent to a normal conjunction,
i.e., ∆ ∗ pi = ∆ ∧ pi. This justifies the third translation rule.
(∆1 ∨∆2) ∧ pi ; (∆1 ∧ pi) ∨ (∆2 ∧ pi)
(∆1 ∨∆2) ∗∆ ; (∆1 ∗∆) ∨ (∆2 ∗∆)
(κ1∧pi1) ∗ (κ2∧pi2) ; (κ1∗κ2)∧(pi1∧pi2)
(κ1∧pi1) ∧ (pi2) ; κ1∧(pi1∧pi2)
(γ1∧φ1) ∧ (γ2∧φ2) ; (γ1∧γ2) ∧ (φ1∧φ2)
(∃x ·∆) ∧ pi ; ∃y · ([y/x]∆ ∧ pi)
(∃x ·∆1) ∗∆2 ; ∃y · ([y/x]∆1 ∗∆2)
(S1 ∨ S2) ; {∆1∨∆2 |∆1 ∈ S1, ∆2 ∈ S2}
F (S) ; {F (∆) |∆ ∈ S}
where
F (A) ::= A∧pi | A ∧W pi | A∗∆ | A ∗W ∆ | ∃x·A
y denotes fresh variable
Figure 2.4: Normalization Rules for Separation Constraints and with Operators Lifted to a Set
2.3.1 Forward Verification Example
We present the detailed verification of the first branch of the insert method from Sec 2.1.
Note that program variables appear primed in formulae to denote the latest values, whereas log-
ical variables are always unprimed. The verification is straightforward, except for the last step,
where a folding operation is invoked when we check an obtained disjunctive formula estab-
lishes the method’s postcondition. The procedure to perform the unfolding/folding operations
30 CHAPTER 2. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
is presented in Sec 2.4.
{{x′::sortl〈n, mi, ma〉 ∗ vn′::node〈v, 〉}} // [FV−METH](initialize precondition)
if (vn.val ≤ x.val) then {
{{(x′::node〈mi, null〉 ∗ vn′::node〈v, 〉 ∧ mi=ma ∧ n=1∧ v≤mi)
∨ (∃q, k · x′::node〈mi, q〉∗q::sortl〈n−1, k, ma〉∗vn′::node〈v, 〉
∧mi≤k ∧ mi≤ma ∧ n≥2 ∧ v≤mi)}} // [FV−IF], [UNFOLDING](Sec 2.4)2
vn.next := x;
{{(x′::node〈mi, null〉 ∗ vn′::node〈v, x′〉 ∧ mi=ma ∧ n=1∧ v≤mi)
∨ (∃q, k · x′::node〈mi, q〉 ∗ q::sortl〈n−1, k, ma〉∗vn′::node〈v, x′〉
∧mi≤k ∧ mi≤ma ∧ n≥2 ∧ v≤mi)}} // [FV−FIELD−UPDATE]
vn
{{(x′::node〈mi, null〉 ∗ vn′::node〈v, x′〉 ∧ mi=ma ∧ n=1∧ v≤mi ∧ res=vn′)
∨ (∃q, k · x′::node〈mi, q〉∗ q::sortl〈n−1, k, ma〉 ∗ vn′::node〈v, x′〉
∧mi≤k ∧ mi≤ma∧n≥2 ∧ v≤mi ∧ res=vn′)}} // [FV−VAR]
}
{{res::sortl〈n+1, min(v, mi), max(v, ma)〉}}
// [FV−METH](checking postcondition), [FOLDING](Sec 2.4)
2.4 Entailment Checking
Our prover for checking the entailment relation of separation formulae makes use the set of
heap states to support non-deterministic entailment. By non-determinism, we mean a search
process that returns multiple answers, any one of which indicates a successful verification. Our
entailment prover is of the form ∆A`κV ∆C ∗S which denotes κ ∗∆A`∃V ·(κ ∗∆C) ∗S, where
S is a set of possible residual poststates. The purpose of heap entailment is to check that heap
nodes in the antecedent ∆A are sufficiently precise to cover all nodes from the consequent ∆C ,
and to compute the set of possible residual poststates S. The entailment succeeds when S is
non-empty, otherwise it is deemed to have failed. κ is the history of nodes from the antecedent
that have been used to match nodes from the consequent, V is the list of existentially quantified
2The rule [UNFOLDING] is to replace the predicate x′::sortl〈n, mi, ma〉 by its definition. The rule [FOLDING]
used in the last step is to fold a formula which matches with a predicate’s definition back to the predicate. Both rules
will be discussed in detail in Sec 2.4.
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variables from the consequent. Note that κ and V are derived. The entailment checking pro-
cedure is initially invoked with κ = emp and V = ∅. The entailment proving rules are given in
Fig 2.5. We now briefly discuss the key steps that we may use in such an entailment proof.
2.4.1 Matching up heap nodes from the antecedent and the consequent
The procedure works by successively matching up heap nodes that can be proven aliased. As
the matching process is incremental, we keep the successfully matched nodes from antecedent
in κ for better precision. For example, consider the following entailment proof:
(((p=null ∧ n=0) ∨ (p6=null ∧ n>0))∧n>0 ∧ m=n) =⇒ p6=null
(XPure1(p::ll〈n〉) ∧ n>0 ∧ m=n =⇒ p 6=null) S = {(n>0 ∧ m=n)}
n>0 ∧ m=n `p::ll〈n〉 p6=null ∗ S
p::ll〈n〉 ∧ n>0 ` p::ll〈m〉 ∧ p 6=null ∗ S
Had the predicate p::ll〈n〉 not been kept and used, the proof would not have succeeded
since we require this predicate and n>0 to determine that p 6=null. Such an entailment would
be useful when, for example, a list with positive length n is used as input for a function that
requires a non-empty list.
Another feature of the entailment procedure is exemplified by the transfer of m=n to the an-
tecedent (and subsequently to the residue). In general, when a match occurs (rule [ENT−MATCH])
and an argument of the heap node coming from the consequent is free, the entailment procedure
binds the argument to the corresponding variable from the antecedent and moves the equality
to the antecedent. In our system, free variables in consequent are variables from method pre-
conditions. These bindings play the role of parameter instantiations during forward reasoning,
and can be accumulated into the antecedent to allow the subsequent program state (from resid-
ual heap) to be aware of their instantiated values. This process is formalized by the function
freeEqn below, where V is the set of existentially quantified variables:
freeEqn([ui/vi]ni=1, V ) =df let pii = (if vi∈V then true else vi=ui) in
∧n
i=1 pii
For soundness, we perform a preprocessing step to ensure that variables appearing as argu-
ments of heap nodes and predicates are i) distinct and ii) if they are free, they do not appear in
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the antecedent by adding (existentially quantified) fresh variables and equalities. This guaran-
tees that the formula generated by freeEqn does not introduce any additional constraints over
existing variables in the antecedent, as one side of each equation does not appear anywhere else
in the antecedent.
Apart from the matching operation, another two essential operations that may be required
in an entailment proof are (1) unfolding a shape predicate and (2) folding some data nodes
back to a shape predicate. Unfold/fold operations can be used to handle well-founded inductive
predicates in a deductive manner. They are normally invoked before a matching operation is
invoked. In particular, we can unfold a predicate that appears in the antecedent if it co-relates
(via aliasing) with a data node in the consequent. Correspondingly, if a predicate that appears
in the consequent co-relates (via aliasing) with a data node in the antecedent, then we can fold
the data node (perhaps together with other nodes) in the antecedent back to a shape predicate so
that it can match with the predicate in the consequent. The well-founded condition is sufficient
to ensure termination. We shall now use some examples to illustrate these two key steps.
2.4.2 Unfolding a shape predicate in the antecedent
Consider:
x::ll3〈n, B〉∧n>2 ` (∃r·x::node〈r, y〉∧y6=null∧r ∈ B) ∗S
where S captures the set of possible residual states. Note that a predicate x::ll3〈n, B〉 from
the antecedent and a data node x::node〈r, y〉 from the consequent are co-related via the same
variable x. For the entailment to succeed, we would first unfold the ll3〈n, B〉 predicate in the
antecedent:
∃q1, v ·x::node〈v, q1〉∗q1::ll3〈n−1, B1〉∧n>2∧B=B1 ∪ {v}
` (∃r·x::node〈r, y〉∧y6=null ∧ r ∈ B) ∗S
After removing the existential quantifiers, we obtain:
x::node〈v, q1〉∗q1::ll3〈n−1, B1〉∧n>2 ∧ B=B1 ∪ {v}
` (x::node〈r, y〉∧y6=null ∧ r ∈ B) ∗S
The data node in the consequent is then matched up, giving:
q1::ll3〈n−1, B1〉∧n>2∧B=B1 ∪ {v}∧q1=y ` (q1 6=null ∧ v ∈ B) ∗S
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Due to the well-founded condition, each unfolding exposes a data node that matches with
the data node in the consequent. Thus a reduction of the consequent immediately follows, which
contributes to the termination of the entailment proving. A formal definition of the unfolding
operation is given by the [UNFOLDING] rule in Figure 2.5.
2.4.3 Folding against a shape predicate in the consequent
Consider:
x::node〈1, q1〉∗q1::node〈2, null〉∗y::node〈3, null〉 ` (x::ll3〈n, B〉∧n>1∧1 ∈ B) ∗S
The data node x::node〈1, q1〉 from the antecedent and the predicate x::ll3〈n, B〉 from the
consequent are co-related by the variable x. In this case, we apply the folding operation to the
first two nodes from the antecedent against the shape predicate from the consequent. After that,
a matching operation is invoked since the folded predicate now matches with the predicate in
the consequent.
The fold step may be recursively applied but is guaranteed to terminate for well-founded
predicates as it will reduce a data node in the antecedent for each recursive invocation. This
reduction in the antecedent cannot go on forever. Furthermore, the fold operation may introduce
bindings for the parameters of the folded predicate. In the above, we obtain ∃n1, n2 ·n=n1+1∧
n1=n2+1 ∧ n2=0 and ∃B1, B2 · B=B1∪{2} ∧ B1={1}∪B2 ∧ B2={}, where n1, n2, B1, B2 are
existential variables introduced by the folding process, and are subsequently eliminated. These
binding formulae may be transferred to the antecedent if n and B are free (for instantiation).
Otherwise, they will be kept in the consequent. Since n and B are indeed free, our folding
operation would finally derive:
y::node〈3, null〉 ∧ n = 2 ∧ B = {1, 2}` (n>1 ∧ 1 ∈ B) ∗S
The effects of folding may seem similar to unfolding the predicate in the consequent. How-
ever, there is a subtle difference in their handling of bindings for free derived variables. If we
choose to use unfolding on the consequent instead, these bindings may not be transferred to the
antecedent. Consider the example below where n is free :
z=null ` z::ll3〈n, B〉 ∧ n>−1 ∗S
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By unfolding the predicate ll3〈n〉 in the consequent, we obtain :
z=null ` (z=null∧n=0∧B = {}∧n>−1)
∨(∃q, v·z::node〈v, q〉∗q::ll3〈n−1, B1〉∧B = B1 ∪ {v}∧n>−1) ∗ S
There are now two disjuncts in the consequent. The second one fails because it mismatches. The
first one matches but still fails as the derived binding n=0 was not transferred to the antecedent.
When a fold against a predicate p2::c2〈v∗2〉 is performed, the constraints related to variables
v∗2 are significant. The split function projects these constraints out and differentiates those con-
straints based on free variables. These constraints on free variables can be transferred to the
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A formal definition of folding is specified by the rule [FOLDING] in Figure 2.5. Some heap
nodes from κ are removed by the entailment procedure so as to match with the heap formula
of the predicate p::c〈v∗〉. This requires a special version of entailment that returns three extra
things:
• consumed heap nodes,
• existential variables used,
• final consequent.
The final consequent is used to return a constraint for {v∗} via ∃Wi·pii. A set of answers
is returned by the fold step as we allow it to explore multiple ways of matching up with its
disjunctive heap state. Our entailment also handles empty predicates correctly with a couple of
specialised rules.
2.4.4 Approximating separation formula by pure formula.
In our entailment proof, the entailment between separation formulae is reduced to entailment
between pure formulae by successively removing heap nodes from the consequent until only a
pure formula remains. When this happens, the heap formula in the antecedent can be soundly
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approximated by function XPuren. The function XPuren(Φ), whose definition is given in Fig 4.6,
returns a sound approximation of Φ as a formula of the form: β ::= ex i · β | ∨(∃v∗·pi)∗ where
ex i construct is being used to capture a distinct symbolic address i that has been abstracted
from a heap node or predicate Φ. The function IsData(c) returns true if c is a data node, while
IsPred(c) returns true if c is a shape predicate.
We illustrate how the approximation functions work by computing XPure1(p::ll〈n〉). Let Φ
be the body of the ll predicate, i.e. Φ ≡ (root=null∧n=0) ∨ (root::node〈 , r〉∗r::ll〈n−1〉).
Inv0(p::ll〈n〉) =df n ≥ 0
XPure0(Φ) =df ex j · (root=0∧n=0)∨(root=j∧j>0 ∧ Inv0(r::ll〈n−1〉))
= ex j · (root=0∧n=0)∨(root=j∧j>0∧n−1≥0)
Inv1(p::ll〈n〉) =df [p/root]XPure0(Φ)
= ex j · (p=0∧n=0) ∨ (p=j∧j>0∧n−1≥0)
XPure1(p::ll〈n〉) =df ex i · [i/j]Inv1(p::ll〈n〉)
= ex i · (p=0∧n=0) ∨ (p=i∧i>0∧n−1≥0)
The following normalization rules are also used to propagate ex to the leftmost :
(ex I ·φ1)∨(ex J ·φ2) ; ex I∪J · (φ1 ∨ φ2)
∃ v · (ex I ·φ) ; ex I · (∃ v ·φ)
(ex I ·φ1)∧(ex J ·φ2) ; ex I∪J ·φ1∧φ2∧
∧
i∈I,j∈J i 6=j
The ex i∗ construct is converted to ∃ i∗ when the formula is used as a pure formula. For instance,
the above XPure1(p::ll〈n〉) is converted to ∃i · (p=0∧n=0) ∨ (p=i∧i>0∧n−1≥0), which is
further reduced to (p=0∧n=0)∨(p>0∧n−1≥0).
The soundness of the heap approximation (given in the next section) ensures that it is safe
to approximate an antecedent by using XPure, starting from a given sound invariant (checked
by [FV−PRED] in Sec 2.3). The heap approximation also allows the possibility of obtaining
a more precise invariant by unfolding the definition of a predicate one or more times, prior to
applying the XPure0 approximation with the predicate’s invariant. For example, when given
a pure invariant n≥0 for the predicate ll〈n〉, the XPure0 approximation is simply the pure
invariant n≥0 itself. However, the XPure1 approximation would invoke a single unfold before
the XPure0 approximation is applied, yielding ex i·(root=0∧n=0∨root=i∧i>0∧n−1≥0),
which is sound and more precise than n≥0, since the former can relate the nullness of the root
pointer with the size n of the list.
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The invariants associated with shape predicates play an important role in our system. With-
out the knowledge m≥0, the proof search for the entailment x::node〈 , y〉∗y::ll〈m〉 ` x::ll〈n〉∧
n≥1 would not have succeeded (failing to establish n≥1). Without a more precisely derived in-
variant using XPure1 on predicate ll, the proof search for the entailment x::ll〈n〉 ∧ n>0 `
x6=null would not have succeeded either.
2.5 Storage Model
The semantics of our separation heap formula is similar to the model given for separation logic
[107], except that we have extensions to handle our user-defined shape predicates.
To define the storage model we assume sets Loc of locations (positive integer values), Val of
primitive values, with 0 ∈ Val denoting null, Var of variables (program and logical variables),
and ObjVal of object values stored in the heap, with c[f1 7→ν1, .., fn 7→νn] denoting an object
value of data type c where ν1, .., νn are current values of the corresponding fields f1, .., fn. with
h, s from the following concrete domains:
h ∈ Heaps =df Loc ⇀fin ObjVal
s ∈ Stacks =df Var→ Val∪Loc
Note that each heap h is a finite partial mapping while each stack s is a total mapping, as in the
classical separation logic [107, 56]. Function dom(f) returns the domain of function f . Note
that we use 7→ to denote mappings, not the points-to assertion in separation logic, which has
been replaced by p::c〈v∗〉 in our notation.
2.6 Semantic Model
Let s, h |= Φ denote the model relation, i.e. the stack s and heap h satisfy the constraint Φ.
The model relation for separation heap formulas is defined below. The model relation for pure
formula s |= pi denotes that the formula pi evaluates to true in s.
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Definition 2.6.1. [Model for Separation Constraint]
s, h |=Φ1∨Φ2 iff s, h |= Φ1 or s, h |= Φ2
s, h |=∃v1..n·κ∧pi iff ∃ν1..n·(s[v1 7→ν1, .., vn 7→νn], h |= κ and s[v1 7→ν1, .., vn 7→νn] |=pi)
s, h |=κ1∗κ2 iff ∃h1, h2 · h1 ⊥ h2 and h = h1·h2 and
s, h1 |= κ1 and s, h2 |= κ2
s, h |=emp iff dom(h) = ∅
s, h |=p::c〈v1..n〉 iff data c {t1 f1, .., tn fn}∈P, h=[s(p) 7→r],
and r=c[f1 7→s(v1), .., fn 7→s(vn)]
or (c〈v1..n〉≡Φ inv pi)∈P and s, h |= [p/root]Φ
Note that h1⊥h2 indicates h1 and h2 are domain-disjoint, i.e. dom(h1)∩dom(h2)=∅. h1·h2
denotes the union of disjoint heaps h1 and h2. The definition for s, h |= p::c〈v∗〉 is split into
two cases: (1) c is a data node defined in the program P; (2) c is a shape predicate defined in the
program P. In the first case, h has to be a singleton heap. In the second case, the shape predicate
c may be inductively defined.
2.7 Dynamic Semantics
This section presents a small-step operational semantics for our language given in Fig. 2.1. The
machine configuration is represented by 〈s, h, e〉, where s denotes the current stack, h denotes
the current heap, and e denotes the current program code. Each reduction step is formalized
as a transition of the form: 〈s, h, e〉↪→〈s1, h1, e1〉. The full set of transitions is given in Fig.
4.7.2. We have introduced an intermediate construct ret(v∗, e) to model the outcome of call
invocation, where e denotes the residual code of the call. It is also used to handle local blocks.
The forward verification rule for this intermediate construct is given as follows:
[FV−RET]
` {∆} e {∆2} ∆1 = (∃v′∗ ·∆2)
` {∆} ret(v∗, e) {∆1}
Note that whenever the evaluation yields a value, we assume this value is stored in a special
logical variable res, although we do not explicitly put res in the stack s.
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We also have the following postcondition weakening rule:
[FV−POST−WEAKENING]
` {∆} e {∆1} ∆1≈>∆2
` {∆} e {∆2}
where ∆1≈>∆2 =df ∀s, h · s, h |= Post(∆1) =⇒ s, h |= Post(∆2). As discussed earlier, we
can view ∆1 and ∆2 as binary relations (as far as only program variables are concerned). There-
fore, we use Post(∆) here to refer to the postcondition(i.e. the set of post-states) specified by
∆. Note also that ∆1 and ∆2 share the same set of initial states (in which e start to execute).
Definition 2.7.1 (Poststate). Given a constraint ∆, Post(∆) captures the relation between primed
variables of ∆. That is :
Post(∆) =df ρ (∃V·∆), where






We now explain the notations used in the operational semantics. We use k to denote a
constant,⊥ to denote an undefined value, and () to denote the empty expression (program). Note
that the runtime stack s is viewed as a ‘stackable’ mapping, where a variable v may occur several
times, and s(v) always refers to the value of the variable v that was popped in most recently.3
The operation [v 7→ν]+s “pushes” the variable v to s with the value ν, and ([v 7→ν]+s)(v) = ν.
The operation s−{v∗} “pops out” variables v∗ from the stack s. The operation s[v 7→ν] changes
the value of the most recent v in stack s to ν. The mapping h[ι 7→r] is the same as h except that
it maps ι to r. The mapping h+[ι 7→r] extends the domain of h with ι and maps ι to r.
3We can give a more formal definition for s, where different occurrences of the same variable can be labeled with
different ‘frame’ numbers. We omit the details here.




κ1∧pi1`κV (pi2) ∗ {κ1∧pi1 | b}
[ENT−MATCH]







IsPred(c2)∧IsData(c1) {(∆i, κri , piri )}ni=1=foldκ(p1::c1〈v∗1〉∗κ1∧pi1, p2::c2〈v∗2〉)
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∆1`κV ∆3 ∗S2 S=S1∪S2
∆1`κV (∆2∨∆3) ∗S
[ENT−LHS−OR]





fresh w S={∃ w ·∆ | ∆∈S1}




∃v ·∆1`κV ∆2 ∗S
[UNFOLDING]
c〈v∗〉≡Φ inv pi ∈ P
unfold(p::c〈v∗〉) =df [p/root]Φ
[FOLDING]
c〈v∗〉≡Φ inv pi ∈ P Wi=Vi−{v∗, p}
κ∧pi`κ′{p,v∗}[p/root]Φ ∗ {(∆i, κi, Vi, pii)}ni=1
foldκ
′
(κ∧pi, p::c〈v∗〉) =df {(∆i, κi, ∃Wi·pii)}ni=1
Figure 2.5: Non-Deterministic Separation Constraint Entailment
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(c〈v∗〉 ≡ Φ inv pi) ∈ P
Inv0(p::c〈v∗〉) =df [p/root, 0/null]pi
(c〈v∗〉 ≡ Φ inv pi) ∈ P n≥1







XPuren(κ1 ∗ κ2) =df XPuren(κ1) ∧ XPuren(κ2)
IsData(c) fresh i
XPuren(p::c〈v∗〉) =df ex i·(p=i∧i>0)
IsPred(c) fresh i∗
Invn(p::c〈v∗〉) = ex j∗ ·
∨
(∃u∗·pi)∗
XPuren(p::c〈v∗〉) =df ex i∗ · [i∗/j∗]
∨
(∃u∗·pi)∗
Figure 2.6: XPure : Translating to Pure Form
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〈s, h, v〉↪→〈s, h, s(v)〉 〈s, h, k〉↪→〈s, h, k〉 〈s, h, v.f〉↪→〈s, h, h(s(v))(f)〉
〈s, h, v:=k〉↪→〈s[v 7→k], h, ()〉 〈s, h, (); e〉↪→〈s, h, e〉
〈s, h, e1〉↪→〈s1, h1, e3〉
〈s, h, e1; e2〉↪→〈s1, h1, e3; e2〉
〈s, h, e〉↪→〈s1, h1, e1〉
〈s, h, v:=e〉↪→〈s1, h1, v:=e1〉
s(v)=true
〈s, h, if v then e1 else e2〉↪→〈s, h, e1〉
s(v)=false
〈s, h, if v then e1 else e2〉↪→〈s, h, e2〉
〈s, h, {t v; e}〉↪→〈[v 7→⊥]+s, h, ret(v, e)〉
〈s, h, ret(v∗, k)〉↪→〈s−{v∗}, h, k〉
〈s, h, e〉↪→〈s1, h1, e1〉
〈s, h, ret(v∗, e)〉↪→〈s1, h1, ret(v∗, e1)〉
r=h(s(v1))[f 7→s(v2)] h1=h[s(v1)7→r]
〈s, h, v1.f := v2〉↪→〈s, h1, ()〉
data c {t1 f1, .., tn fn}∈P ι/∈dom(h) r=c[f1 7→s(v1), .., fn 7→s(vn)]
〈s, h, new c(v1···n)〉↪→〈s, h+[ι 7→ r], ι〉
s1=[wi 7→s(vi)]ni=m+s t0 mn((ref ti wi)m−1i=1 , (ti wi)ni=m) {e}
〈s, h,mn(v1···n)〉↪→〈s1, h, ret({wi}ni=m, [vi/wi]m−1i=1 e)〉
Figure 2.7: Small-Step Operational Semantics




Considerable work has been done in analyzing and verifying programs with heap allocated data
structures. Next, we provide a summary of the most relevant related works based on several
often overlapping categories. For each category, we attempt to position the current thesis in re-
lation to the other works. We start with the general areas of separation logic and shape analysis,
followed by more specific work done on tracking size and set/bag properties. Furthermore, we
present an overview of other program verifiers, followed by an investigation of the three main
research directions pursued by the current thesis: immutability annotations, structures specifi-
cations, and static and dynamic specifications.
3.1 Separation Logic
From the moment when separation logic was first proposed [56, 107], its use has been further
extended for termination proofs [15], interprocedural shape analysis [45, 18, 109], overlapping
structures verification [76, 52], concurrency [119, 120, 47, 46], Java verification [35, 101]. In
the search for a decidable fragment of separation logic for automated verification, Berdine et al.
[7, 8] support only a limited set of predicates without size properties. Similarly, Jia and Walker
[59] postponed the handling of recursive predicates in their work on automated reasoning of
pointer programs.
On the inference front, Lee et al. [75] has conducted an intraprocedural analysis for loop in-
variants using grammar approximation under separation logic. Their analysis can handle a wide
range of shape predicates with local sharing but is restricted to predicates with two parameters
and without size properties. Separation logic has also shown promising results in interproce-
dural shape analysis. Several approaches have been formulated, based either on computing
procedure summaries [45, 18], or on abstraction of calling context [109].
Following the increasing exploitation of separation logic in verification tools [8, 35, 9, 92],
the development of entailment checking procedures for separation logic was tackled in several
works, among which we recall those based on SMT solvers [13], and on superposition calculus
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[103]. While most of the work on proving properties of mutable data structures using separation
logic targeted structures with constrained sharing, there are also works for overlapping data
structures. After running multiple sub-analyses for tracking information about non-overlapping
components, Lee et al. combine the results of these sub-analysis and derive the safety properties
of the entire overlapping structure [76]. A different approach is taken in [52], where Hawkins
et al. allow the programmer to specify an overlapping data structure in the style of a relational
database, with the goal of generating correct programs.
Sims [114] extends separation logic with fixpoint connectives and postponed substitution
to express recursively defined formulae to model the analysis of while-loops. However, it is
unclear how to check for entailment in their extended separation logic. While our work does
not address the inference/analysis challenge, we have succeeded in providing direct support for
automated verification via an expressive specification mechanism.
In this thesis, we make use of the formalism of separation logic for verifying properties of
mutable data structures in sequential programs. Our approach requires annotations in the form
of pre and postconditions for each method and invariants for each loop. We aim for a sound
and terminating formulation of automated verification via separation logic but do not aim for
completeness in the expressive fragment that we handle.
3.2 Shape Checking/Analysis
Many formalisms for shape analysis are proposed for checking user programs’ intricate manip-
ulations of shapely data structures. One well-known work is the Pointer Assertion Logic [89]
by Moeller and Schwartzbach, which is a highly expressive mechanism to describe invariants of
graph types [63]. The Pointer Assertion Logic Engine (PALE) uses Monadic Second-Order
Logic over Strings and Trees as the underlying logic and the tool MONA [64] as the prover.
PALE invariants are not designed to handle arithmetic, hence it is not possible to encode height-
balanced priority queue in PALE. Moreover, PALE is unsound in handling procedure calls [89],
whereas we would like to have a sound verifier. Harwood et al. [50] describe a UTP theory
for objects and sharing in languages like Java or C++. Their work focuses on a denotational
model meant to provide a semantical foundation for refinement-based reasoning or Hoare-style
axiomatic reasoning. Our work focuses more on practical verification for heap-manipulating
programs.
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In an object-oriented setting, the Dafny language [77] uses dynamic frames (introduced by
Kassios [61]) in its specifications. The term frame refers to a set of memory locations, and an
expression denoting a frame is dynamic in the sense that as the program executes, the set of
locations denoted by the frame can change. A dynamic frame is thus denoted by a set-valued
expression (in particular, a set of object references), and this set is idiomatically stored in a
field. Methods in Dafny use “modifies” and “reads” clauses, which frame the modifications of
methods and dependencies of functions. By comparison, separation logic provides a reasoning
logic that hides the explicit representation of dynamic frames.
For shape inference, Sagiv et al. [112] present a parameterized framework, called TVLA,
using 3-valued logic formulae and abstract interpretation. Based on the expected properties of
data structures, programmers must supply a set of predicates to the framework which are then
used to analyse that certain shape invariants are maintained.
However, most of these techniques are focused on analysing shape invariants, and do not
attempt to track the size and bag properties of complex data structures. One exception is the
quantitative shape analysis of Rugina [111] where a data flow analysis is proposed to compute
quantitative information for programs with destructive updates. By tracking unique points-to
reference and its height property, their algorithm is able to handle AVL-like tree structures.
Even then, the author acknowledge the lack of a general specification mechanism for handling
arbitrary shape/size properties.
The current thesis aims at handling user-defined shape predicates, which may describe com-
plex data structures as AVL trees, red-black trees, sorted lists, doubly-linked lists. Moreover,
the shape predicates may track other properties of the data structures, such as size and bag
properties.
3.3 Size Properties
In another direction of research, size properties have been most explored for declarative lan-
guages [55, 122, 23] as the immutability property makes their data structures easier to analyse
statically. Size analysis was later extended to object-based programs [24] but was restricted to
tracking either size-immutable objects that can be aliased and size-mutable objects that are una-
liased, with no support for complex shapes. The Applied Type System (ATS) [20] was proposed
for combining programs with proofs. In ATS, dependent types for capturing program invariants
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are extremely expressive and can capture many program properties with the help of accompa-
nying proofs. Using linear logic, ATS may also handle mutable data structures with sharing in a
precise manner. However, users must supply all expected properties, and precisely state where
they are to be applied, with ATS playing the role of a proof-checker. In comparison, we use a
more limited class of constraint for shape, size and bag analysis but support automated modular
verification.
3.4 Set/Bag Properties
Set-based analysis has been proposed to verify data structure consistency properties in [67],
where a decision procedure is given for a first order theory that combines set and Presburger
arithmetic. This result may be used to build a specialised mixed constraint solver but it cur-
rently has high algorithmic complexity. Lahiri and Qadeer [68] reported an intra-procedural
reachability analysis for well-founded linked lists using first-order axiomatization. Reachability




Extended Static Checking for Java (ESC/Java) [42], developed at Compaq Systems Research
Center, aims for scalability and usability. For that, it forgoes soundness for the potential ben-
efits of more automation and faster verification time. Hence, ESC/Java suffers from both false
negatives (programs that pass the check may still contain errors that ESC/Java is designed to
handle), and false positives (programs flagged as erroneous are in fact correct programs). On
the contrary, our verifier is a sound program verifier as it does not suffer from false negatives: if
a program is verified, it is guaranteed to meet its specifications for all possible program execu-
tions.
3.5.2 ESC/Java2
The ESC/Java effort is continued with ESC/Java2 [27], which adds support for current versions
of Java, and also verifies more JML [71] constructs. One significant addition is the support
for model fields and method calls within annotations [25]. Since ESC/Java2 continues to use
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Simplify [31] as its underlying theorem prover which does not support transitive closure oper-
ations, it may have difficulties in verifying properties of heap-based data structures that require
reachability properties, such as collections of values stored in container data structures.
3.5.3 Spec]/Boogie
Spec] [5] is a programming system developed at Microsoft Research. It is an attempt at verifying
programs written for the C] programming language. It adds constructs tailored to program
verification, such as pre- and post-conditions, frame conditions, non-null types, model fields and
object invariants. Spec] programs are verified by the Boogie verifier [5, 6]. Boogie generates
verification conditions that are passed to an SMT solver in order to be discharged. The default
SMT solver is Z3 [30]. Spec] also supports runtime assertion checking.
Spec] supports object invariants but leaves the decision of when to enforce/assume object
invariants to the user. In order to verify object invariant modularly, Spec] employs an ownership
scheme that allows an object o to own its representation – objects that are reachable from o and
are part of o’s abstract state. The ownership scheme in Spec] forces a top-down unpacking of
the objects for updates, and a bottom-up packing for re-establishing the object invariant. The
packing and unpacking of objects are done explicitly by having programmers writing special
commands in method bodies.
In our system, instead of using special fields in method contracts to indicate whether an
invariant should be enforced, users directly use predicates. Hence, there is no need for explicitly
packing and unpacking the objects in the method body. Consequently, users are shielded from
the details of the verification methodology, which are largely irrelevant, from a user’s point of
view.
3.5.4 Jahob
The main focus of Jahob [65, 66] is on reasoning techniques for data structure verification
that combines multiple theorem provers to reason about expressive logical formulas. Jahob
uses a subset of the Isabelle/HOL [95] language as its specification language, and works on
instantiatable data structures, as opposed to global data structures used in its predecessor, Hob
[69]. Like SPEC], Jahob supports ghost variables and specification assignments which places
onus on programmers to help in the verification process by providing suitable instantiations of
these specification variables.
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3.5.5 EVE Proofs
EVE Proofs [118] is an automatic verifier for Eiffel [87]. The tool translates Eiffel programs
to Boogie [5]. EVE Proofs is integrated in the Eiffel Verification Environment. The authors
acknowledge the importance of frame conditions in modular verification. When a routine is
called, the verifier is invalidating all knowledge about the locations which may have changed.
Therefore it is essential to constrain the effect a routine has on the system to preserve as much in-
formation as possible. As Eiffel does not offer a way to specify the frame condition, the authors
introduced an automatic extraction of “modifies” clauses. Their approach uses the postcondition
to extract a list of locations which constitute the “modifies” clause.
Although the approach uses the dynamic type for the pre- and postcondition of a routine
call, it uses the static type for the frame condition. This can lead to unsoundness in the system.
As opposed to EVE Proofs, our approach does not have to infer frame conditions, courtesy to
the frame rule of separation logic [107]. The crucial power of the frame rule is that it allows a
global property to be derived from a local one, without looking at other parts of the program.
Another restriction of EVE Proofs regards the methodology for invariants, which has to take
into account that objects can temporarily violate the invariant, but also that an object can call
other objects while being in an inconsistent state. As this is not considered at the moment, their
current implementation of invariants can introduce unsoundness in the system.
3.5.6 jStar
jStar [35, 34] is an automatic verification tool based on separation logic aiming at object-oriented
programs. The tool combines the idea of abstract predicate families [100, 101] and the idea
of symbolic execution and abstraction using separation logic [33]. jStar integrates theorem
proving and abstract interpretation techniques as loop invariants are synthesized automatically.
However, the user must provide abstraction rules used to ensure convergence in the fixed-point
computation of loop invariants. While very general structural rules which need to be used with
any kind of logic systems are built in, the user must provide the problem specific logical rules
used by the theorem prover to decide entailment and other kinds of implications. jStar does not
check that user-defined rules are consistent.
By comparison, our system does not require the specification of logical rules. As we do not
infer loop invariants, we do not require the abstraction rules either. While the user might provide
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lemmas, which state any auxiliary relations between predicate definitions, as opposed to jStar,
we do verify that the lemmas provided by the user are sound [93].
3.5.7 SLAyer
SLAyer [9] is a verification system designed to automatically prove the absence of memory
safety errors (i.e. dangling pointer dereferences, double frees, memory leaks) of programs writ-
ten in C. Validity of memory is treated at a per-object granularity, meaning that errors such as
buffer overflows are not covered. It has been successfully used for finding bugs in Windows 8
codebase. SLAyer does not intend to check other properties of data structures beyond memory
safety.
3.5.8 Thor
Thor [83] is a tool meant to automatically discover memory errors by combining shape analysis
and arithmetic reasoning. The implemented shape analysis uses separation logic for describ-
ing the memory states and is capable of reasoning about doubly-linked lists. Regarding the
arithmetic reasoning, Thor adds support for stack-based integers, integers in the heap, and the
lengths of lists by utilizing off-the-shelf arithmetic analysis. If a program can be proven safe
by only the shape reasoning, then no further processing is required. However, if the program’s
safety depends on arithmetic information, then the result of the shape analysis will be translated
into an arithmetic program. Consequently, the integer programs produced by the shape analysis
phase provide a new source of test programs for the arithmetic analysis tool.
3.5.9 VeriFast
VeriFast [57, 58] is a tool for the specification and verification of safety properties of pointer-
manipulating imperative programs. It supports abstract predicates described in the separation
logic formalism, such that the memory is represented as a conjunction of points-to assertions
and abstract predicate assertions, while data values are represented as first-order logic terms. As
opposed to our approach, abstract predicates must be folded and unfolded explicitly using ghost
statements. Assertions over data values are delegated to an SMT solver.
3.5.10 Key
Key is a verification tool designed for proving the correctness of programs written in the Java
language [1, 121]. The underlying logic used in Key is a dynamic logic [29], an extension of
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first-order predicate logic with modal operators. For addressing the aliasing issue, Key makes
use of dynamic frames. The dynamic frames allow the explicit specification of the set of memory
locations that are relevant for a method or for an abstract variable. “Modifies” clauses, used for
listing the memory locations that can be modified, are being encoded in the underlying dynamic
logic [37].
3.5.11 Why/Krakatoa/Caduceus/Frama-C
Why/Krakatoa/Caduceus/Frama-C [39, 82] is a set of tools for deductive verification of Java and
C source code, where the requirements are specified as annotations in the source. Why provides
its own internal language, to which the input languages are compiled. The internal language
is a small ML-like language with imperative features (references and arrays), exceptions and
annotations. For Java the specifications are given in the Java Modeling Language (JML) and are
interpreted by the Krakatoa tool. For C, Why has its own specification language, largely inspired
from JML and interpreted by the Caduceus or Frama-C tools. Verification conditions generated
by the Why tool can then be discharged by different theorem provers. However, to the best of
our knowledge, neither inheritance nor method overriding is supported by their system. Frama-
C denotes a suite of tools dedicated to the analysis of the source code written in C, which gathers
several static analysis techniques in a single collaborative framework. By using Frama-C, the
results output by an analyzer can be used by other analyzers in the framework.
3.5.12 jMoped
jMoped [116, 115] is a checker for Java programs. The tool combines model-checking and
testing, as model checking is used to symbolically test many inputs at the same time. Internally, a
Java program is translated into a symbolic pushdown system (SPDS), preserving the control flow
of the program. JMoped checks for errors such as assertion violations, null pointer exceptions,
and array bound violations. Whenever an error is found, jMoped outputs the arguments leading
to the error. As opposed to our approach, it requires the user to set bounds for the size of
variables and of the heap, in order to perform the modelling only for a finite amount of data.
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3.5.13 Remarks
As a comparison, we shall discuss some features in our current verification system that differ
from those used in other verifiers. Our use of user-defined predicates, which capture the proper-
ties to be analysed, removes the need for model fields. Regarding ghost variables (specification
variables), we provide support for automatically instantiating them. Furthermore, we make use
of unfold/fold reasoning to handle the properties of recursive data structures. This obviates the
need for specifying transitive closure relations that are used by classical verifier, such as Jahob,
when tracking recursive properties. Additionally, as separation logic employs local reasoning
via a frame rule, our approach does not require a separate “modifies” clause to be prescribed.
3.6 Immutability Annotations
Immutability has been extensively studied in the context of object-oriented programs under the
form of object immutability (a given object cannot be mutated through any reference whatso-
ever), class immutability (no instance of an immutable class can be changed), reference im-
mutability (a given reference is not used to modify its referent) [11, 125, 124, 49, 106]. Our
approach works at the specification level, rather than as part of the type system, and can achieve
object immutability by marking the object as immutable, and reference immutability by marking
the reference as immutable. For field and class immutability, we can provide support for it by
adding immutability annotations to field and data (class) declarations, respectively. This makes
every instances of such annotated field or data (class) be automatically marked as immutable in
our logic.
However, what really distinguishes our work from type-based approaches is that we can ap-
ply immutability annotation on user-definable predicate definitions. This can be used to annotate
either partial or entire data structures for read-only access, as may be required by the logics of a
given program component. This new approach adds considerable expressiveness to immutable
specifications, allowing us to support more concise, more precise and more flexible schemes for
both analysis and verification of user programs.
Separation logic uses separation and local reasoning as a means to enforce exclusive owner-
ship over each heap cell [107]. This interpretation of the points-to assertion in separation logic
is not simply to describe a part of the heap, but can be enhanced with read/write permissions
for better analysis and control. This observation has been extensively exploited by works
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dealing with permissions [12, 36] for enabling race free sharing of heap storage between con-
current threads. Bornat et al. [12] extended separation logic to allow shared read access using
permissions. The authors considered predicates that admit to a weaker permission, namely read-
only permission. One problem with the read-only permissions is that ∗ can no longer be used
to express disjointness as the same permission can appear twice, i.e. two read permissions on
the same cell. Any two read permissions on a field look identical and cannot be distinguished.
Hence, permissions need to be disjoint. Parkinson solves this problem by giving names to per-
missions [99].
Inspired by the use of permissions for the concurrent programming setting [12], we have
designed a much simpler mechanism for enabling immutability annotations in the sequential
programming setting. In our case, ∗ still expresses disjointness. As our model is focused on
the sequential setting, we do not currently support multiple read-only permissions for a given
resource. Instead, our goal is to exploit those scenarios in which data structures can be treated
as immutable in order to support a more precise verification/analysis. Our solution is tailored
towards more flexible alias analysis, supports partial immutability, better cut-points preservation
for modular analysis and can support access controls through immutable predicates within both
pre and post-conditions. The new specification mechanism allows us to design a more concise
and more precise verification/analysis system, with finer controls over accesses to resources
(data structures).
3.7 Structured Specifications
Previous works on enhancing pre/post specifications [70, 60] were mainly concerned with im-
proving modularity to allow easier understanding of specifications. With this objective, multiple
specifications and redundant representations were advocated as the primary machinery. In the
context of shape analysis, Chang and Rival [19] make use of if notation for defining inductive
checkers. However, the conditional gets approximated to disjunction during the actual analysis.
Verification wise, the three structured specification mechanisms that we have proposed are not
available in existing tools, such as JML [17], Spec# [5], Dafny [79], JStar [35] and VeriFast [57].
The closest relationships may be summarized, as follows. JML supports specification cases, in
the form of multiple pre/post conditions, for better modularity and clarity of specifications. Our
case constructs also intend to provide better guidance to the verification process. Spec#/Dafny
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supports ghost variables for manual instantiation (by user) of logical variables. In contrast, our
early/late instantiation mechanisms provided two solutions to automatic instantiation of logical
variables. Overall, little attempt has been made to add specification structures that can help
produce a better verification outcome.
On timings, we did not compare with Spec# and Dafny, since our benchmark on heap-
manipulating programs is not properly covered by their specification logic. Regarding JStar, it
currently uses logics involving only shapes and equalities, it does not support more expressive
properties, like set and numeric properties, needed by our benchmark. Lastly, VeriFast requires
more user intervention in the form of explicit unfolding and folding of the abstract predicates
through ghost statements.
In a distributed systems setting, Seino et al. [113] present a case analysis meant to improve
the efficiency of protocol verification, which involves finding appropriate predicates and split-
ting a case into multiple sub-cases based on the predicates. In order to cover all the possible
case splits, they use a special type of matrix. Pientka [104] argues for the need of case analysis
in inductive proofs. The potential case splits are selected heuristically, based on the pattern of
the theorem. A case split mechanism has been used by Brock et al. [14] to guide case anal-
ysis during proving. As opposed to the previous works, our current proposal is to incorporate
structured mechanisms within the specification mechanism itself for guiding the case analysis,
existential instantiation or staged proving.
3.8 Object Oriented Verification
In support of modular reasoning on properties of object-oriented programs, the notion of be-
havioral subtyping has been intensively studied in the last two decades, e.g. [80, 2, 81, 32, 86,
41, 90, 99]. The notion of specification inheritance, where an overriding method inherits the
specifications of all the overridden methods, was first introduced in Eiffel [86]. As an effort to
relate these two notions, [32] presented a modular specification technique which automatically
forces behavioral subtyping through specification inheritance. More recently, [73] proposed
a formal characterization for behavioral subtyping and modular reasoning. The basic idea of
modular reasoning, which the authors call supertype abstraction, is that reasoning about an in-
vocation, say E.m(), is based on the specification associated with the static type of the receiver
expression E. In [73], the authors proved the equivalence between supertype abstraction and
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behavioral subtyping. The new formalization is supposed to serve as a semantic foundation for
object-oriented specification languages.
Various embodiments of these proposals have been implemented in both static and runtime
verification tools and have been applied to rich specification and programming languages such
as ESC/Java [42], JML [71], Spec# [5], ESpec [98], Krakatoa [85, 84]. Software model check-
ing frameworks [110, 51] have also been used in the verification of OO programs. Inference
mechanisms for loop invariants have been proposed in [94, 102] amongst others, and they can
make verification even easier to use. However, most of these works are based primarily on the
idea of dynamic specifications. Even when static specifications are added, like code contracts
in JML [74, ch 15], they did not enforce an important subtyping relation between a static spec-
ification and its dynamic counterpart. Moreover, in comparison with our approach, Spec# is
more restrictive in handling overriding as it does not allow any changes in the precondition of
the overriding method.
Using the rules of behavioral subtyping, Findler et al. have formalized hierarchy violations
and blame assignment for pre and postcondition failures [40, 41]. They identified a problem
(related to preservation of class invariants) that arises from synthesizing the specifications of
overriding methods through specification inheritance. This problem is caused by specification
inheritance’s manner of enforcing behavioral subtyping which may wrongly assume that the
original specification of an overriding method is too weak. In our proposal, we can avoid this
problem by using specification abstraction instead of specification inheritance, if class invariants
are to be preserved for the overriding methods. Furthermore, while [40] and [41] focus on
checking the correctness of contracts at run-time, we propose a static verification system.
The problem of writing specifications for programs that use various forms of modularity
where the internal resources of a module should not be accessed by the module’s clients, is
tackled in several papers [96, 100, 72]. In [96] the internal resources of a module are hidden
from its clients using a so called hypothetical frame rule, whereas in [100] the notion of abstract
predicates is introduced. While [96] only supports single instances of the hidden data structure,
abstract predicates can deal with dynamic instantiation of a module. Visibility modifiers are
taken into consideration in [72] where a set of rules for information hiding in specifications
for Java-like languages is given. Moreover, the authors demonstrate their application on the
specification language JML. However, some JML tools, including ESC/Java2 [42, 26] ignore
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visibility modifiers in specifications.
The emergence of separation logic provided a novel way to handle the challenging aliasing
issues for heap-manipulating programs [100, 99, 101].
The closest to our work is the distinction between static and dynamic specifications, pro-
posed by Parkinson and Bierman, in support of modular verification and direct method calls
handling [101]. Regarding the modularity issues found in the Java programming language,
they address the issue of encapsulation with the concept of an abstract predicate, which is the
logical analogue of an abstract datatype, and the issues of inheritance by extending the con-
cept of abstract predicates to abstract predicate families. This extension allows a predicate to
have multiple definitions that are indexed by class, which allows subclasses to have a different
internal representation while remaining behavioural subtypes. We support encapsulation and
inheritance through the use of partial and full views. Similar to their work, we support inheri-
tance and overriding, while avoiding unnecessary re-verifications. We have a marginal emphasis
on static specifications over dynamic specifications, as we advocate for the latter to be derived
from the former, when needed, using the refinement techniques of specification specialization
and abstraction.





The importance of immutability information has been discussed in several works [49, 11]. Im-
mutability is essential when we have to guarantee that non-privileged clients are never allowed
to modify some given resource (or data structure). Moreover, immutability is useful in the pres-
ence of aliasing, where it is challenging [49] to maintain invariants of aliased objects otherwise.
In a concurrent programming setting, immutability, seen as a read-only permission, enables safe
sharing between different threads without the cost of synchronization [99, 12].
Immutability was extensively investigated in the context of object-oriented programs un-
der several forms, such as object immutability (a given object cannot be mutated through any
reference whatsoever), class immutability (no instance of an immutable class can be changed),
reference immutability (a given reference is not used to modify its referent) [11, 125, 124].
These proposals were formulated as extensions of the underlying type system.
However, to the best of our knowledge, the concept of immutability has not been applied to
a richer specification logic that could be used to specify more concisely and precisely the be-
haviors of software programs, particularly in the sequential programming setting. In the current
thesis, we investigate the benefits of enforcing immutability requirements in the context of an
expressive logic, called separation logic [108], that is particularly suited for verifying proper-
ties of mutable data structures. In contrast to the previous works, our approach applies at the
specification level, rather than as part of the type system.
The current work enhances the approach introduced in the previous chapters of this thesis
with the possibility of specifying which parts of the data structures cannot be mutated (are
immutable), and by allowing the sharing of aliases in the heap formula through the use of the
conjunctive ∧ operator. In several recent verification systems based on separation logic [92, 8,
35], a specification formula is a restricted form of logic that allows only separating conjunction,
∗, in the heap description. The separating conjunction Φ1 ∗Φ2 denotes a program state with two
disjoint heap spaces described by sub-formulae Φ1 and Φ2, respectively. Such heap separation
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supports precise knowledge about the pointer aliasing, and can be exploited by the frame rule
of separation logic [107], that forms the basis for local reasoning.
Our goal is to take advantage of the immutability property, so as to generalize the heap
description to allow a greater degree of sharing. Thus, instead of relying on just a spatial formula
Φ1 ∗Φ2 in the specification logic, our new verification system also supports conjunctive formula
of the form Φ1 ∧Φ2 whereby the heap formula Φ1 is expected to be marked as immutable, whilst
Φ2 is unrestricted. This allows the heap nodes from both Φ1 and Φ2 to be possibly aliased
with one another, thus supporting a more general specification mechanism for data structures,
including the use of overlaid data structures.
4.2 Chapter Overview
In the rest of the chapter we shall focus on the apparatus for writing and verifying specifications
with immutability annotations. Sec 4.3 provides examples to motivate the need for immutability
annotations for a more concise and precise specification mechanism. Sec 4.4 introduces the
specification language. Sec 4.5 and Sec 4.6 formalize the entailment proving for immutability
enhanced specifications and the verification rules to generate Hoare triples, respectively. The
soundness properties for both the forward verifier and the entailment prover are discussed in
Sec 4.7. Sec 4.8 presents our experimental results.
4.3 Examples
Immutable annotations allow us to write stronger specifications that lead to more concise and
precise program verification. We shall use simple examples to highlight how these desirable
traits for program specifications are being achieved. To help construct simple examples, let us
consider the specification for a singly-linked list, already described in Sec 2.2.
data node { int val; node next}
ll〈n〉 ≡ root=null ∧ n=0




Consider a method that receives a list as its input, before returning the list’s length as its result.
Typically, such a method would not be mutating its input list. Let us first specify this method
without any immutability annotation. Note the use of a special variable res for denoting the




{ if (x==null) then return 0;
else return 1 + length(x.next); }
The precondition assumes that variable x points to a singly-linked list of length n using the
predicate x::ll〈n〉. The same predicate, x::ll〈n〉, is also present in the postcondition which
suggests that a list of the same length is being preserved by the method. However, we would
really prefer to express something stronger for this method since it is the same input list (from
the method’s entry) that is being preserved in the postcondition (at the method’s exit).
One solution for capturing total preservation of list is to introduce a stronger llS predicate
that would capture the entire sequence of elements and their nodes, as shown below. Note that V
captures the sequence of values, while L captures the sequence of pointers to nodes in the linked
list.
llS〈V, L, n〉 ≡ root=null ∧ n=0 ∧ V=L=[]
∨ root::node〈v, q〉 ∗ q::llS〈V1, L1, n−1〉 ∧ V=v:V1
∧ L=root:L1
inv n≥0;
With this more informative predicate, we could now capture a more complete specification of
length method, as follows:
int length(node x)
requires x::llS〈V, L, n〉
ensures x::llS〈V, L, n〉∧res=n ;
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However, this approach makes our verification more complex as we are now required to verify
two additional properties, namely the preservation of sequence of values and sequence of ad-
dresses, for the input list. Apart from causing more work for our verifier, we must also rely on
a more complex prover that is expected to handle proofs involving sequences.
We propose a simpler solution to this problem that uses immutability annotation of the
form @I to annotate the specification of each node or each predicate that is only read (and not
modified) by its method. In the case of the length method, we can indicate that the list pointed




The precondition states that the linked-list pointed by x will only be read by the length method.
This indirectly ensures the preservation of the input list, which need not be re-proven in the
postcondition. The net result is a cleaner specification that more succinctly captures the intended
semantics of the length method. We said that the new specification is more concise (or shorter)
since it has one fewer predicate in the postcondition. It is also more precise (or accurate) since
it captures the total preservation of the input list without resorting to the use of a more complex
predicate. These improvements are due entirely to the use of an immutable predicate in the
precondition.
4.3.2 Flexible Aliasing
Let us now consider a method, called sum, that receives two data nodes pointed by x and y,
respectively, and computes the sum of the values stored inside the two nodes.
Under the principle of heap separation, as promoted by separation logic, our specifica-
tion logic would explicitly state that the two input nodes are either disjoint, as specified using
x::node〈a, 〉∗y::node〈b, 〉, or are exact aliases for one another, namely x::node〈v1, 〉∧x=y.
To support both these scenarios, one way for specifying this is to use two pairs of pre and
post-conditions, one corresponding to the case when x and y are disjoint, and another to the case
when they are exact aliases, as shown below.
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int sum(node x, node y)
requires x::node〈a, q1〉∗y::node〈b, q2〉
ensures x::node〈a, q1〉∗y::node〈b, q2〉∧res=a+b;
requires x::node〈a, q〉∧x=y
ensures x::node〈a, q〉∧res=2 ∗ a;
{return x.val + y.val}
With the help of these two specifications, we can now deal with different scenarios, whereby
the nodes may either be aliased or otherwise. As an example, consider the two sum calls in the
code fragment below.
node u = new node(...)
node w = new node(...)
int r1 = sum(u, u)
int r2 = sum(u, w)
The first call sum(u, u) would only match with the second pre/post specification, while the
second call sum(u, w) where the input nodes are disjoint, would match with the first pre/post
specification.
Though this specification is fairly precise, it is unnecessary complicated for the given method.
In particular, neither of the two nodes pointed to by x and y are being updated. For such a sce-
nario, it is actually not important if x and y are aliases or not. What is important is to be able to
access the values of the two nodes. With the help of immutability annotations, we can actually
use a much simpler specification below.
int sum(node x, node y)
requires x::node〈a, 〉@I∧y::node〈b, 〉@I
ensures res=a+b;
We apply the immutability annotation @I on both the nodes pointed by x and y, respectively.
Moreover, we allow the use of ∧ operator, instead of the ∗ operator, to express the fact that x
and y may either be aliases or otherwise. As a consequence, the same pre/post specification
can now be used for both the sum calls, namely sum(u, u) and sum(u, w), from our earlier code
fragment. Yet another improvement is that the two immutable nodes need not re-appear in the
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postcondition, thus avoiding the need to re-prove its preservation by the sum method. With this
cleaner specification, we are able to claim that the result returned by the method is always a+b,
regardless of whether or not x and y are aliases or not.
We refer to this as the flexible aliasing from the use of immutable specification. The knowl-
edge that something is immutable enables us to support arbitrary aliasing in the heap description
with the use of the conjunctive ∧ operator. This results in a unified specification that is both
concise and precise. Functional programmers are all too aware of this benefit, whereby aliasing
was never an issue for understanding (or analysing) purely functional code without any heap
mutation. In the present work, we advocate for the use of immutable annotations to help us
achieve a similar benefit for the specification of data structures that are only being read, and
never modified, in the imperative setting.
4.3.3 Preservation of Cut-Points
Cut-points refer to the intermediate data points that may be encountered prior to a method call.
Previous works on program analysis [45] have attempted to preserve cut-points for method
calls, where possible. This is typically achieved by keeping track of multiple summaries for
each method under analysis, so that more cut-points could be preserved. In this section, we
show how cut-points may be preserved with the help of immutability annotations.
Let us re-visit the length example, covered in Sec 4.3.1. Let us also consider the following
code fragment:
node y = new node(2, null)
node x = new node(1, y)
int r = length(x)
Prior to the length call, we would have the following heap state, x::node〈1, y〉∗y::node〈2, null〉,
that is formed by two assignment statements. This heap state captures two cut-points from vari-




We would have matched the current heap state to x::ll〈2〉 before asserting x::ll〈2〉∧r=2 as the
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post-state of the code fragment. However, this abstracted heap state has lost track of the entire
cut-point from variable y, while the node at x is being replaced by a x::ll〈2〉 predicate. As a
result, we are unable to reason about any information pertaining to y (and to a lesser extend x)
after the method call.




During the entailment for each immutable predicate, such as x::ll〈n〉@I, the original heap state
remains unchanged but instantiation on properties, such as n=2, can still be computed from the
current heap state. Thus, at the end of the code fragment given earlier, we expect the following to
be captured, x::node〈1, y〉∗ y::node〈2, null〉∧r=n=2, which preserves the cut-points for both
x and y. This difference in the treatments between mutable and immutable predicates by our
new entailment procedure, allows considerable more information to be preserved for immutable
predicates. We shall formally describe this procedure later in Sec 4.5.2.
4.3.4 Partial Immutability
Another aspect of our immutability enhanced specification is that we could support the anno-
tation of only a segment of linked nodes, rather than a fully linked data structure. Let us first
consider a segment of singly-linked nodes, as defined by the following predicate:
lseg〈p, n〉 ≡ root=p ∧ n=0
∨ root::node〈r, q〉 ∗ q::lseg〈p, n−1〉
inv n≥0 ;
As an example of its use, let us also consider a method to join a linked list to another, as shown
below.
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void append(node x, node y)
requires x::lseg〈null, n〉∧x6=null
ensures x::lseg〈y, n〉 ;
{if (x.next6=null) then append(x.next, y);
else x.next=y;}
The first linked-list must be non-empty and moreover it will be mutated by the method to join
up with the second list. On closer inspection, it is actually the last node of the first linked list
that is being mutated. Thus, to capture the specification of append method in a more accurate
manner, we can actually use the following pre/post specification instead:
void append(node x, node y)
requires x::lseg〈p, n〉@I∗p::node〈v, null〉
ensures p::node〈v, y〉 ;
The entire segment of the first linked list minus the last element, namely x::lseg〈p, n〉@I, is
now marked as immutable. Only the last node p::node〈v, null〉 of the first linked list is left
as a mutable node, and suitably specified as modified in the post-condition of the method. This
specification is both simpler and more precise. All cut-points pertaining to the initial segment of
parameter x are preserved by the presence of an immutable lseg predicate in the precondition.
It can even be used to reason about the formation of cyclic linked list when x = y, or even
lasso-style circular linked list when y points to a node within the first list of nodes.
4.3.5 Read and Write Phases
One of the goals of the current proposal is to relax the heap separation principles specific to
separation logic, by allowing two phases in the heap description. The two phases have the
following attributes:
• a read phase, where all the predicates must be immutable. As mutation is disabled in the
read phase, we allow heap sharing between the constituting heap predicates, which can
be co-joined by both ∗ and ∧. This corresponds to the initial reading phase in a program,
and contains the heap being read before any writing took place.
• a write phase, where the predicates can be either mutable or immutable. As this phase
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might involve writing, we do not allow heap sharing. Hence, we require structural sepa-
ration between the heap predicates through ∗.
Our formulation for entailment proving is simple as it comprises only two phases, but is
general enough to cover several situations where flexible aliasing may be deployed. We advocate
for capturing the precise aliasing only when required, namely after at least one mutation/writing
has took place.
For illustration, let us assume a method call length, which calls the length method
defined in Sec 4.3.1 for two lists received as argument, and records the addition of the two
results in a data node, also received as argument. Initially, we leave the call length method
unspecified.
void call length(node x, node y, node z)
{ int l = length(x)+length(y);
z.val = l; }
In the body of the call length method, we can distinguish two distinct phases, namely:
• an initial read phase, where the linked lists pointed by x and y are being read by the
length method.
• a subsequent write phase, where the data node pointed by z is updated to record the
addition of the lengths of the lists pointed by x and y.
Using our read/write phases approach, we can provide the specification given below, where
the heap description precisely captures the code behavior. Semantically, Φ1#Φ2 is equivalent
to Φ1∧Φ2. Operationally, we interpret Φ1#Φ2 as a specification that comprised of a read phase
for an immutable formula Φ1, followed by a write phase for a possibly mutated Φ2. In this
example, the initial read phase is captured by x::ll〈n〉@I∧y::ll〈m〉@I , while the subsequent
write phase is denoted by z::node〈 , v〉. As mentioned before, inside the read phase there is
no need to explicitly specify the aliasing between x and y (this is exploited in the specification
through the use of the ∧ connector). Moreover, as all the reading takes place before updating
the node pointed by z, there is no need to capture the aliasing between x and y and z (this is
exploited through the use of the # connector).
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void call length(node x, nodey, node z)
requires (x::ll〈n〉@I∧y::ll〈m〉@I)#z::node〈 , v〉
ensures z::node〈n+m, v〉;
4.3.6 Immutable Postconditions
Apart from improving the analysis of methods, one other application of our immutability en-
hancement is the construction of immutable (or partially immutable) data structures. For il-
lustration, consider a method for constructing a list of length n. Let us assume that after the
construction phase we do not allow the list to be mutated.
In order to guarantee that the list cannot be mutated outside this method, we can mark it as
immutable in the method’s postcondition. Consequently, after a call to the ll build method,
any caller will only be allowed to read the list, and cannot update it in any way.
node ll build(int n)
requires n≥0
ensures res::ll〈n〉@I;
{ if (n == 0) then null;
else { int v = ... ;
new node(v, ll build(n−1)); } }
We can use this mechanism to specify the methods of immutable classes or data structures.
4.4 Specification and Programming Language
In Figure 4.1 we introduce the differences from the programming and specification languages
given in Fig 2.1 and Fig 2.2, respectively. Each heap predicate can be annotated with an im-
mutability annotation, u ∈ {I,M}, (v::c〈v∗〉@u). This is to support use-site annotations. In
order to support declaration-site annotations, every data type declaration and heap predicate
definition can also have attached immutability annotations. If no annotation is present, a data
node/heap predicate is considered to be mutable. For illustration, x::node〈v, y〉@I corresponds
to an immutable node, meaning a node whose both fields cannot be mutated. Note that we
support the following subtyping relation between the immutability annotations M<:I .
The heap part, κ, is organized according to the code’s reading and writing phases:
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Data type datat ::= data c[@u] { (field)∗ }
Imm ann. u ::= I |M
Shape pred. spred ::= c〈v∗〉[@u] ≡ Φ inv pi0
Heap formula κ ::= κR#κW | emp
κR ::= κR∗∧κR | v::c〈v∗〉@I | emp
κR∗ ::= κR∗∗κR∗ | v::c〈v∗〉@I | emp
κW ::= κW ∗κW | v::c〈v∗〉[@u] | emp
Figure 4.1: Modifications to the programming and specification languages
• κR corresponding to the initial read phase in the code. This phase contains only im-
mutable predicates co-joined by either ∗ or ∧. Note that it is compulsory in this phase for
each predicate to be immutable, i.e. to have an immutability annotation @I .
• κW corresponding to the write phase in the code. This phase can contain both immutable
and mutable predicates co-joined by ∗.
• The read and write phases are co-joined by the # connector, whose semantic is given in
Sec. 4.7.2.
During the verification process, the heap state might contain nested read and write phases,
κ ::= κR#(κW ∗κ). For brevity, we only present the formalization for one read and one write
phase.
Our specification is meant to minimize the need to explicitly express aliasing relations.
Accordingly, we use the following principles:
1. Aliasing does not need to be considered:
– inside the read phase as none of the available pointers can be used to mutate the
heap.
– between the read phase and the write phase as, during our entailment checking, once
the writing phase is encountered, the read phase is discarded. Basically, we consider
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that writing to the heap invalidates all the previous reads from the heap. This will be
further described during the entailment proving procedure in Sec 4.5 .
2. Aliasing needs to be considered:
– inside the write phase
4.5 Entailment Checking
Our goal in the current section is enhancing the entailment proving procedure introduced in
Sec 2.4 to handle the current form of the heap formula with conjunction and immutability an-
notations.
Besides the entailment procedure in Sec 2.4, we also provide an amended form that al-
lows heap sharing between the consequent and the residual states, as long as the shared heap
is immutable: ∆A`κV ∆C ∗i SR. If we consider any of the residual states, ∆R ∈ SR, then the
semantics of the ∗i connector is such that
s, h |=∆C∗i∆R iff ∃h1, h2, h3 · h = h1⊥h2⊥h3 and
s, h1·h3 |= ∆C and s, h2·h3 |= ∆R
Similar to the entailment procedure introduced in Sec 2.4, the purpose of heap entailment is
to check that heap nodes in the antecedent ∆A are sufficiently precise to cover all nodes from
the consequent ∆C , and to compute the set of possible residual poststates SR. The entailment
succeeds when SR is non-empty, otherwise it is deemed to have failed. κ is the history of nodes
from the antecedent that have been used to match nodes from the consequent, V is the list of
existentially quantified variables from the consequent. κ and V are derived. The entailment
checking procedure is initially invoked with κ = emp and V = ∅.
4.5.1 Splitting the entailment
Our entailment proving is structured as follows:
• split the heap on the RHS according to the rules
[ENT−SPLIT−RHS1] and [ENT−SPLIT−RHS2] (Fig 4.2)
• split the heap on the LHS according to the rules
[ENT−SPLIT−LHS1] and [ENT−SPLIT−LHS2] (Fig 4.3)
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For convenience, we also provide a lifted variant of the entailment checking procedure,
which takes a set of prestates. The entailment succeeds in such a case if any of the prestates
gives rise to a successful entailment, that is if at least one of the Si is non-empty. This variant
of the entailment is useful when we break the entailment procedure according to the read and
write phases, where each individual phase could potentially give rise to a set of residual states.
In order for the entire entailment to succeed, we need it to only succeed for one of the phases.
∀i∈1. . .n·Φi`κV Φ ∗i Si
{Φ1, . . . ,Φn}`κV Φ ∗i ∪ni=1 Si
For the case of the [ENT−SPLIT−RHS1] rule in Fig 4.2, the splitting is performed when
encountering a phase split, #. At that point, the heap entailment is divided into sub-phases
corresponding to the read and write phases, respectively:
• First the read phase, κR, is entailed, obtaining a set of residual states, S. If the heap from
the read phase is co-joined through ∧, then the entailment will be further split according
to rule [ENT−SPLIT−RHS2] in Fig 4.2. To differentiate the entailment of the read phase,
we provide the entailment judgement Φ1|=RDRHSκV Φ2 ∗i SR (Fig 4.2).
• Secondly, the write phase is entailed with the help of the residual state from the previous
entailment. Take note that before entailing the write phase, κW , the read phase needs to
be dropped as it is no longer safe to use that information (the heap from the read phase
might have been mutated by a write in the write phase). The dropping of the read phase
is performed by the dropRP function, which is given below.






dropRPκ(κR # κW ) =df κW
• Lastly, the pure information from the RHS, pi2, is entailed, generating the final set of
residual states, S2.
For the rule [ENT−SPLIT−LHS1] in Fig 4.3, we take advantage of the proof search capability
of our system by trying to entail the heap κ from the RHS using both the read phase, κR, and
write phase, κW , from the LHS. The entailment succeeds if either the read or the write phase
on the LHS gives rise to a successful entailment, that is if at least one of the residual states S1
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[ENT−SPLIT−RHS1]
κ1∧pi1|=RDRHSκV κR ∗i S
dropRP (S)`κV κW ∗i S1
S1`κV pi2 ∗i S2
κ1∧pi1`κV (κR#κW∧pi2) ∗i S2
[ENT−SPLIT−RHS2]
κ1∧pi1`κV κR∗ ∗i S
S|=RDRHSκV κR ∗i S1
κ1∧pi1|=RDRHSκV (κR∗∧κR) ∗i S1
Figure 4.2: Splitting RHS
[ENT−SPLIT−LHS1]
κR|=RDLHSκV κ ∗i S1
κW`κV κ ∗i S2
κR#κW`κV κ ∗i (S1 ∪ S2)
[ENT−SPLIT−LHS2]
κR∗`κV κ ∗i S1
κR|=RDLHSκV κ ∗i S2
κR∗∧κR|=RDLHSκV κ ∗i (S1 ∪ S2)
Figure 4.3: Splitting LHS
and S2 is non-empty. When the LHS consists of only the read phase, rule [ENT−SPLIT−LHS2]
from Fig 4.3 applies. This rule continues splitting the antecedent whenever ∧ is encountered
in the heap formula on the LHS. The entailment succeeds if at least one of the sub-entailments
succeeds. We provide the entailment judgement Φ1|=RDLHSκV Φ2 ∗i SR (Fig 4.3).
4.5.2 Matching
During entailment, each pair of aliased nodes from the antecedent and consequent are matched
up, whenever they are proved identical. The formal rules for matching are given in [ENT−MATCH−MUT]
and [ENT−MATCH−IMM] in Fig 4.5. Rule [ENT−MATCH−MUT] applies whenever the node
to be matched on the RHS is mutable, while [ENT−MATCH−IMM] applies for immutable nodes
on the RHS. For the former rule, the matching node from the LHS is consumed. As the match-
ing process is incremental, we keep the successfully matched nodes from antecedent in κ for
better precision. Function XPuren soundly approximates the heap formula in the antecedent, and
it will be described in Sec 4.5.3.
In the case of the rule [ENT−MATCH−IMM], the matching node on the LHS is not con-
sumed. However, the node needs to be temporarily removed until the entire κ2 is entailed. This
is due to the fact that p2::c〈v∗2〉@I and κ2 must reside in disjoint heaps as they are co-joined by
the separating conjunction. Hence, we will extract the matching node from the heap formula
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SH(S, (p1::c〈v∗1〉@u, id)) =df ∀Φ ∈ S.SHΦ(Φ, (p1::c〈v∗1〉@u, id))
SHΦ(
∨
(∃v∗·κ∧pi)∗, (p1::c〈v∗1〉@u, id)) =df
∨
(∃v∗·SHκ(κ, (p1::c〈v∗1〉@u, id))∧pi)∗
SHκ(κX C κY , (p1::c〈v∗1〉@u, id)) =df SHκ(κX , (p1::c〈v∗1〉@u, id)) C
SHκ(κY , (p1::c〈v∗1〉@u, id)),
for X, Y ∈ {R,W} and C ∈ {#, ∗,∧}
SHκ(p2::c〈v∗2〉@u, (p1::c〈v∗1〉, id)) =df p2::c〈v∗2〉@u
SHκ([id1], (p1::c〈v∗1〉@u, id)) =df p1::c〈v∗1〉 if id=id1
SHκ([id1], (p1::c〈v∗1〉@u, id)) =df [id1] if id6=id1
Figure 4.4: Function SH
and replace it by a formula hole with a unique identifier ([id]). The matching node is substi-
tuted back into the formula at the end of the entailment of κ2 by function SH given in Fig 4.4.
This function iterates over the heap formula until reaching the holes. When hitting a hole, it
checks the hole identifier and, in the case of a match with the identifier received as argument, it
substitutes the corresponding heap predicate back into the formula.
Note that, at the point in the entailment procedure when the matching is reached, the heap
formulae in both the antecedent and consequent contain only heap predicates co-joined by ∗.
This is due to the fact that the entailment was already split according to the rules in Sec 4.5.1
such that ∧ and # were eliminated from the heap.
Another feature of the entailment procedure is exemplified by the transfer of the bindings
between free variables from the matched node in the consequent and the corresponding vari-
ables from the consequent to the antecedent (and subsequently to the residue). In general, when
a match occurs (rules [ENT−MATCH−MUT] and [ENT−MATCH−IMM]) and an argument of the
heap predicate coming from the consequent is free, the entailment procedure binds the argument
to the corresponding variable from the antecedent and moves the equality to the antecedent. In
our system, free variables in consequent are variables from method preconditions. These bind-
ings play the role of parameter instantiations during forward reasoning, and can be accumulated






V−{v∗2} ρ(κ2∧pi2) ∗i S u<:M
p1::c〈v∗1〉@u∗κ1∧pi1`κV (p2::c〈v∗2〉@M∗κ2∧pi2) ∗i S
[ENT−MATCH−IMM]
XPuren(p1::c〈v∗1〉@u∗κ1∗pi1)=⇒p1=p2 ρ=[v∗1/v∗2]
[id]∗κ1∧pi1∧freeEqn(ρ, V )`κV−{v∗2}ρ(κ2∧pi2) ∗i S u<:I
p1::c〈v∗1〉@u∗κ1∧pi1`κV (p2::c〈v∗2〉@I∗κ2∧pi2) ∗i SH(S, (p1::c〈v∗1〉, id))
Figure 4.5: Heap Entailment Rules
into the antecedent to allow the subsequent program state (from residual heap) to be aware of
their instantiated values. This process is formalized by the function freeEqn below, where V is
the set of existentially quantified variables:
freeEqn([ui/vi]ni=1, V ) =df
let pii = (if vi∈V then true else vi=ui) in
∧n
i=1 pii
4.5.3 Heap Approximation by a pure formula
As explained in Sec 2.4, in our entailment proof, the entailment between separation formulae
is reduced to entailment between pure formulae by successively removing heap nodes from the
consequent until only a pure formula remains. When the consequent is pure, the heap formula in
the antecedent is approximated by function XPuren. In the current section, we enhance the defi-





(∃v∗·pi)∗ represents a pure formula approximating Φ and S denotes the set of disjoint
memory sets in Φ. Each disjoint memory set contains non-aliased symbolic memory addresses.
The definition of XPuren(Φ) is given in Fig 4.6. The function IsData(c) returns true if c is a
data node, while IsPred(c) returns true if c is a heap predicate. ∪disj and ∩disj are used for
computing the set of disjoint memory sets and are defined as follows:
S1 ∪disj S2 = {X ∪ Y | X ∈ S1 ∧ Y ∈ S2}
S1 ∩disj S2 = {X ∩ Y | X ∈ S1 ∧ Y ∈ S2}
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We illustrate how the approximation functions work by computing
XPure0(x::ll〈n〉@I∗y::ll〈m〉@I#z::ll〈v〉 ∧ n≥0 ∧m≥0 ∧ v≥0)
Note that, according to the definition provided for the ll〈n〉 predicate, the pure invariant pro-
vided is n≥0.
ll〈n〉 ≡ root=null ∧ n=0
∨ root::node〈 , q〉 ∗ q::ll〈n−1〉
inv n≥0;
XPure0(x::ll〈n〉@I) = (Inv0(x::ll〈n〉@I), {{x}}) =
= (n≥0, {{x}}) given that n≥0
XPure0(y::ll〈m〉@I) = (Inv0(y::ll〈m〉@I), {{y}}) =
= (m≥0, {{y}}) given that m≥0
XPure0(z::ll〈v〉) = (Inv0(z::ll〈v〉), {{z}}) =
= (v≥0, {{z}}) given that v≥0
XPure0(x::ll〈n〉@I∗y::ll〈m〉@I) =
= (n≥0 ∧ m≥0, {{x}} ∪disj {{y}}) =
= (n≥0 ∧ m≥0, {{x, y}})
XPure0(x::ll〈n〉@I∗y::ll〈m〉@I#z::ll〈v〉) =
= (n≥0 ∧ m≥0 ∧ v≥0, {{x, y}} ∪ {{z}}) =
= (n≥0 ∧ m≥0 ∧ v≥0, {{x, y}, {z}})
4.6 Forward Verification
As most of the forward verification rules are the same as those given in Sec 2.3, in Fig 4.7 we
only provide new ones for method verification, method call, field read and field update. These
rules exploit the modified form of the entailment procedure defined in Sec 4.5 for allowing
sharing of immutable heap.
Verification of a method starts with each precondition, and proves that the corresponding
postcondition is guaranteed at the end of the method. The verification is formalized in the rule
[FV−METH−IMM]. As opposed to the [FV−METH] rule in Sec 2.3, now we make use of the
modified form of the entailment procedure through (∃W·Si1)`Φipo ∗i Si2.
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(c〈v∗〉 ≡ Φ inv pi) ∈ P
Inv0(p::c〈v∗〉@u) =df [p/root, 0/null]pi
(c〈v∗〉 ≡ Φ inv pi) ∈ P n≥1
XPuren−1(Φ) = (pin−1, Sn−1)
Invn(p::c〈v∗〉@u) =df [p/root, 0/null]pin−1
XPuren(κi) = (pi′i, S)
XPuren(
∨
i(∃v∗i ·κi∧pii)∗) =df (
∨
i(∃v∗i ·pi′i∧[0/null]pii)∗,∩disjiSi)
XPuren(emp) =df (true, ∅)
XPuren(κ1) = (pi1, S1) XPuren(κ2) = (pi2, S2)
XPuren(κ1 ∧ κ2) =df (pi1∧pi2, S1 ∪ S2)
XPuren(κ1) = (pi1, S1) XPuren(κ2) = (pi2, S2)
XPuren(κ1#κ2) =df (pi1∧pi2, S1 ∪ S2)
XPuren(κ1) = (pi1, S1) XPuren(κ2) = (pi2, S2)
XPuren(κ1 ∗ κ2) =df (pi1∧pi2, S1 ∪disj S2)
IsData(c) fresh i















Figure 4.6: XPure : Translating to Pure Form
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[FV−METH−IMM]
V={vm..vn} W=prime(V )
∀i = 1, .., p · ( ` {Φipr∧nochange(V )} e {Si1}
(∃W·Si1)`Φipo ∗i Si2 Si2 6={})
` t0 mn((ref tj vj)m−1j=1 , (tj vj)nj=m) {requires Φipr ensures Φipo}pi=1 {e}
• function prime(V) returns {v′ | v ∈ V }.
• predicate nochange(V) returns ∧v∈V (v = v′). If V = {}, nochange(V)=true.
• ∃W · S returns {∃W · Si|Si ∈ S}.
At a method call, each of the method’s precondition is checked, ∆`ρΦipr ∗i Si, where ρ
represents a substitution of vj by v′j , for all j = 1, .., n. The combination of the residue Si
and the postcondition is added to the poststate (this addition might cause phase nesting). If a
precondition is not entailed by the program state ∆, the corresponding residue is not added to
the set of states. The test S6={} ensures that at least one precondition is satisfied.
[FV−CALL−IMM]
t0 mn((ref tj vj)m−1j=1 , (tj vj)
n
j=m) {requires Φipr ensures Φipo}pi=1 {e} ∈ P
ρ=[v′j/vj ]
n





po ∗ Si S 6= {}
` {∆}m(v1..vn) {S}
Whenever there is a field access (read or update), the current state, ∆, must contain the
node to be dereferenced, v′::c〈v1, .., vn〉. For [FV−FIELD−READ], it is sufficient for the en-
tailed node to be immutable as it will only be read. For [FV−FIELD−UPDATE], the node needs
to be mutable, as it will be updated. As shown in the matching rules from Sec 4.5.2, for the
case of the immutable node v′::c〈v1, .., vn〉@I , the matching of the immutable node on the RHS
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[FV−FIELD−READ]
∆`κV v′::c〈v1, .., vn〉@I ∗i S1 fresh v1..vn S1 6=∅
S2 = ∃v1..vn·(S1∧res=vi)
` {∆} v.fi {S2}
[FV−FIELD−UPDATE]
∆`κV v′::c〈v1, .., vn〉@M ∗S1 fresh v1..vn S1 6=∅
S2 = ∃v1..vn·(S1 ∗ [v′0/vi]v′::c〈v1, .., vn〉)
` {∆} v.fi:=v0 {S2}
Figure 4.7: Forward Verification Rules
with a corresponding node from the LHS will not consume the node from the LHS. Hence, for
[FV−FIELD−READ] there is no need to add back the node at the end of the entailment. However,
when entailing the mutable node v′::c〈v1, .., vn〉 in the rule [FV−FIELD−UPDATE], the corre-
sponding node on the LHS will be consumed and needs to be added back at the end of the entail-
ment. Moreover, in the entailment ∆`κV v′::c〈v1, .., vn〉@I ∗i S1 from rule [FV−FIELD−READ],
as the matching node on the LHS is not consumed, there might be heap sharing between the
RHS and the residual states. Hence, we use the modified entailment procedure Φ1`κV Φ2 ∗i SR
introduced in Sec 4.5.
Note that we use the primed notation for denoting the latest value of a variable. Correspond-
ingly, [v′0/vi] is a substitution that replaces the value vi with the latest value of v′0.
4.7 Soundness
In this section we present the soundness properties for both the forward verifier and the entail-
ment prover. The storage model, semantic model and dynamic semantics are similar to those
given in Sec 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7, respectively, with extensions for immutability annotations.
4.7.1 Storage Model
We define our storage model by making use of a domain of heaps, which is equipped with a
partial operator for gluing together disjoint heaps. h0 · h1 takes the union of partial functions
when h0 and h1 have disjoint domains of definition, and is undefined when h0(l) and h1(l) are
both defined for at least one location l ∈ Loc.
4.7. SOUNDNESS 77
To define the model we assume sets Loc of locations (positive integer values), Val of prim-
itive values, with 0 ∈ Val denoting null, Var of variables (program and logical variables), and
ObjVal of object values stored in the heap, with c[f1 7→ν1, .., fn 7→νn] denoting an object value of
data type c where ν1, .., νn are current values of the corresponding fields f1, .., fn. Each object
value has attached an immutability annotation from {I,M}. I means that the corresponding
object value cannot be modified, while M allows its mutation.
h ∈ Heaps =df Loc ⇀fin ObjVal x {I,M}
s ∈ Stacks =df Var→ Val∪Loc
4.7.2 Semantic Model of the Specification Formula
Let s, h |= Φ denote the model relation, i.e. the stack s and heap h satisfy the constraint Φ.
Function dom(f) returns the domain of function f . We use 7→ to denote mappings, not the
points-to assertion in separation logic, which has been replaced by p::c〈v∗〉@u, u∈{I,M} in
our notation, as mentioned in Sec 4.3. The model relation for separation heap formulae is given
in Def 4.7.1. The model relation for pure formula s |= pi denotes that the formula pi evaluates
to true in s. The addImm function in Fig 4.8 propagates the immutability annotation u inside
the heap formula Φ.
4.7.3 Dynamic Semantics
This section presents a small-step operational semantics for our language. The rules are given
in Fig. 4.9. The machine configuration is represented by 〈s, h, e〉, where s denotes the current
stack, h denotes the current heap, and e denotes the current program code. Note that the opera-
tional semantics must consider the mutability assertions recorded in the heap h. Each reduction
step is formalized as a transition of the form: 〈s, h, e〉↪→〈s1, h1, e1〉. We have introduced an
intermediate construct ret(v∗, e) to model the outcome of call invocation, where e denotes the
residual code of the call. It is also used to handle local blocks.
Similar to Sec 2.7, we use k to denote a constant, ⊥ to denote an undefined value, and ()
to denote the empty expression (program). The operation [v 7→ν]+s “pops in” the variable v to
s with the value ν, such that ([v 7→ν]+s)(v) = ν. The operation s−{v∗} “pops out” variables
v∗ from the stack s. The operation s[v 7→ν] changes the value of the most recent v in stack s
to ν. The mapping h[ι 7→ur] is the same as h except that it maps ι to r, with u as the attached
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Definition 4.7.1 (Model for Specification Formula).
s, h |=Φ1∨Φ2 iff s, h |= Φ1 or s, h |= Φ2
s, h |=∃v1..n·κ∧pi iff ∃ν1..n·s[v1 7→ν1, .., vn 7→νn], h |= κ and
s[v1 7→ν1, .., vn 7→νn] |=pi
s, h |=κ1∗κ2 iff ∃h1, h2 · h1⊥h2 and h = h1·h2 and
s, h1 |= κ1 and s, h2 |= κ2
s, h |=κ1#κ2 iff ∃h1, h2, h3 · h1⊥h2⊥h3 and h = h1·h2·h3 and
s, h1·h3 |= κ1 and s, h2·h3 |= κ2
s, h |=κ1∧κ2 iff ∃h1, h2, h3 · h1⊥h2⊥h3 and h = h1·h2·h3 and
s, h1·h3 |= κ1 and s, h2·h3 |= κ2
s, h |=emp iff dom(h) = ∅
s, h |=p::c〈v1..n〉@u iff data c {t1 f1, .., tn fn}∈P, h=[s(p)7→wr],
and r=c[f1 7→s(v1), .., fn 7→s(vn)]
and u<:w
or (c〈v1..n〉≡Φ inv pi)∈P and
s, h |= [p/root](addImm(Φ, u))
immutability annotation, u∈{I,M}. If no immutability annotation is present, then the map-
ping h[ι 7→r] maintains the previous immutability annotation. The mapping h+[ι 7→ur] extends
the domain of h with ι and maps ι to r with the immutability annotation u. The operation
h(l)[vn 7→tn] updates the field vn of the object stored at location l in the heap h with the value
tn. We also make use of the function type(v) to get the run-time type of the variable v.
In order to relate the logic with the storage model, we introduce an auxiliary construct,
assert Φ, which checks whether the model relation s, h |=Φ holds. The forward verification
rule for this intermediate construct is given below.
[FV−ASSERT]
∆`κV Φ1 ∗i S1 S1 6=∅
` {∆} assert Φ1 {∆}
The connection between the immutability information from the specification and the storage
4.7. SOUNDNESS 79





addImmκ(κX C κY , u) =df addImmκ(κX , u) C addImmκ(κY , u),
for X, Y ∈ {R,W} and C ∈ {#, ∗,∧}
addImmκ(p2::c〈v1, .., vn〉@u1, u) =df p2::c〈v1, .., vn〉@u
Figure 4.8: Function addImm
model is established at the beginning and end of each method execution, when the assert
construct is used to check that the stack s and the heap h model the method’s precondition and
postcondition, respectively. Note that in the rule for new c(v∗) we assume that the object newly
created is immutable, and, whenever a field update takes place, the immutability annotation is
updated to @M (in the rule for field update v1.fi := v2 in Fig 4.9).
4.7.4 Soundness of Verification
The soundness of our verification rules is defined with respect to the small-step operational
semantics. We need to extract the post-state of a heap constraint by function Post(∆) defined
in Def 2.7.1.
Theorem 4.7.1 (Preservation). If
` {∆} e {S2} S2 6={} s, h |= Post(∆) 〈s, h, e〉↪→〈s1, h1, e1〉
Then there exists S1 6={}, such that ∀∆1 ∈ S1· s1, h1 |= Post(∆1) and ` {∆1} e1 {S3} S3⊆S2.
Proof: By structural induction on e. Details can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 4.7.2 (Progress). If
` {∆} e {S1} S1 6={} s, h |= Post(∆)
then either e is a value, or there exist s1, h1, and e1, such that 〈s, h, e〉↪→〈s1, h1, e1〉.
Proof: By structural induction on e. Details can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 4.7.3 (Safety). Consider a closed term e without free variables in which all methods
have been successfully verified. Assuming unlimited stack/heap spaces and that ` {true} e {∆},
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〈s, h, v〉↪→〈s, h, s(v)〉 〈s, h, k〉↪→〈s, h, k〉 〈s, h, v.f〉↪→〈s, h, h(s(v))(f)〉
〈s, h, v:=k〉↪→〈s[v 7→k], h, ()〉 〈s, h, (); e〉↪→〈s, h, e〉
〈s, h, e1〉↪→〈s1, h1, e3〉
〈s, h, e1; e2〉↪→〈s1, h1, e3; e2〉
〈s, h, e〉↪→〈s1, h1, e1〉
〈s, h, v:=e〉↪→〈s1, h1, v:=e1〉
s(v)=true
〈s, h, if v then e1 else e2〉↪→〈s, h, e1〉
s(v)=false
〈s, h, if v then e1 else e2〉↪→〈s, h, e2〉
〈s, h, {t v; e}〉↪→〈[v 7→⊥]+s, h, ret(v, e)〉
〈s, h, ret(v∗, k)〉↪→〈s−{v∗}, h, k〉
〈s, h, e〉↪→〈s1, h1, e1〉
〈s, h, ret(v∗, e)〉↪→〈s1, h1, ret(v∗, e1)〉
type(v1) = c〈w1, .., wn〉
r=h(s(v1))[f 7→s(v2)] h1=h[s(v1)7→Mr]
〈s, h, v1.fi := v2〉↪→〈s, h1, ()〉
s, h |=Φ
〈s, h, assert Φ〉↪→〈s, h, ()〉
s, h |=iΦ
〈s, h, assertimm Φ〉↪→〈s, h, ()〉
data c {t1 f1, .., tn fn}∈P ι/∈dom(h) r=c[f1 7→s(v1), .., fn 7→s(vn)]
〈s, h, new c(v∗)〉↪→〈s, h+[ι 7→I r], ι〉
t0 mn((ref tj wj)m−1j=1 , (tj wj)
n
j=m) {requires Φipr ensures Φipo}pi=1 {e}
s1=[wj 7→s(vj)]nj=m+s 〈s1, h, (assert Φipr)pi=1〉↪→〈s1, h, ()〉
〈s1, h, ret({wj}nj=m, [vj/wj ]m−1j=1 e; (assert Φipo)pi=1)〉↪→〈s, h1, e1〉
〈s, h,mn(v∗)〉↪→〈s, h1, e1〉
Figure 4.9: Small-Step Operational Semantics
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then either 〈[], [], e〉↪→∗〈[], h, v〉 terminates with a value v that is subsumed by the postcondition
∆, or it diverges 〈[], [], e〉6↪→∗.
Theorem 4.7.4 (Soundness of Entailment). If entailment check ∆1`∆2 ∗i S succeeds, we have:
for all s, h, and ∆ ∈ S , if s, h |= ∆1 then s, h |= ∆2 ∗i ∆.
Proof: Details can be found in the Appendix.
4.8 Experimental Evaluation
We have built a prototype system using Objective Caml. The proof obligations generated by
our verification are discharged using a number of off-the-shelf constraint solvers (like Omega
Calculator [105]) or theorem provers (like Isabelle [95] and Mona [64]).
Preliminary experiments were conducted by testing our system on a suite of examples sum-
marized in Figure 4.10. The examples can handle data structures with sophisticated shape and
size properties, such as sorted lists, and balanced trees, in a uniform way. Method sum is the
one described in Sec 4.3.1. Methods insert and delete refer to the insertion and deletion of
a value into/from the corresponding data structure, respectively. Moreover, we verify a suite of
sorting algorithms, which receive as input an unsorted singly-linked list and return a sorted list.
The benchmarks under the category Big Naturals consider the representation of a big natu-
ral as a list, with each node containing a decimal digit. The order of recording the digits is such
that the head of the list contains the least significant digit. We make use of the following heap
predicate for describing the singly-linked list containing the big natural number:
root::bignat〈v〉 ≡ root=null ∧ v=0
∨ root::node〈p, q〉 ∗ q::bignat〈v1〉 ∧ 0≤p≤9
∧v=10∗v1+p ∧ v>0
inv v≥0;
The definition asserts that a big natural is either an empty list denoting the value 0 (the base case
root=null∧v=0), or it consists of a head data node (root::node〈p, q〉) and a separate tail data
structure which is also a big natural (q::bignat〈v1〉). For the latter case, the value of the big
natural is computed as v=10∗v1+p. To ensure uniqueness in representing the value 0, this pred-
icate also adds the constraint v>0 for non-null representations of big natural numbers. Using
this definition, the methods under the Big Naturals category compute the addition, subtraction
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Program LOC Timings Heap Immutability Heap Aliasing scenarios
codes [secs] sharing degree [%] reduction [%] reduction[%]
Data Nodes (verifies data node value)
sum 1 0.04 X 100 50 50
Big Naturals (verifies bignat value)
addition 29 0.74 X 62 38 40
subtraction 24 0.76 X 62 38 40
multiplication 23 0.97 X 71 36 25
compare 20 0.66 X 100 50 50
karatsuba mult 64 3.82 X 60 60 33
Linked List (verifies shape + length)
length 6 0.05 χ 100 50 0
append 8 0.08 X 66 40 50
List Segment (verifies shape + length)
append 8 0.06 X 50 33 50
Sorted List (verifies shape + bounds + sortedness)
insert 17 0.26 χ 50 33 0
insertion sort 45 0.32 X 57 36 25
selection sort 52 0.37 χ 57 36 0
bubble sort 42 0.45 χ 40 29 0
merge sort 105 0.51 X 77 35 20
quick sort 85 0.68 X 50 33 20
AVL Tree (verifies shape + height + balance factor)
insert 169 5.63 χ 44 30 0
delete 287 8.92 X 69 40 74
Perfect Tree (verifies shape + height + perfectness)
insert 89 0.34 χ 50 33 0
Binary Search Tree (verifies shape + min + max + sortedness)
insert 40 0.45 χ 50 33 0
delete 62 0.49 χ 50 33 0
Priority Queue (verifies shape + size + height + max-heap)
insert 54 0.89 χ 50 33 0
delete max 140 2.73 X 38 28 25
Red-Black Tree (verifies shape + size + black-height)
insert 167 2.65 X 75 42 75
delete 430 15.16 X 70 42 93
Figure 4.10: Experimental Results
and multiplication of two big naturals in the corresponding methods, respectively. Under the
same category, method compare takes as input two big naturals and returns 0 if they are equal,
1 if the first one in bigger, and −1 if the first one is smaller. Lastly, method karatsuba mult
uses the fast multiplication Karatsuba algorithm for multiplying two big naturals.
The second column of Figure 4.10 contains the number of lines of code, followed by the
timings in the third column. The fourth column records whether or not the specification contains
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heap sharing, meaning if there are any usage of ∧ in the heap description. We mark the presence
of heap sharing byX, and the absence by χ. The fifth column contains the immutability degree
of a specification, denoting the percentage of immutable heap predicates out of the total number
of heap predicates in the specification. The sixth and seventh columns record the reduction
in the size of the specification when using the immutability enhancements proposed by the
current work. The sixth column represents the heap reduction, which is due to the fact that
the heap predicates marked as immutable in the precondition are guaranteed to be preserved
by the corresponding method, and do not have to be mentioned in the postcondition. The last
column registers the reduction in the number of aliasing scenarios that have to be recorded by the
specification. This happens when several aliasing scenarios are unified through the use of ∧ in
the heap description. In order to compute the timings, immutability degree, heap reduction and
aliasing scenarios reduction for each benchmark, we took into consideration all the functions
that are being called.
For illustration, let us consider the results recorded for the method sum under Data Nodes.
The specification, which is given below, employs heap sharing due to the presence of ∧ in the
precondition. The immutability degree is 100% (all the heap predicates in the specification are
immutable), the reduction of heap predicates is 50% (the two immutable heap predicates from
the precondition do not have to be repeated in the postcondition) and the reduction of aliasing
scenarios is 50% (the scenario when x and y are aliases is unified with the scenario when they
are disjoint).
int sum(node x, node y)
requires x::node〈a, 〉@I∧y::node〈b, 〉@I
ensures res=a+b;
The results of our preliminary experiments recorded in Fig 4.10 can be interpreted as fol-
lows:
• The heap sharing and immutability degree (fourth and fifth columns, respectively) are
measures on the applicability of our enhancements. The potential heap sharing in a spec-
ification creates the opportunity to use ∧ in the heap description for unifying multiple
aliasing scenarios. Fig 4.10 shows that for 15 out of all 24 benchmarks, there is good po-
tential for heap sharing in the specification. Moreover, the immutability degree recorded
in the figure confirms the fact that, on average, from all the heap that a method accesses,
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62% can be symbolically analyzed for read-only. Hence, only less than half is marked
for mutation. The heap that is not being updated can be declared as immutable in the
associated specification. These results affirms the applicability of our approach.
• The heap and aliasing scenarios reduction (sixth and seventh columns, respectively) are
used to quantify the gains recorded by our current enhancements with respect to the con-
ciseness of the specification. The data shows that, on average, there is a 38% reduction
in the number of heap predicates, and a 28% reduction in the number of aliasing scenar-
ios. This heap and aliasing scenarios reduction shows an improvement in the specification
conciseness when using the immutability annotations proposed by the current work.
• The immutability degree together with the heap reduction (fifth and sixth columns, respec-
tively) are measures that relate to the improvement on the precision of the specifications,
as they denote the cases where cut-point preservations are possible.
When comparing the verification timings for the immutability-enhanced approach with those
for the base approach, we found them to be similar. The biggest differences were recorded in
the case of the insert method for red-black tree (1.2 secs in favor of the base approach), and of





Recent developments of the specification mechanisms have focused mostly on expressiveness
[8, 5, 17] (to support verification for more properties), abstraction [100, 97] (to support informa-
tion hiding in specification) and modularity [70, 21, 35] (to support more readable and reusable
specifications). To the best of our knowledge, there has been hardly any attempt on the de-
velopment of specification mechanisms that could support better verifiability (in terms of both
efficiency and effectiveness). Most efforts on better verifiability have been confined to the ver-
ification technology; an approach that may lead to less portability (as we become more reliant
on clever heuristics from the verification tools) and also more complex implementation for the
verification tools themselves. In this thesis, we shall propose a novel approach towards better
verifiability that focuses on new structures in the specification mechanism instead.
To illustrate the need for an enhanced specification mechanism, we will make use of sep-
aration logic, which allows for a precise description of heap-based data structures and their
properties. As an example, consider a data node node2 and a predicate describing an AVL tree
that captures the size property via s and the height via h:
data node2 { int val; int height; node2 right; node2 left; }
avl〈h, s〉 ≡ root=null ∧ h=0 ∧ s=0
∨ root::node2〈 , h, r, l〉 ∗ r::avl〈h1, s1〉∗l::avl〈h2, s2〉∧h = max(h1, h2)+1
∧ − 1≤h1−h2≤1∧s=s1+s2+1
inv h≥0∧s≥0;
The aforementioned definition asserts that an AVL tree is either empty (the base case root=null∧
h=0 ∧ s=0), or it consists of a data node (root::node2〈 , h, r, l〉) and two disjoint subtrees
(r::avl〈h1, s1〉∗l::avl〈h2, s2〉). Each node is used to store the actual data in the val field, and
the maximum height of the current subtree in the height field. The constraint −1≤h1−h2≤1
states that the tree is balanced, while s=s1+s2+1 and h=max(h1, h2)+1 compute the size and
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height of the tree pointed by root from the properties s1, s2 and h1, h2, respectively, that are
obtained from the two subtrees. The ∗ connector ensures that the head node and the right and
left subtrees reside in disjoint heaps. We also specify a default invariant, h≥0∧s≥0, that holds
for all AVL trees.
Next, we specify a method that attempts to retrieve the height information from the root
node of the data structure received as argument. In case the argument has the value null, the
method returns 0, as captured by res=0. To provide a suitable link between pre- and post-
conditions, we use the logical variables v, h, lt, lr that have to be instantiated for each call to
the method. As a first try, we capture both the null and non-null scenarios as a composite
formula consisting of a disjunction of the two cases, as shown below:
int get height(node2 x)
requires x=null ∨ x::node2〈v, h, lt, lr〉
ensures (x=null ∧ res=0) ∨ (x::node2〈v, h, lt, lr〉 ∧ res=h);
{if (x = null) then 0 else x.height}
This specification introduces disjunctions both in the pre and post-conditions, which would
make the verification process perform search over the disjuncts[92]. Basically, each disjunct
corresponds to an acceptable scenario of which at least one needs to be proven. However, there
are situations when the program state does not contain enough information to determine which
of the scenarios applies. For illustration, let us consider that we are interested in retrieving
the height information for an AVL tree pointed by x and the program state before the call to
the get height method is x::avl〈h1, s1〉. We have to verify that the current program state
obeys the method’s precondition. However, when verifying the null and non-null scenar-
ios separately, both checks fail as the program state x::avl〈h1, s1〉 does not contain sufficient
information to conclude neither that x 6=null, nor that x=null. We provide the two failing ver-
ification conditions below. As none of the following two entailments succeeds, the verification
of the method call fails.
x::avl〈h1, s1〉`(x=null)∗Φr1
x::avl〈h1, s1〉`(x::node2〈v, h, lt, lr〉)∗Φr2
As a second try, we write the specification in a modular fashion by separating the two scenar-
ios as advocated by past works ([70, 21] and Chapter 2). In [70], Leavens and Baker proposed
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for each specification to be decomposed into multiple specifications (where it is called case
analysis) to capture different scenarios of usage. Their goal was improving the readability of
specifications, as smaller and simpler specifications are easier to understand than larger ones.
In Chapter 2 multiple specifications were advocated to help achieve more scalable program
verification. By using multiple pre/post conditions, we obtain the following specification:
int get height(node2 x)
requires x=null
ensures res=0;
requires x::node2〈v, h, lt, rt〉
ensures x::node2〈v, h, lt, rt〉 ∧ res=h;
During the verification process, each scenario (denoted by a pre/post-condition pair) is
proven separately (Chapter 2). However, neither of the two entailments (for each of the two
scenarios) succeeds, causing the verification of the method call to fail.
A possible solution is to perform case analysis on variable x: first assume x=null, then
assume x 6=null, and try to prove both cases. For soundness, these cases must be disjoint
and exhaustively cover all scenarios. Accordingly, the following two provable entailments are
obtained, and the verification succeeds:
x::avl〈h1, s1〉∧x=null`(x=null)∗Φr1
x::avl〈h1, s1〉∧x6=null`(x::node2〈v, h, lt, lr〉)∗Φr2
However, case analysis is not always available in provers, as it might be tricky to decide on
the condition for a case split.
5.2 Chapter Overview
In the rest of the chapter we shall focus on the apparatus for writing and verifying (or checking)
structured specifications. Sec 5.3 provides examples to motivate the need for structured specifi-
cations, whereas Sec 5.4 formalizes the notion of structured specifications. Sec 5.5 introduces
the verification rules to generate Hoare triples, and Sec 5.6 presents the entailment proving for
structured specifications. Sec 5.8 presents our experimental results.
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5.3 Examples
In the current section we present two more examples that motivate our enhancements to the
specification mechanism.
5.3.1 Example 1
Consider a method that receives two AVL trees, t1 and t2, and merges them by recursively
inserting all the elements of t2 into t1. By using the case construct introduced in Sec 4.1 we
may write a case structured specification, which captures information about the resulting tree
size when t1 is not null, and about the resulting size and height, whenever t1 is null:
case{t1 = null → requires t2::avl〈s2, h2〉
ensures res::avl〈s2, h2〉;
t1 6=null → requires t2::avl〈s2, h2〉 ∗ t1::avl〈s1, 〉
ensures res::avl〈s1+s2, 〉};
However, let us note that there is a redundancy in this specification, namely the same pred-
icate t2::avl〈s2, h2〉 appears on both branches of the case construct. After the need for a case
construct which was already discussed in Sec 5.1, this is the second deficiency we shall address
in our specification mechanism, that is due to a lack of sharing in the logic formula which in
turn causes repeated proving of identical sub-formulae. To provide for better sharing of the
verification process, we propose to use staged formulae of the form (Φ1 then Φ2), to allow
sub-formula Φ1 to be proven prior to Φ2.
Though (Φ1 then Φ2) is semantically equivalent to (Φ1 ∗ Φ2), we stress that the main pur-
pose of adding this new structure is to support more effective verification with the help of spec-
ifications with less redundancy. By itself, it is not meant to improve the expressivity of our
specification, but rather its effectiveness. Nevertheless, when it is used in combination with the
case construct, it could support case analysis of logical variables to ensure successful verifica-
tion. The same structuring mechanisms can be used by formulae in both predicate definitions
and pre/post specifications.
Getting back to the AVL merging example, the redundancy in the specification can be fac-
tored out by using a staged formulae, as follows:
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requires t2::avl〈s2, h2〉 then
case{t1 = null → ensures res::avl〈s2, h2〉;
t1 6=null → requires t1::avl〈s1, 〉
ensures res::avl〈s1+s2, 〉};
During the verification process, when reaching a call to the AVL merging method, the cur-
rent program state must entail the method’s precondition. Since the entailment process needs
to explore both branches of the specification, the t2::avl〈s2, h2〉 node will be proven twice for
each method call. By using staged formulae, the second specification will force the common
formula to be proved only once. Although the two specifications capture the same informa-
tion, the second version requires much less proving effort. For this example, there was a 40%
reduction in verification time by our system, due solely to the presence of staged formulae.
For the general case, if x denotes the number of heap nodes/predicates that are shared in
the consequent formula, and y the number of possible matchings from the antecedent, then the
number of redundant matchings that are eliminated is (x − 1) ∗ y. An analogy can be made
between the use of the staged formula and the use of the binary decision diagram (BDD) as an
intermediate representation for SAT formulae to support better sharing of identical sub-formulae
[16]. Where applicable, we expect staged formulae to improve the effectiveness of verification.
5.3.2 Example 2
Parameter instantiation is needed primarily for connecting the logical variables between precon-
dition and postcondition of specifications. Traditionally, manual instantiation of ghost variables
has played this role. In this thesis, we propose two new mechanisms, early and late instantia-
tions, to support automatic instantiations of logical variables. As an example, consider a data
node cell and a predicate cellPred defined as follows:
data cell { int val}
cellPred〈i〉 ≡ root=null ∧ i≤3 ∨ root::cell〈 〉 ∧ i>3
To highlight the difference between early and late instantiations, we shall consider two sep-
arate proof obligations. The first one is given below.
p::cell〈 〉 ` (p::cellPred〈j〉∧j>2)∗Φr
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At this point, we first need to match a heap predicate p::cellPred〈j〉 on the RHS with a data
node p::cell〈 〉 on the LHS to obtain an instantiation for the variable j. A fundamental question
is whether the variable instantiation could occur for just the predicate p::cellPred〈j〉 (we refer
to this as early instantiation), or it has to be for the entire formula p::cellPred〈j〉 ∧ j>2
(known as late instantiation). By default, our system uses early (or implicit) instantiation for
variables that are not explicitly declared. In this scenario, early instantiation j>3 is obtained
when folding with the predicate p::cellPred〈j〉. This instantiation is transferred to the LHS.
Consequently, we obtain a successful proof below.
j>3 ` (j>2)∗Φr
Now, let us consider a second proof obligation that will require late instantiation:
p=null ` (p::cellPred〈j〉∧j>2)∗Φr
Similar to the previous case, we will first use a default early instantiation mechanism. After
matching p::cellPred〈j〉, we obtain the instantiation j≤3. However, moving only this binding
to the LHS is not enough, causing the proof below to fail.
p=null ∧ j≤3 ` (j>2)∗Φr
To support late instantiation for variable j, we declare it explicitly using [j] below:
p=null ` ([j] p::cellPred〈j〉∧j>2)∗Φr
This time variable j is kept on the RHS until the end of the entailment. As its proof below
succeeds, the instantiation for j will be captured in the residue as Φr=j≤3∧j>2.
p=null ` (∃j.j≤3∧j>2)∗Φr
Though late instantiation is more general, it may require existential quantifications over a larger
formula. Hence, by default, we prefer to use early instantiation where possible, and leave it to
the user to manually declare where late instantiation is mandated.
5.4 Specification and Programming Language
We shall now focus on the structured specifications mechanism. Fig 5.1 provides a syntactic
description where Z denotes structured (pre/post) specifications, while Q denotes structured
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Shape pred. spred ::= c〈v∗〉 ≡ Q inv pi
Pre/Post. Z ::= ∃v∗1·Y1 . . . ∃v∗n·Yn multiple specs
Y ::= case{pi1⇒Z1; . . . ; pin⇒Zn} case construct
| requires [w∗] Φ [then] Z staged spec
| ensures Q post
Formula Q ::=
∨ ∃v∗·R multiple disjuncts
R ::= case{pi1⇒Q1; . . . ; pin⇒Qn} case construct
| [w∗] Φ [then Q] staged formula
Figure 5.1: Structured Specifications
formulae that may be used for pre/post specifications, as well as for predicate definitions. Apart
from multiple specifications, our new syntax includes case constructs and staged formulae. Take
note that the syntax for the rest of the formulae, namely the pure formula pi, the heap formula κ,
and the formula Φ remain the same as those given in Fig 2.2.
For structured specification, the requires keyword introduces a part of precondition through
a staged specification. The postcondition is captured after each ensures keyword, which must
appear as a terminating branch for the tree-like specification format. We support late instantia-
tion via variables w∗, from requires [w∗] Φ Z and [w∗] Φ [then Q] at the end of proving Φ.
To minimise user annotations, our system automatically determines the other unbound variables
(different from those to be late instantiated) as either existential or to be early instantiated.
Our construct to support case analysis is case{pi1⇒Z1; . . . ; pin⇒Zn} for specification,
and case{pi1⇒Q1; . . . ; pin⇒Qn} for formula. We impose the following three conditions on
pi1, . . . , pin:
(i) are restricted to only pure constraints, without any heap formula.
(ii) are exclusive, meaning that ∀i, j · i6=j → pii∧pij=false.
(iii) are exhaustive, meaning that pi1∨ . . .∨pin=true.
Condition (i) is imposed since pure formula can be freely duplicated. Condition (ii) is
imposed to avoid conjunction over the heap-based formula. If absent, each heap state may have
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to satisfy multiple case branches. Condition (iii) is needed for soundness of case analysis which
requires all scenarios to be considered. To illustrate, consider:
[(w : t)∗] Φ case{x=null⇒Q1; x 6=null⇒Q2}
The first condition holds as the two guards, x=null and x 6=null, are pure. Furthermore, our
system checks successfully that the guards are exclusive ((x=null∧x 6=null)=false) and
exhaustive ((x=null ∨ x 6=null) = true).
5.5 Forward Verification
The main goal of structured specification is to support a modular verification process that could
be carried out efficiently and precisely. In this section, we propose a set of rules to help generate
Hoare-style triples for code verification, together with entailment checking to support proof
obligations over the structured formulae domain.
To better support structured specifications and case analysis, we propose a new triple of the
form {|Φ|} e {|Z|}, with pre being an unstructured formula and Z being the structured specifica-
tion. We use structured specifications in the poststate because our case analysis is guided from
the post-states. In contrast, unstructured formulae are used in the prestate since the structured
form is unnecessary here. The semantic meaning of this new triple is defined as follows:
Definition 5.5.1. The validity of {|Φ|} e {|Z|} is defined inductively over the structure of Z. That
is:
if Z ≡ ensuresQ :
|= {|Φ|} e {|Z|} ⇐⇒ |= {Φ}e{Q};
if Z ≡ requiresΦ1 [then]Z1 :
|= {|Φ|} e {|Z|} ⇐⇒ |= {|Φ∗Φ1|} e {|Z1|};
if Z ≡ case{pi1⇒Z1; . . . ; pin⇒Zn} :
|={|Φ|} e {|Z|} ⇐⇒ ∀i∈{1, .., n}·|={|Φ∧pii|} e {|Zi|};
if Z ≡ (∃v∗1·Y1 . . . ∃v∗n·Yn) :
|= {|Φ|} e {|Z|} ⇐⇒ ∀i∈{1, .., n}· |= {|Φ|} e {|∃v∗i ·Yi|})2
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[FV−METH]
H=[(v:t)∗, (u:t)∗]
G = prime(H)+H + [res:t0]
G ` {|∧(v′=v)∗ ∧∧(u′=u)∗|} code {|Z|}




∀i ·G`{|Φ|} code {|ρYi|}
G`{|Φ|} code {|∃v∗1·Y1..∃v∗n·Yn|}
[FV−REQUIRES]
{w∗} ∩ Vars(G) = {}
G1 = G+ [(w : t)
∗]
G1 ` {|Φ1∗Φ2|} code {|Z|}
G`{|Φ1|} code {|requires [(w:t)∗] Φ2 Z|}
[FV−ENSURES]
V=PassByValue(G)
` {Φ} code {Φ2}
∃prime(V ) · Φ2 `emp{} Q∗S S 6={}
G`{|Φ|} code {|ensures Q|}
[FV−CASE]
∀i∈{1, .., n} ·G ` {|Φ ∧ pii|} code {|Zi|}
G`{|Φ|} code {|case{pi1⇒Z1;...; pin⇒Zn}|}
Figure 5.2: Building Verification Rules for Structured Specifications
Our main verification rules are given in Fig. 5.2. Note that G records a list of variables
(including res as result of the code) visible to the code verifier. Our specification formulae
use both primed and unprimed notations, where primed notations represent the latest values of
program variables, and unprimed notations denote either logical variables or initial values of
program variables.
The verification of method declarations is described by the [FV−METH] rule. It verifies
the method body code against the specification Z, as indicated by the rule. The function
prime({v1, .., vm}) returns the primed version {v′1, .., v′m}. The third line of the premise deals
with the verification taskG ` {|∧(v′=v)∗ ∧∧(u′=u)∗|} code {|Z|}, where the precondition in-
dicates that the latest values of program variables are the same as their initial values. The other
rules are syntax-directed and rely on the structure of the specification Z.
The rule [FV−MULTI−SPECS] deals with the case where the post-state is a multi-specification.
It verifies the code against each of the specifications. Note that the substitution ρ replaces vari-
ables v∗ with fresh variables nv∗. The rule [FV−REQUIRES] deals with the case where the
post-state starts with a requires clause. In this case, the formula in the requires clause
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is added to the pre-state (by separation conjunction) before verifying the code against the re-
maining part of the specification in the post-state. The variables for late instantiation (w∗) are
also attached to the end of the list G. The rule [FV−ENSURES] deals with the case where the
post-state starts with an ensures clause. It invokes our forward verification rules to derive the
strongest postcondition Φ2 for the normal Hoare triple {Φ}code{Φ2} and invokes the entail-
ment prover (described in the next section) to check that the derived post-state Φ2 subsumes
the given post-condition Q (The test S 6= {} signifies the success of this entailment proof).
Note that V denotes the set of pass-by-value parameters that are not modified by the procedure.
Hence, their values (denoted by primed variables) are ignored in the postcondition, even if the
program code may have updated these parameters. The last rule [FV−CASE] deals with the case
where the post-state is a case specification. It verifies in each case the specification Zi is met
when the guard pii is assumed in the pre-state.
To illustrate the generation of the verification tasks, consider the AVL merging given in
Section 5.3.1. By applying the rules from Figure 5.2, two Hoare triples are produced.
` {t2::avl〈s2, h2〉 ∧ t1=null} code {res::avl〈s2, h2〉}
` {t1::avl〈s1, 〉∗t2::avl〈s2, h2〉∧t1 6=null} code {res::avl〈s1+s2, 〉}
5.6 Entailment Checking
In the current section, we enhance the entailment proving procedure to handle structured for-
mulae in the consequent. More specifically, the entailment procedure for structured formulae
checks that, given formulae Φ1 and Q2, Φ1 entails Q2, that is if in all heaps satisfying Φ1, we
can find a subheap satisfying Q2.
Following from the entailment checking procedure introduced in Sec 2.4, besides determin-
ing if the entailment relation holds, the current entailment procedure also infers the residual
heap of the entailment, that is a formula ΦR such that Φ1 ` Q2 ∗ ΦR , and derives the predicate
parameters. The relation is formalized using a judgment of the form Φ1`κVQ2 ∗ΦR, which is a
shorthand for Φ1∗κ ` ∃V · (Q2∗κ)∗ΦR. Note that κ denotes the consumed heap, while V is a
set, {v∗, E:w∗}, containing the existential variables encountered, v∗, together with the variables
w∗ for late instantiation.
To support proof search, we have also generalised the entailment checking procedure to
return a set of residues SR: Φ1`κVQ2 ∗SR.This entailment succeeds when SR is non-empty,
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otherwise it is deemed to have failed. The multiple residual states captured in SR signify differ-
ent search outcomes during proving. The main rules are given in Figure 5.3. Take note that we
make use of a method mark(V,w∗) , which marks the variables to be late instantiated, w∗, by
removing them from the existential variables stored in V and adding them as E : w∗:
mark(V,w∗) = (V−{w∗})∪{(E : w)∗}
The rule [ENT−FORMULA] makes use of the aforementioned marking method in order to
mark the fact that variables w∗ are to be late instantiated, whereas rule [ENT−EXIST] adds the
existentially quantified variables v∗ to the set V .
[ENT−FORMULA]
Φ `κmark(V,w∗) (Φ1) ∗ S
Φ `κV [w∗] Φ1 ∗ S
[ENT−CASE]
∀i · Φ ∧ pii `κV Qi ∗ Si





Φ`κV (ensures Q) ∗ (Φ∗Φ1)
[ENT−STAGED−FORMULA]
Φ `κmark(V,w∗) (Φ1) ∗ S S `κV−{w∗} (Q) ∗ S2
Φ `κV ([w∗] Φ1 then Q) ∗ S2
[ENT−RHS−OR]







Φ `κV ∪{v∗} R ∗ S
Φ`κV ∃v∗·R ∗ S
Figure 5.3: Entailment for Structured Formula
In the rule for staged formula, [ENT−STAGED−FORMULA], the instantiation for the vari-
ables w∗ takes place in the first stage, Φ1. As instantiation moves the corresponding bindings
to the LHS (or antecedent of entailment), the variables w∗ must be removed from the set of
existentially quantified variables when entailing the rest of the formula, Q. At the end of the en-
tailment proving, the variables that were marked as late-instantiated are existentially quantified
in the residue state. The generalised entailment with a set of n formulae in the antecedent is an
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abbreviation of the n entailments, as illustrated below:
∀i∈{1, .., n} · Φi `κV (Q) ∗ Si
{Φ1, ..,Φn} `κV (Q) ∗
⋃n
i=1 Si
The rule [ENT−CASE] adds the pure term pii to the antecedent. This rule requires a lifted
disjunction operation defined as S1∨S2≡{Φ1∨Φ2|Φ1∈S1,Φ2∈S2} when applied to two sets of
states, S1, S2.
While a successful entailment of one disjunct suffices for the entailment of a disjunctive
formula, our entailment rule [ENT−RHS−OR] facilitates a proof search by trying to entail each
of the RHS disjuncts separately. Therefore, the residue state must contain the union of all
residues corresponding to the proof search from a set of entailments, ∀i · Φ `κV Ri ∗ Si.
Take note that, at each call site, the forward verification procedure ensures that the method’s
precondition is satisfied and assumes the method’s postcondition. This is achieved by entailing a
formula denoting a specification of the Z form. As the corresponding entailment rules are similar
to those for the entailment of a structured formula given in Figure 5.3, we omit them for brevity.
The only unusual rule is ENT−ENSURES that is needed when entailing the actual postcondition
ensures Q. In this case, the postcondition is added to the residual state in unstructured form,
immediately after the translation Q ;T Φ1 to unstructured form.
5.6.1 Instantiations
Our structured specification mechanism provides three types of instantiations for the logical
variables (of consequent) during the entailment proving process:
• no instantiation : this technique is used for existential variables and need only apply its
substitutions within the consequent itself.
• early (or implicit) instantiation : bindings of these variables, obtained from matching
or folding predicates, are immediately moved to the antecedent.
• late (or explicit) instantiation : bindings of these variables are kept in the consequent,
and moved to the antecedent at the end of scope of the logical variables.
If no instantiation is required, we only need to apply direct substitutions of the existential
variables during matching or folding of the predicate. This is the simplest mechanism and
should be used, where possible.
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Parameter instantiation is needed primarily for connecting the logical variables between the
precondition and the postcondition of a specification. In this section, we outline the specific
mechanisms needed to support both early and late instantiations. We highlight two main rules.
The first one occurs when matching a predicate in the antecedent with another predicate (with
the same root parameter, x) in the consequent, as follows:
[ENT−MATCH]
w∗ = late vars(V ) v∗ = V−w∗




V ρ(κ2∧pi2∧late eq) ∗S
x::p〈v∗1〉∗κ1∧pi1`κV (x::p〈v∗2〉∗κ2∧pi2) ∗S
We divide the parameter bindings via split into three categories:
(i) existential (denoted by v∗),
(ii) to be late instantiated (denoted by w∗),
(iii) to be early instantiated (all other variables of the consequent).
Early binding early eq is immediately moved to the antecedent, while the late binding late eq
is kept in the consequent. In contrast, the existential binding ρ is made into a substitution that is
directly applied to the consequent. Applying direct substitution into the consequent is simplest
since the existential variables are immediately eliminated, where possible, and there is no need
to separately identify instantiations to move to the antecedent. For late instantiation, we keep
the bindings for the logical variables in the consequent until the end of entailment, in order to
obtain a more precise binding, as illustrated by the rule below.
[ENT−EMP]
(XPure(κ1∗κ)∧pi1=⇒∃V·pi2) w∗ = late vars(V )
v∗ = V−w∗ I = (∃v∗·pi2)
κ1∧pi1`κV (emp∧pi2) ∗ {κ1∧(pi1∧I)}
This occurs when the consequent is completely pure and has only an emp heap state. We
construct an instantiation, named I, for the variables to be late instantiated, w∗, before it is
moved to the antecedent via the residue of entailment proving. Note that the function XPure will
translate a heap-based formula into an approximate heap-independent formula.
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5.7 Soundness
The storage model, semantic model and dynamic semantics are similar to those given in Sec 2.5,
2.6, and 2.7, respectively, with extensions for the new structured formulae. Let s, h |= Q in
Fig 5.4 denote the model relation, i.e. the stack s and heap h satisfy the constraint Q, with h, s
from the following concrete domains:
h ∈ Heaps =df Loc ⇀fin ObjVal
s ∈ Stacks =df Var→ Val∪Loc
The model relation for pure formula s |= pi denotes that the formula pi evaluates to true in s.
s, h |=Q iff Q=∨ni=1 ∃v∗·Ri and s, h |= ∨ni=1 ∃v∗·Ri
s, h |=∨ni=1 ∃vi1..im·Ri iff ∃k∈{1, .., n}·∃αk1..km·s[vk1 7→αk1, .., vkm 7→αkm], h |= Rk
s, h |=[wni=1]Φ then Q iff ∃h1, h2 · h1⊥h2 and h = h1·h2
and ∃α1..n·s[w1 7→α1, ..,wn 7→αn], h1 |= Φ and s, h2 |= Q
s, h |=case{(pii⇒Qi)ni=1} iff ∀k∈{1, .., n}·(s, h |= pik → s, h |= Qk)
s, h |=Φ1∨Φ2 iff s, h |= Φ1 or s, h |= Φ2
s, h |=∃v1..n·κ∧pi iff ∃α1..n·s[v1 7→α1, .., vn 7→αn], h |= κ
and s[v1 7→α1, .., vn 7→αn] |=pi
s, h |=κ1∗κ2 iff ∃h1, h2 · h1⊥h2 and h = h1·h2
and s, h1 |= κ1 and s, h2 |= κ2
s, h |=emp iff dom(h) = ∅
s, h |=p::c〈v1..n〉 iff exists a data type decl. data c {t1 f1, .., tn fn}
and h=[s(p) 7→r] and r=c[f1 7→s(v1), .., fn 7→s(vn)]
or exists a pred. def. (c〈v1..n〉≡Q inv pi)∈P and
s, h |= [p/root]Q
Figure 5.4: Model for Structured Formulae
For the case of a data node, v::c〈v∗〉, h has to be a singleton heap. On the other hand, a shape
predicate defined by c〈v1..n〉≡Q may be inductively defined.
With the semantics of the structured formulae in place, we can provide a translation from






[w∗] Φ1 then Q;T Φ1 ∗ Φ
∀i · Ri;T Φi∨ ∃v∗·Ri;T ∨ ∃v∗·Φi [w∗] Φ;T Φ
Figure 5.5: Translation from a structured formula to its equivalent unstructured formula
a structured formula to its equivalent unstructured formula. This translation is formalised with
Q ;T Φ, as shown in Fig 5.5.
We make use of the semantics for structured formulae Q and for unstructured formula Φ to
prove the correctness of the given translation rules.
Theorem 5.7.1 (Correctness of Translation). Given Q and Φ such that Q ;T Φ: for all s, h,
s, h |= Q if and only if s, h |= Φ.
Proof: By structural induction on Q.
Theorem 5.7.2 (Safety). Consider a closed term e without free variables in which all methods
have been successfully verified. Assuming unlimited stack/heap spaces and that ` {true} e {∆},
then either 〈[], [], e〉↪→∗〈[], h, v〉 terminates with a value v that is subsumed by the postcondition
∆, or it diverges 〈[], [], e〉6↪→∗.
Proof: It follows from the safety of our underlying verification system (i.e. the one without
structured specifications) [92], the definition 5.5.1, and the soundness of the entailment prover
enriched with structured formulae formulated by Theorem 5.7.3.
Theorem 5.7.3 (Soundness of Entailment). Given Φ, Q such that s, h |= Φ, if Φ `κV Q∗Φr for
some Φr, then s, h |= Q∗Φr. That is, for all program states in which Φ holds if Φ `κV Q∗Φr
then Q∗Φr holds.
Proof: By structural induction on Q.
5.8 Experimental Evaluation
We have built a prototype system using Objective Caml. The proof obligations generated by our
verification are discharged using some off-the-shelf constraint solvers (like Omega Calculator
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[105]) or theorem provers (like MONA [64]). The specification mechanism works with any
constraint domain, as long as a corresponding prover for the domain is available. The specific
domains that our verifier currently supports, includes linear (Omega Calculator, Z3, CVC-lite)
and non-linear arithmetic (Redlog), set (MONA, Isabelle bag tactic) and list properties (a Coq
tactic).
We have conducted preliminary experiments by testing our system on a suite of examples
summarized in Figure 5.6. These examples are small but can handle data structures with so-
phisticated shape and size properties such as sorted lists, balanced trees, etc., in a uniform way.
Methods “insert” and “delete” refer to the insertion and deletion of a value into/from the cor-
responding data structure, respectively. Method “delete first” deletes the node at the head in a
circular list. Moreover, we verify a suite of sorting algorithms, which receive as input an un-
sorted singly-linked list and return a sorted list. Verification time for each function includes the
time to verify all functions that it calls. We compare the timings obtained with and without case
analysis.
Take note that for each of the verified methods, in order to compare the results obtained
with and without case analysis, we provided specifications with the same level of modularity
through specifications with multiple pre/post. FAIL for the ”without case” means it did not
verify functional correctness (including memory safety). This is due the absence of case analysis
that would have been provided by the missing case spec.
Preliminary results indicate that case analysis improves both the completeness and the per-
formance of our system. From the completeness point of view, case analysis is important for
verifying a number of examples that would fail otherwise. For instance, the method imple-
menting the selection sort algorithm over a linked list fails when it is written with multiple
specification instead of the case construct. The same scenario is encountered for the method
inserting/deleting a node of red black tree, and for the method appending two list segments.
The case construct thus helps our system to verify more examples successfully. Regarding the
performance, the timings obtained when using case analysis are smaller, taking on average 21%
less computation time than those obtained without case analysis. The improvements are due to
earlier pruning of false contexts with the help of case constructs and optimizations of the case
entailment rule.
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Program Timings (in seconds) speed
Codes LOC with case without case gain (%)
Linked List verifies length
delete 20 0.65 0.89 26
append 14 0.30 0.39 23
List Segment verifies length
append 11 0.95 failed -
Circular Linked List verifies length + circularity
delete first 15 0.35 0.41 15
insert 10 0.28 0.35 20
Doubly Linked List verifies length + double links
insert 18 0.35 0.52 33
delete 29 0.94 1.27 26
Sorted List verifies bounds + sortedness
insert 17 0.71 0.96 26
delete 21 0.60 0.68 22
insertion sort 45 0.92 1.35 32
selection sort 52 1.24 failed -
bubble sort 42 1.95 2.92 43
merge sort 105 2.01 2.53 31
quick sort 85 1.82 2.47 26
AVL Tree verifies size + height + balanced
insert 169 32.27 39.48 19
delete 287 85.1 97.30 13
Perfect Tree verifies height + perfectness
insert 89 0.73 0.99 26
Red-Black Tree verifies size + black-height
insert 167 5.44 failed -
delete 430 22.43 failed -
Figure 5.6: Verification Times for Case Construct vs Multiple Pre/Post
We also investigated the performance gain that can be attributed to the use of staged formu-
lae. We observed that the timings improved on average by 20%. However, in some cases, such
as the AVL-merge example, we obtain a 38% speedup from 5.1 seconds to 3.2 seconds. Other
noteworthy examples include the AVL insertion (from 32.27s to 22.93s) and AVL deletion (from
85.1s to 81.6s).
We may conclude from our experiments that structured specifications together with case
analysis give better precision to our verification system while also improving its performance,
when compared to corresponding unstructured specifications.
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CHAPTER VI
STATIC AND DYNAMIC SPECIFICATIONS
6.1 Motivation
Object-based programs are hard to statically analyse mostly because of the need to track object
mutations in the presence of aliases. Object-oriented (OO) programs are even harder, as we have
to additionally deal with class inheritance and method overriding.
One major issue to consider when verifying OO programs is how to design specification for
a method that may be overridden by another method down the class hierarchy, such that it con-
forms to method subtyping. In addition, it is important to ensure that subtyping is observed for
object types in the class hierarchy, including any class invariant that may be imposed. From the
point of conformance to OO semantics, most analysis techniques uphold Liskov’s Substitutivity
Principle [80] on behavioral subtyping. Under this principle, an object of a subclass can always
be passed to a location where an object of its superclass is expected, as the object from each
subclass must subsume the entire set of behaviors from its superclass. To enforce behavioral
subtyping for OO programs, several past works [32, 5, 62] have advocated for class invariants
to be inherited by each subclass, and for pre/post specifications of the overriding methods of its
subclasses to satisfy a specification subsumption (or subtyping) relation with each overridden
method of its superclass.
In this chapter, for brevity reasons, in stead of the notation {requiresΦipr ensures Φipo}pi=1
denoting a method’s specification, we will we will use an infix notation {prei ∗→ posti}pi=1.
A basic specification subsumption mechanism was originally formulated as follows. Consider
a method B.mn in class B with (preB ∗→ postB) as its pre/post specification, and its overriding
method C.mn in subclass C, with a given pre/post specification (preC ∗→ postC). The speci-
fication (preC ∗→ postC) is said to be a subtype of (preB ∗→ postB) in support of method
overriding, if the following subsumption relation holds:
preB∧type(this)<:C =⇒ preC postC =⇒ postB
(preC ∗→ postC) <:C (preB ∗→ postB)
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The two conditions are to ensure contravariance of preconditions, and covariance on post-
conditions. They follow directly from the subtyping principle on methods’ specifications. As
the two specifications are from different classes, we add the subtype constraint type(this)<:C
to allow the above subsumption relation to be checked for the same C subclass. To reflect this,
we parameterize the subsumption operator <:C with a C-class as its suffix.
The main purpose of using specification subsumption is to support modular reasoning by
avoiding the need to re-verify the code of overriding method C.mn with the specification
(preB ∗→ postB) of its overridden method B.mn. In the case that specification subsumption
does not hold, an alternative way to achieve behavioral subtyping is to use the specification
inheritance technique of [32] to strengthen the specification of each overriding method with the
specification of its overridden method, as follows:
Consider a method B.mn in class B with (preB ∗→ postB) as its pre/post specification, and
its overriding method C.mn in subclass C, with pre/post specification (preC ∗→ postC). To
ensure specification subsumption, we can strengthen the specification of the overriding method




Specification inheritance requires the use of multiple specifications (or intersection type)
to provide for a more expressive mechanism to describe each method. By inheriting a new
specification for the overriding method, this technique uses code re-verification itself to ensure
that a behavioral subtyping property would be enforced. We can generalise a definition of the
subsumption relation between two multiple specifications, as follows:
Definition 6.1.1 (Multi-Specifications Subsumption). Given two multiple specifications,∧n
j=1 specBj (for class B) and
∧m
i=1 specCi (for subclass C), where each of specBj and
specCi is a pre/post annotation of the form pre ∗→ post. We say that they are in speci-
fication subsumption relation, (
∧m
i=1 specCi) <:C (
∧n
j=1 specBj), if the following holds :
∀j∈1..n ∃i∈1..m · specCi<:C specBj.
While modular reasoning can be supported by the above subsumption relations, the rea-
soning were originally formulated in the framework of Hoare logic. Recently, separation logic
has been proposed as an extension to Hoare logic, providing precise and concise reasoning for
pointer-based programs. A key principle followed in separation logic is the use of local reason-
ing to facilitate modular analysis/reasoning. An early work on applying separation logic to the
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OO paradigm was introduced by [100]. In that work, two key concepts were identified. Firstly,
an abstract predicate family pt(v1, .., vn) was used to capture some program states for objects
of class hierarchy with type t. Each abstract predicate has a visibility scope and is allowed to
have a different number of parameters, depending on the actual type of its root object. More-
over, each predicate family acts as an extensible predicate for which incremental specification
is given and verified for each class. Secondly, the concept of specification compatibility was
introduced to capture the subsumption relation soundly, as follows:
A specification preC ∗→ postC is said to be compatible with preB ∗→ postB under all
program contexts, if the following holds:
∀code · {preC}code{postC} =⇒ {preB}code{postB}
(preC ∗→ postC) <: (preB ∗→ postB)
Specification compatibility can be viewed as a more fundamental way to describe specifica-
tion subsumption in terms of Hoare logic triples. However, it cannot be directly implemented,
since its naive definition depends on exploring all possible program codes for compatibility. In
this thesis, we provide a practical alternative towards automated verification of OO programs
that can support better precision and avoid unnecessary code re-verification. We use key princi-
ples of separation logic to achieve this.
6.2 Chapter Overview
After introducing the specification language in Sec 6.3, we motivate our work through an exam-
ple in Sec 6.4. Our proposal is summarized by a few principles for OO verification in Sec 6.5,
and more details on the approach towards supporting method inheritance via an enhanced speci-
fication subsumption relation are provided in Sec 6.6. Sec 6.7 presents mechanisms for ensuring
that method overriding and method inheritance conform to the OO paradigm, whereas Sec 6.8
introduces techniques for deriving dynamic specifications from the static counterparts. Sec 6.9
describes the verification system, while its soundness is discussed in Sec 6.10.
6.3 Specification and Programming Language
We consider a core OO language consisting of a simple sequential language with just the basic
features from the OO paradigm. Some omitted features, such as exceptions, static fields and
static methods, can be handled in an orthogonal manner and do not cause any difficulty to our
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tdecl ::= classt | spred
classt ::= class c1 extends c2 inv κ∧pi { (t v)∗meth∗ }
meth ::= t mn ((t v)∗) [static sp1] [dynamic sp2] {e}
sp ::= {Φipr ∗→Φipo}pi=1
pi ::= γ∧φ∧β
β ::= v=c | v<:c
Figure 6.1: A Core Object-Oriented Language
verification system.
We provide our language in Figure 6.1, and assume that the constructs not covered in Fig 6.1
remain unchanged from the programming and specification languages given in Fig 2.1 and
Fig 2.2, respectively. This core language is the target of some preprocessing steps. A pro-
gram consists of a list of class and view declarations and an expression which corresponds to
the main method in many languages. We assume that the super class of each class is explicitly
declared, except for Object at the top of the class hierarchy. We also use this as a special
variable referring to the receiver object, and super to refer to a superclass’s method invocation.
For simplicity, we assume that variable names declared in each method are all distinct and use
the pass-by-value parameter mechanism.
6.4 Examples
The focus on specifications that support method overriding has a potential drawback that these
specifications are typically imprecise (or weaker) for methods of superclasses. Such specifi-
cations typically have stronger preconditions (which restrict their applicability) and/or weaker
postconditions (which lose precision). This drawback can cause imprecision for OO verifi-
cation which has in turn spurred practical lessons on tips and tricks for specification writers
[62]. Furthermore, mechanisms such as specification inheritance may have unnecessary code
re-verification, especially when specification subsumption holds.
Let us consider the specification of a simple up-counter class in Figure 1. This Cnt class is
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accompanied by three possible subclasses:
• FastCnt to support a faster tick operation,
• PosCnt which works only with positive numbers,
• TwoCnt which supports an extra backup counter.
Let us first design the specifications for instance methods of class Cnt without worrying
about method overriding. A possible set of pre/post specifications is given below where this
and res are variables denoting the receiver and result of each method.
void Cnt.tick() static this::Cnt〈n〉 ∗→ this::Cnt〈n+1〉
void Cnt.set(int x) static this::Cnt〈n〉 ∗→ this::Cnt〈x〉
int Cnt.get() static this::Cnt〈n〉 ∗→ this::Cnt〈n〉∧res=n
We refer to these as static specifications and precede them with the static keyword. They can
be very precise as they were considered statically on a per method basis without concern for
method overriding, and can be used whenever the actual type of the receiver is known. The
notation y::c〈v1, .., vn〉 denotes that variable y is pointing to an object with the actual type1 of
c-class and where each field y.fi is denoted by variable vi. For example, in this::Cnt〈n〉,
the field this.val is denoted by variable n. This format for objects is used primarily for static
specification. To describe an object type whose type is merely a subtype of the c-class, we shall
use a different notation, namely y::c〈v∗〉$, which implicitly captures an object extension with
extra fields from its subclass.
If we take into account the possible overriding of the tick method by its corresponding
method in the FastCnt subclass, we may have to weaken the postcondition of Cnt.tick.
Furthermore, to guarantee the invariant this.val≥0 of the PosCnt class, we may have to
strengthen the preconditions of methods Cnt.set, Cnt.tick and Cnt.get. These weakenings
result in the following dynamic specifications which are the usual ones being considered for
dynamically dispatched methods, where the type of the receiver is a subtype of its current class.
1To make our static specifications more reusable through inherited methods, we shall avoid the use of an explicit
constraint, like type(this)=c, on the actual type of the receiver.
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void set(int x) {this.val:=x}
}




class PosCnt extends Cnt inv this.val≥0 {
PosCnt(int v) {this.val:=v}
void set(int x) {if x≥0 then this.val:=x else error()}
}
class TwoCnt extends Cnt { int bak;
TwoCnt(int v, int b) {this.val:=v; this.bak:=b}
void set(int x) {this.bak:=this.val; this.val:=x}
void switch(int x)
{int i:=this.val; this.val:=this.bak; this.bak:=i}
}
Figure 6.2: Example: Cnt and its subclasses
void Cnt.tick() dynamic this::Cnt〈n〉$∧n≥0 ∗→ this::Cnt〈b〉$∧n+1≤b≤n+2
void Cnt.set(int x) dynamic this::Cnt〈n〉$∧x≥0 ∗→ this::Cnt〈x〉$
int Cnt.get() dynamic this::Cnt〈n〉$∧n≥0 ∗→ this::Cnt〈n〉$∧res=n
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Such changes make the specifications of the methods in superclasses less precise, and are
carried out to ensure behavioral subtyping. Furthermore, these specifications must also cater
to potential modifications that may occur in the extra fields of the subclasses by their over-
riding methods either directly or indirectly. Due to conflicting requirements, we advocate the
co-existence of both static and dynamic specifications. The former is important for precision
and shall be used primarily for code verification, while the latter is needed to support method
overriding and must be used for dynamically dispatched methods. Formally:
Definition 6.4.1 (Static Pre/Post). A specification is said to be static if it is meant to describe
a single method declaration, and need not be used for subsequent overriding methods.
Definition 6.4.2 (Dynamic Pre/Post). A specification is said to be dynamic if it is meant for
use by a method declaration and its subsequent overriding methods.
Past works, such as [2, 32, 81, 99, 5, 90], are based primarily on dynamic specifications,
though implicit static specifications via type(this)=c can also be used in ESC/Java and Spec#,
while JML uses code contract [74, ch 15] as a form of static specification. However, these
proposals for static specifications are somewhat ad-hoc, as they do not impose any relation
between static and dynamic specifications. In our approach, we emphasize static specifications
over dynamic specifications. Most importantly, we always ensure that the static specification
of a method from a given class is always a subtype of the dynamic specification of the same
method within the same class. This principle is important for modular verification, as we need
only verify the code of each method once against its static specification. It is unnecessary to
verify the corresponding dynamic specification since the latter is a specification supertype. Our
proposal uses the following principles for OO verification, achieving both precision and reuse.
6.5 Principles for Enhanced OO Verification
• Static specification is given for each new method declaration, and may be added for in-
herited methods to support new auxiliary calls and subclasses with new invariants.
• Dynamic specification is either given or derived. Whether given or derived, each dynamic
specification must satisfy two subsumption properties. Each must be a :
– specification supertype of its static counterpart. This helps keep code re-verification
to a minimum.
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– specification supertype of the dynamic specification of each overriding method in
its subclasses. This helps ensure behavioral subtyping.
• Code verification is only performed for static specifications.
6.6 Our Approach
Our approach to enhancing OO verification is based on separation logic. We shall describe how
we adapt separation logic for reasoning about objects from a class hierarchy and how to write
precise specifications that avoid unnecessary code re-verification.
6.6.1 Object View and Lossless Casting
For separation logic to work with OO programs, one key problem that we must address is a
suitable format to capture the objects of classes. We should preferably also address the problem
of performing upcast/downcast operations statically in accordance with the OO class hierarchy,
and without loss of information where possible.
Consider two variables, x and y, which point to objects from Cnt class (with a single field)
and TwoCnt class (with two fields), respectively. Intuitively, we may represent the first object
by x::Cnt〈v〉 where v denotes its field, and the second object by y::TwoCnt〈v, b〉 where v, b
denote its two fields. However, a fundamental problem that we must solve is how to cast the
object of one class to that of its superclass, and vice-versa when needed. To do this without
loss of information, we provide two extra information : (i) a variable to capture the actual type
of a given object and (ii) a variable to capture the object’s record extension that contains extra
field(s) of its subclass. When a TwoCnt object is first created, we may capture its state using the
formula :
y::TwoCnt〈t, v, b, p〉∧t=TwoCnt∧p=null
The above formula indicates that the actual type of the object is t=TwoCnt and that there is no
need for any record extension since p=null. With this object format, we can now perform an
upcast to its parent Cnt class by transforming it to:
y::Cnt〈t, v, q〉∗q::Ext〈TwoCnt, b, p〉∧t=TwoCnt∧p=null
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Though this cast operation is viewing the object as a member of Cnt class, it is still a TwoCnt
object as the type information t=TwoCnt indicates. Furthermore, we have created an extension
record q::Ext〈TwoCnt, b, p〉 that can capture the extra b field of the TwoCnt subclass. For
simplicity, we currently use an implicit pointer q to capture the extension record. This model
allows a sequence of upcast operations to be easily captured. Such an upcast operation is lossless
as we have sufficient information to perform the inverse downcast operation back to the original
TwoCnt format. To allow lossless casting between Cnt and TwoCnt, we add an equivalence rule
:
TwoCnt〈t, v, b, p〉 ≡ root::Cnt〈t, v, q〉∗q::Ext〈TwoCnt, b, p〉
An unfold step (which replaces a term that matches the LHS by RHS) corresponds to an upcast
operation, while the fold step (which replaces a term that matches the RHS by LHS) corresponds
to a downcast operation. Such a rule can be derived from each superclass-subclass pairing.
Formally:
Definition 6.6.1 (Lossless Casting). Given a class c〈v∗〉 with fields v∗ and its immediate sub-
class d〈v∗, w∗〉 where w∗ denotes its extra fields, we shall generate the following casting rule
that is coercible in either direction:
root::d〈t, v∗, w∗, p〉 ≡ root::c〈t, v∗, q〉∗q::Ext〈d, w∗, p〉
Note that for any object view d〈t, . . .〉 it is always the case that the subtype relation t<:d holds
as its invariant. Furthermore, the default root parameter on the LHS may be omitted for brevity.
Lossless casting is important for establishing the subsumption relation between each static
specification and its dynamic counterpart, as the extension record can be preserved, if needed,
by each static specification. Lossless casting is also important for the static specification of
inherited methods which should preferably be inherited without the need for re-verification.
This can be achieved by exploiting local reasoning which allows us to assert that an extension
record need not be modified by each inherited method.
There are also occasions when we are required to pass the full object with all its (extended)
fields. This occurs for dynamic specifications where subsequent overriding method may change
the extra fields of its subclass. To cater to this scenario, we introduce an ExtAll〈t1, t2〉 view
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that can capture all the extension records from a class t1 for an object with actual type t2. This
scenario occurs for the dynamic specification of Cnt.set method, as shown below:
this::Cnt〈t, , p〉∗p::ExtAll〈Cnt, t〉∧x≥0
∗→ this::Cnt〈t, x, p〉∗p::ExtAll〈Cnt, t〉
Such a dynamic specification may be used with any subtype of Cnt. The entire object view
must be passed to support dynamic specifications which are expected to cater to the current
method and all subsequent overriding methods. The ExtAll predicate itself can be defined as
follows:
ExtAll〈t1, t2〉 ≡ t1=t2∧root=null ∨ root::Ext〈t3, v∗, q〉
∗q::ExtAll〈t3, t2〉∧t3<t1∧t2<:t3 inv t2<:t1
The notation t3<t1 denotes a class t3 and its immediate superclass t1. The ExtAll predi-
cate is used to generate all the extension records from class t1 to t2. For example, expression
x::ExtAll〈Cnt, Cnt〉 yields x=null, and x::ExtAll〈Cnt, TwoCnt〉 yields x::Ext〈TwoCnt, b, null〉.
Our format allows two kinds of object views to be supported:
Definition 6.6.2 (Full and Partial Views). We refer to the use of formula x::c〈t, v∗, p〉∗p::ExtAll〈c, t〉
as providing a full view for an object with actual type t that is being treated as a c-class object,
while x::c〈t, v∗, p〉 provides only a partial view with no extension record. For brevity, full views
are also written as x::c〈v∗〉$, while partial views are coded using x::c〈v∗〉.
This distinction between partial and full views (for objects) follows directly from our de-
cision to distinguish static from dynamic specifications. Partial views are typically used for
the receiver object of static specifications, while full views are used by dynamic specifications.
Some readers may contend that lossless casting of an object x from d〈v∗, w∗〉 to c〈v∗〉 may also
be captured with the help of separating implication by representing the extension record using
x::c〈v∗〉−−∗ x::d〈v∗, w∗〉. This approach works well for partial views, but cannot easily handle
the ExtAll predicate required by full views. Moreover, by omitting separating implication, our
current approach to automated verification is easier to build and prove.
6.6.2 Ensuring Class Invariants
Ensuring that class invariants hold can be rather intricate, with the key problems being how and
when to check for the invariants. Based on the simplest assumption, one would expect object
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invariants to hold at all times. However, this assumption is impractical for mutable objects.
One sensible solution is to expect invariants to hold based on visible state semantics, which is
typically aligned to the boundaries of public methods. Even this approach may not be flexible
enough. Thus, in Boogie [4, 78], programmers are also allowed to use a specification field,
called valid, that can indicate if the invariant for an object is being preserved or temporarily
broken for mutation. Similarly, in [88], programmers are allowed to indicate invariants that are
inconsistent (not preserved) at some method boundary.
We aim for a similar level of flexibility but which still remains easy to use. To achieve
this, we introduce the concept of an invariant-enhanced view for each class with a non-trivial
invariant, as follows:
Definition 6.6.3 (Invariant-Enhanced View). Consider a class c with a non-trivial invariant
δc (6=true) over the fields v∗ of the object. We shall define a new view of the form c#I〈v∗〉
to capture its class invariant, as : c#I〈v∗〉 ≡ root::c〈v∗〉∗δc. Furthermore, for each subclass
d〈v∗, w∗〉 with an extra invariant δd over the fields v∗, w∗, we expect its invariant to be δc∗δd and
shall provide a corresponding view : d#I〈v∗, w∗〉 ≡ root::d〈v∗, w∗〉∗δc∗δd.
The use of separating conjunction to capture the class invariant allows a form of object
ownership to be specified for heap objects present in δc. Furthermore, invariant-enhanced view
can easily and explicitly indicate when an invariant can be enforced and when it can be assumed.
If a c〈v∗〉 is being used, the class invariant is neither enforced nor assumed. If a c#I〈v∗〉 is used
in the precondition, its invariant must be enforced at each of its call sites, but can be assumed
to hold at the beginning of its method declaration. If a c#I〈v∗〉 is used in the postcondition, its
invariant must be enforced at the end of its method declaration, but can be assumed to hold at
the post-state of each of its call sites.
With the help of invariant-enhanced views, we can provide pre/post specifications that guar-
antee class invariants are always maintained by public methods. This can help ensure that all
objects created and manipulated by public methods are guaranteed to satisfy their class invari-
ants. Alternatively, it is also possible to allow some methods (typically private ones) to receive
or produce objects without the invariant property. This corresponds to situations where the class
invariant is temporarily broken. Our invariant-enhanced views can achieve this as they can be
selectively and automatically enforced in pre/post annotations.
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For example, the invariant-enhanced view of PosCnt is:
PosCnt#I〈t, v, p〉 ≡ root::PosCnt〈t, v, p〉∗v≥0
Two methods get and tick are being inherited from the Cnt superclass, while a third method
set is re-defined to ensure the class invariant. We may provide new static specifications for
these three respective methods, to incorporate the invariant-enhanced view. Figure 6.3 shows
how this is done for our running example. It is sufficient to use a weaker precondition of
the form this::PosCnt〈v〉 for static-spec(PosCnt.set) without compromising its postcondi-
tion this::PosCnt#I〈x〉. This corresponds to a temporary violation of the class invariant of
PosCnt.
6.6.3 Enhanced Specification Subsumption
With our use of more precise static specifications, we can now leverage on a better specification
subsumption that can exploit the local reasoning capability of separation logic. In particular, the
extended fields of objects that are not used should be preserved by specification subsumption.
More formally, we define the enhanced form of specification subsumption, as follows:
Definition 6.6.4 (Enhanced Spec. Subsumption). A pre/post annotation preB ∗→ postB is
said to be a subtype of another pre/post annotation preA ∗→ postA if the following relation
holds:
preA` preB∗∆ postB∗∆` postA
(preB ∗→ postB) <: (preA ∗→ postA)
Note that ∆ captures the residual heap state from the contravariance check on preconditions that
is carried forward to assist in the covariance check on postconditions.
As an example of its utility, consider the following specification subsumption that is ex-
pected to hold for enhanced OO verification.
static-spec(Cnt.set) <: dynamic-spec(Cnt.set)
For the above to hold, we must prove:
this::Cnt〈t, v, p〉 ∗→ this::Cnt〈t, x, p〉
<: this::Cnt〈t, v, q〉∗q::ExtAll〈Cnt, t〉∧x≥0 ∗→
this::Cnt〈t, x, q〉∗q::ExtAll〈Cnt, t〉
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The above subtyping cannot be proven with the basic specification subsumption relation
from Sec 1 (without the use of a residual heap state), but succeeds with our enhanced subsump-
tion relation.
We first show the contravariance of the preconditions:
this::Cnt〈t, v, q〉∗q::ExtAll〈Cnt, t〉∧x≥0
` this::Cnt〈t, v, p〉∗∆
This succeeds with ∆≡p::ExtAll〈Cnt, t〉∧x≥0. We then prove covariance on the postcon-
ditions using:
this::Cnt〈t, x, p〉∗∆ ` this::Cnt〈t, x, q〉∗q::ExtAll〈Cnt, t〉
This is proven with the help of residual heap state ∆ (with an extension record) from the
entailment of preconditions.
Our preservation of residual heap state is inspired by the needs of static specification. By
the use of a new object format (with lossless casting) and a novel specification subsumption
mechanism, we can now support a modular verification process in which re-verification is al-
ways avoided for dynamic specifications. Our enhanced specification subsumption can also be
viewed as a practical algorithm for implementing Parkinson’s specification compatibility [99].
This link shall be formally proven later in Lemma 6.1.
6.7 Conformance to the OO Paradigm
We present mechanisms to ensure that method overriding and method inheritance are supported
in accordance with the requirements of the OO paradigm.
6.7.1 Behavioral Subtyping with Dynamic Specifications
Dynamic specifications are meant for the methods of a given class and its subclasses. They must
conform to the behavioral subtyping principle to support method overriding (and inheritance),
as defined by the requirement below:
Definition 6.7.1 (Behavioral Subtyping Requirement). Given a dynamic specification preC ∗→ postC
in a method mn in class C and another dynamic specification preD ∗→ postD of the correspond-
ing method mn in a subclass D. We say that the two specifications adhere to the behavioral sub-
typing requirement using (preD ∗→ postD)<:D (preC ∗→ postC), if the following subsumption
holds : preD ∗→ postD <: (preC∧type(this)<:D ∗→ postC).
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As shown above, we can use the enhanced specification subsumption relation to check for
behavioral subtyping. For an example, consider the dynamic specification of method Cnt.set
and its overriding method PosCnt.set. Assuming that these dynamic specifications are given,
the behavioral subtyping requirement can be checked using:
dynamic-spec(PosCnt.set) <:PosCnt dynamic-spec(Cnt.set)
Hence, we have:
this::PosCnt〈 〉$∧x≥0 ∗→ this::PosCnt#I〈x〉$ <:
this::Cnt〈v〉$∧x≥0∧(type(this)<:PosCnt) ∗→ this::Cnt〈x〉$
By contravariance of preconditions, we successfully prove:
this::Cnt〈v〉$∧x≥0∧(type(this)<:PosCnt) `
this::PosCnt〈 〉$∧x≥0 ∗ ∆
where ∆ is derived to be x≥0. By covariance of postconditions, we can prove:
this::PosCnt#I〈x〉$∗∆ ` this::Cnt〈x〉$
Hence, the above two dynamic specifications of Cnt.set and PosCnt.set conform to the
behavioral subtyping requirement.
Dynamic specifications may also be given (or derived) for inherited methods, especially
when their static specifications have been modified. As with method overriding, we con-
tinue to expect that the behavioral subtyping requirement holds between a dynamic speci-
fication (as supertype) for a method in a class and another dynamic specification (as sub-
type) for the same inherited method in the subclass. Let us consider Cnt.tick and its in-
herited method PosCnt.tick. Though no method overriding is present, we must still ensure
dynamic-spec(PosCnt.tick) <: PosCnt dynamic-spec(Cnt.tick).
6.7.2 Statically-Inherited Methods
Under the OO paradigm, it is possible for a method mn in a class C to be inherited into its
subclass D without any overriding. Furthermore, the user is free to add a new static/dynamic
specification to such an inherited method for each subclass. Such a scenario may occur for a
subclass with a strengthened invariant. For each inherited method of this subclass, we anticipate
a new static specification possibly using its invariant-enhanced view. An important question to
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ask is if there is a need to re-verify this new static specification against the body of the inherited
method.
We shall first consider static specification where the receiver is specified using partial view
of form this::c〈t, v∗, p〉. For this category of static specifications, we are expecting that each
method invocation by this.mn(..) does not modify any fields in the extension record and is
the same as that in the original method prior to method inheritance. To support the inheritance
of static specifications which use partial views for their receivers, without re-verification, we
identify a category of inherited methods that is semantically equivalent (modulo the receiver) to
the original method in the superclass.
Definition 6.7.2 (Statically-Inherited Methods). Given a method mn with body e from class
A that is being inherited into a subclass B, we say that this method is statically-inherited, if the
following conditions hold:
• it has not been overridden in the B subclass.
• for all auxiliary calls this.mn2(..) for which mn6=mn2, it must be the case that B.mn2 is
statically-inherited from A.mn2.
We can show that each statically-inherited method is semantically equivalent to the origi-
nal method from its superclass. The above conditions ensure this by checking that the inher-
ited method always invokes the same sequence of semantically equivalent method calls, as that
when executed with a receiver object from its superclass. With this classification for statically-
inherited methods, we can check inherited static specifications, as follows:
Definition 6.7.3 (Checking Inherited Static Specifications).
Consider a method mn with static specification spA (using a partial view for its receiver) from
class A that is being inherited into a subclass B with static specification spB. If this method
has been statically-inherited into subclass B, we only need to check for specification subsump-
tion spA<:spB. Otherwise, we have to re-verify the method body of mn with the new static
specification spB.
As an example, PosCnt.tick is statically-inherited from Cnt.tick (with a partial view
this::Cnt〈v〉), and we can conclude that both methods are semantically equivalent modulo the
receiver. To avoid the re-verification of the static specification of PosCnt.tick, we only need
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to check for the following subtyping:
static-spec(Cnt.tick) <: static-spec(PosCnt.tick)
Some other methods, such as PosCnt.get, FastCnt.get, FastCnt.set, TwoCnt.tick and TwoCnt.get,
are also statically-inherited. For a counterexample that is not statically-inherited, consider:
class A {
int foo { return this.goo() }
int goo { return 1 }
}
class B extends A {
int goo { return 2 }
}
The foo method cannot be statically-inherited in subclass B, since it invokes an auxiliary goo
method that is not statically-inherited (in this case overridden). In other words, method B.foo()
is not semantically equivalent (modulo the receiver) to A.foo() since they invoke different se-
quences of method calls when given the same parameters except for the receiver. As a result,
we expect that the static specification (with partial view) for B.foo must be re-verified against
its inherited method body from A.foo.
We have two solutions for handling methods that are not statically-inherited. One solution
is to transform each method that is not statically-inherited into an overriding method. This is
achieved by cloning the method declaration for each such method in its subclass. By doing so,
we force code re-verification to be performed for the cloned methods, when inheriting static
specifications into such non statically-inherited methods. A second solution is to utilize full
views on the receivers of static specifications. By using full views on receivers, we shall be
handling each method invocation of the form this.mn2(...) by using its corresponding dynamic
specification. As a consequence, each such static specification (with full views on receiver) can
always be inherited into any subclass without the need for re-verification, regardless of whether
the method is statically-inherited or not. However, some loss in precision may occur since
dynamic specifications are now used by each receiver during the verification of its method’s
body.
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6.8 Deriving Specifications
While a static specification can give better precision, having to maintain both static and dynamic
specifications may seem like more human effort is required by our approach to OO verification.
To alleviate this, we provide the following set of derivation techniques that can be used, where
needed.
• derive dynamic specifications from static counterparts.
• refine dynamic specifications to meet behavioral subtyping.
• inherit static specifications from method of superclass.
Let us initially assume that none of the dynamic specifications are given for our running
example. We first present a simple technique for deriving a dynamic specification from its static
counterpart, as follows:
Definition 6.8.1 (From Static to Dynamic Specification). Given a static specification specS
for class C, we shall derive its dynamic counterpart specD, as follows:
specD = ρC specS where
ρC = [this::C〈v∗〉7→this::C〈v∗〉$,
this::C#I〈v∗〉7→this::C#I〈v∗〉$]
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Some examples of dynamic specifications that can be automatically derived from their static
counterparts are:
dynamic-spec(Cnt.get) = ρCnt static-spec(Cnt.get)
= this::Cnt〈v〉$ ∗→ this::Cnt〈v〉$ ∧ res=v
dynamic-spec(Cnt.tick) = ρCnt static-spec(Cnt.tick)
= this::Cnt〈v〉$ ∗→ this::Cnt〈v+1〉$
dynamic-spec(PosCnt.get) = ρPosCnt static-spec(PosCnt.get)
= this::PosCnt#I〈v〉$ ∗→ this::PosCnt#I〈v〉$ ∧ res=v
dynamic-spec(FastCnt.tick)
= ρFastCnt static-spec(FastCnt.tick)
= this::FastCnt〈v〉$ ∗→ this::FastCnt〈v+2〉$
This technique can help us derive dynamic specifications that are almost identical to static
specifications, and are especially relevant for methods (e.g. in final classes) where overriding is
not possible. However, these automatically derived dynamic specifications may fail to meet the
behavioral subtyping requirement. Failure of behavioral subtyping can be due to two possible
reasons:
1. Dynamic specification of method in superclass is too strong, or
2. Dynamic specification of method in subclass is too weak.
We propose two refinement techniques for related pairs of dynamic specifications to help
them conform to behavioral subtyping. A conventional way is to use specification inheritance
(or specialization) to strengthen the dynamic specification of the overriding method. However,
in our approach, this technique of strengthening the dynamic specifications of a method in the
subclass may violate a key requirement that the dynamic specification be a supertype of its
static counterpart. Thus, prior to using specification specialization, we must either check that
each inherited dynamic specification is indeed a supertype of the static specification from the
overriding method, or can be made to inherit the static specification from the overridden method,
as follows :
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Definition 6.8.2 (Specification Specialization). Given a dynamic specification preDA ∗→ postDA
and its static specification preSA ∗→ postSA for a method mn in class A, and its overriding
method in a subclass B with static specification preSB ∗→ postSB. A dynamic specification
(preDA∧type(this) <: B ∗→ postDA) can be added to the overriding method of the B subclass
if either of the following occurs:
• preSB ∗→ postSB <:B preDA ∗→ postDA holds, or
• ρA→B(preSA ∗→ postSA) can be inherited into the static specification of mn in class B
and successfully verified.
Note that
ρA→B = [this::A〈v∗〉7→this::B〈v∗, w∗〉, this::A#I〈v∗〉7→this::B〈v∗, w∗〉∗δA]
where w∗ are free variables of the extended record, while δA captures the invariant of A class.
The refined dynamic specification for the overriding method is obtained via intersection type,
(preDB ∗→ postDB)
∧
(preDA∧type(this) <: B ∗→ postDA).
As an example, the pair of dynamic specifications for Cnt.get and PosCnt.get do not con-
form to behavioral subtyping. We may therefore attempt to strengthen the dynamic specification
of PosCnt.get by specification specialization through the following multi-specification:
this::PosCnt#I〈v〉$ ∗→ this::PosCnt#I〈v〉$ ∧ res=v ∧
this::Cnt〈v〉$∧type(this)<:PosCnt ∗→ this::Cnt〈v〉$∧res=v
However, the inherited dynamic specification from Cnt.get is not a supertype of static-spec(PosCnt.get).
Hence, in order to proceed with this refinement, we must also inherit the static specification of
static-spec(Cnt.get) into PosCnt.get, as follows:
this::PosCnt#I〈v〉 ∗→ this::PosCnt#I〈v〉 ∧ res=v ∧
this::PosCnt〈v〉 ∗→ this::PosCnt〈v〉 ∧ res=v
This strengthened static specification is now a subtype of the correspondingly derived dy-
namic specification. Furthermore, behavioral subtyping holds between the new dynamic spec-
ifications of Cnt.get and PosCnt.get. A caveat about specification specialization is that the
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strengthened static specification of the method in the subclass may not always guarantee the in-
variant property. For example, this::PosCnt#I〈v〉 ∗→ this::PosCnt#I〈v〉 ∧ res=v guaran-
tees that the class invariant of PosCnt is preserved, but not this::PosCnt〈v〉 ∗→ this::PosCnt〈v〉∧
res=v. It is thus possible for successfully verified calls of this method to violate the class in-
variant property, but the above multi-specification is fully aware of when each such violation
occurs through the use of different predicates. This violation of a class invariant is one reason
why [41] considered specification inheritance to be a potentially ‘unsound’ derivation technique.
As a complement to specification specialization, we propose a dual mechanism that weakens
the specification of the overridden method instead. We refer to this new technique as specifica-
tion abstraction. Instead of an intersection type, we use a union type to obtain a weaker dynamic
specification for the overridden method. Formally:
Definition 6.8.3 (Specification Abstraction). Given a dynamic specification preDA ∗→ postDA
for a method mn in class A, and its overriding method in a subclass B with dynamic specification
preDB ∗→ postDB. If behavioral subtyping does not hold between these dynamic specifications,
we can generalise the specification of the overridden method using the following union type:
dynamic-spec(A.mn) = (preDA ∗→ postDA)∨
ρB→A(preDB) ∗→ ∃w∗·ρB→A(postDB)
ρB→A = [this::B〈v∗, w∗〉$ 7→this::A〈v∗〉$,
this::B#I〈v∗, w∗〉$7→this::A#I〈v∗〉$∗δB]
We refer to this process as specification abstraction. It is a safe operation that weakens the
dynamic specification of an overridden method to the point where behavioral subtyping holds.
As an example, consider the derived dynamic specifications from a pair of methods Cnt.tick
and FastCnt.tick where behavioral subtyping does not currently hold. We are unable to apply
specification specialization, as the inherited static specification of Cnt.tick cannot be verified
by the overriding method of FastCnt.tick. However, with the help of specification abstraction,
we can obtain the following union type for dynamic-spec(Cnt.tick) instead.
this::Cnt〈v〉$ ∗→ this::Cnt〈v+1〉$∨
this::Cnt〈v〉$ ∗→ this::Cnt〈v+2〉$
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Our current separation logic prover is able to directly handle intersection types but not union





=⇒ (pre1 ∧ pre2) ∗→ (post1 ∨ post2)
For brevity, we shall omit the formal details of how normalization (of separation logic for-
mulae) is carried out for the above translation. In the case of Cnt.tick, we can perform nor-
malization to obtain the following weakened dynamic specification:
this::Cnt〈v〉$ ∗→ this::Cnt〈w〉$ ∧ (w=v+1∨w=v+2)
It would appear that the use of specification abstraction loses modularity, due to its depen-
dence on the dynamic specifications of overriding methods. However, this is not true. Firstly,
the purpose of specification abstraction is to derive dynamic specifications which need not be
re-verified. Secondly, we maintain modularity as each static specification is verified once, but
need only be re-verified when the specifications it depends on change. Though changes may
occur for a dynamic specification that a method depends on; the necessity for re-verification
is analogous to a modular compilation system which re-compiles a module whenever the type
interface it depends on changes.
While our approach can theoretically derive all dynamic specifications, we shall also allow
the option for users to directly specify dynamic specifications, where required. This option
is especially helpful in supporting modular open-ended classes that could be further extended
with new subclasses. Our overall procedure for selectively but automatically deriving dynamic
specifications shall be as follows:
Definition 6.8.4 (Deriving Dynamic Specifications). We derive and refine dynamic specifica-
tions, as follows:
• If the dynamic specifications of both overridden and overriding methods are given, check
for the behavioral subtyping requirement.
• If only the dynamic specification of an overridden method is given, derive the dynamic
specification of the overriding method and then use specification specialization to refine
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it.
• If only the dynamic specification of an overriding method is given, derive the dynamic
specification of the overridden method and then use specification abstraction to refine it.
• Otherwise, derive both dynamic specifications and then use specification abstraction to
refine the dynamic specification of the overridden method in the superclass.
Note that the procedure is geared towards the preservation of class invariants, where possi-
ble, as it favours specification abstraction over specification specialization.
Lastly, it may also be possible for static specifications to be omitted for some statically-
inherited methods. We propose a way to derive static specifications for such methods, as follows:
Definition 6.8.5 (Deriving Static Specifications). Given a method mn from class A with static
specification spA, and a subclass B where the same method has been statically-inherited. If no
static specification is given for B.mn, we can derive a static specification for it, as follows :
static-spec(B.mn) = [this::A〈v∗〉7→this::B〈v∗, w∗〉] spA
The extra fields, w∗, in the subclass are never modified by each statically-inherited method.
The above substitution is only applicable for partial views, and it is not needed for full views
which will remain unchanged when deriving static specifications.
Though specification derivation techniques are important aids that make it easier for users
to adopt our OO verification methodology, they are not fundamental in the current work. In
the rest of this chapter, we shall assume that all required dynamic and static specifications are
available, and proceed to describe core components of our enhanced OO verification system.
6.9 Forward Verification
Our verification system for OO programs is implemented in a modular fashion. It processes
the class declarations in a top-down manner whereby the methods of superclasses are verified
before those of the subclasses. We shall assume that static specifications are given, and that
dynamic specifications are already given (or automatically derived). Also, for each method that
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is not statically inherited in a subclass, we shall clone the method for that subclass. There are
three major subsystems present, namely: (i) View Generator, (ii) Inheritance Checker, and (iii)
Code Verifier. These are elaborated next.
6.9.1 View Generator
For each subclass in the class hierarchy, we must generate a lossless upcasting rule in accor-
dance with Defn 6.6.1. However, the format Ext〈c, v∗, p〉 actually denotes a family of record
extensions that is distinct for each subclass c. To distinguish them clearly in our implementa-
tion, we provide a set of specialised record extensions of the form Extc〈v∗, p〉 instead. With
this change, we can generate the following casting rules for our running example:
PosCnt〈t, n, p〉 ≡ root::Cnt〈t, n, q〉∗q::ExtPosCnt〈p〉
FastCnt〈t, n, p〉 ≡ root::Cnt〈t, n, q〉∗q::ExtFastCnt〈p〉
TwoCnt〈t, n, b, p〉 ≡ root::Cnt〈t, n, q〉∗q::ExtTwoCnt〈b, p〉
Correspondingly, we may also provide an ExtAll view for the class hierarchy. In the case
of our running example, we can generate the following definition for the ExtAll view:





∨ root::ExtTwoCnt〈b, q〉∗q::ExtAll〈TwoCnt, t2〉
∧TwoCnt<t1∧t2<:TwoCnt
Lastly, for each subclass with a non-trivial invariant, we also generate two invariant-enhanced
views for this subclass. For our running example, only the subclass PosCnt has an invariant.
Hence, our generator will provide the following:
PosCnt#I〈t, n, p〉 ≡ root::PosCnt〈t, n, q〉∧n≥0
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In summary, the above shows how we explicitly generate predicate views for casting and
class invariants. In practice, our prototype verification system creates these views on demand
during entailment checking itself.
6.9.2 Inheritance Checker
This subsystem ensures that specifications of added methods are consistent with class inheri-
tance and method overriding requirements. Whenever a new subclass B is added, we expect a
set of new overriding methods and another set of statically-inherited methods. We propose to
check for consistency, as follows:
• Firstly, we check that each static specification is a subtype of the dynamic specification.
• For each new overriding method B.mn, we identify the nearest overridden method in a
superclass of B. We then check that each given dynamic specification is a subtype of the
given dynamic specification of its overridden method in its superclass.
• For each statically-inherited method B.mn, we check that its given static specification is a
supertype of the corresponding static specification in its superclass. If a dynamic specifi-
cation is also given, we check that it is a subtype of the given dynamic specification in its
superclass.
Some of the static and dynamic specifications may have been automatically derived. As
these derived specifications are correct by construction, we shall not be checking for the speci-
fication subsumption relation amongst them.
6.9.3 Code Verifier
There are four features in our core language that are peculiar to the OO paradigm, namely (i)
the object constructors, (ii) the cast constructs, (iii) instance method invocations and (iv) super
calls. Let us discuss how they are handled.
For the object constructor, we use the following rule where each primed variable v′i captures
the latest value of variable vi:
S1={∆ ∗ res::c〈c, v′1, .., v′n, null〉}
` {∆} new c(v1, .., vn) {S1}
This rule produces an object of actual type c using partial view.
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Consider a cast construct (c)(v:c1) where v:c1 captures the compile-time type of v inserted
before verification. We shall treat it as being equivalent to a primitive call of the form:
c castc (c1 v) static v::c1〈t, ..〉 ∗→ v::c1〈t, ..〉∧t<:c
∧ true ∗→ true
The above declaration allows the cast construct to possibly fail at runtime. If casting succeeds,
we may expect that the actual type of the object to be a subtype of c, as captured by the first
pre/post annotation. The second pre/post annotation is added for completeness, and may be used
if we are unable to establish the heap state of v.
Another important feature to consider is instance method call of the form (v:c).mn(v1..vn).
We first identify the best possible type of v using β=findtype(∆, v:c). The result β will tell
us if we have the actual type t=c1 or the best static type t<:c1 where t=type(v) and c1<:c.
Note that c1 can be more precise than the compile-time type c due to our use of flow- and path-
sensitive reasoning. If the actual type is known, we choose the static specification of method mn
from class c1. Otherwise, we choose its dynamic specification instead. This decision is captured
by spec=findspec(P, β, mn) where P denotes the entire OO program. The overall rule is:
β=findtype(∆, v:c) ρ = [v1 7→v′1, ..., vn 7→v′n]
findspec(P, β, mn) = {Φipr ∗→Φipo}pi=1
ρ=[v′j/vj ]
n
j=1 ∆`ρΦipr ∗Si ∀i=1, .., p
S =
⋃p
i=1 Si ∗ Φipo
` {∆} (v:c).mn(v1..vn) {S}
If ∆ is a disjunctive formula with different types for v, we can use findtype/findspec
operations in the entailment procedure, so that the best specification is selected for either the
actual or the static type of the object at v for each disjunct. For multi-specifications, we choose
the first specification whose precondition holds. We assume that these multiple specifications
are ordered to yield a more precise result ahead of the less precise ones.
We can easily deal with the invocation of super methods. This feature can be used in place
of the receiver this parameter to refer to the overridden method. It can be easily handled by our
approach since super method calls are essentially static calls that can be precisely captured by
static specifications. Consider an overridden method mn in a superclass A and a call super.mn(..)
being used in an overriding method in subclass B. We can handle this super call by re-writing
it to this.A.mn(..). In this case, our verification process will select the static specification of the
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overridden method in class A to use. Past works, such as [100, 62], do not handle super method
calls for verification well, as there is an inherent mismatch between super method calls (which
are static calls) and the mechanism based on dynamic specifications.
6.10 Soundness
The semantics of our constraints is that introduced in Sec 2.6. There are several soundness
results that are needed to show the overall safety of our verification system. The following
lemma highlights a key result showing that our use of specification subsumption relation is
sound for avoiding re-verification, as follows:
Lemma 6.10.1 (Soundness of Enhanced Spec. Subsumption).
Given that method body e has been successfully verified using preB ∗→ postB. If specifi-
cation subsumption preB ∗→ postB<: preA ∗→ postA holds, then its specification supertype
preA ∗→ postA is guaranteed to verify successfully against the same method body.
Proof: From the premise of specification subsumption (Defn 6.6.4), we can obtain: preA`preB ∗ ∆
and postB∗∆`postA. In our context, preconditions preA, preB and their entailment’s residual
∆ do not contain any primed variables, while only primed variables are modified indirectly
by our program. Hence, adding a formula with only unprimed variables, such as ∆, to both
pre/post always satisfies the side condition of the frame rule. Let e denote the method body
which has been preprocessed to a form where pass-by-value parameters are never modified. Let




i=vi). From the premise
that preB ∗→ postB is a verified specification for the code, we have ` {preB∧N} e {postB}.
In order to show that its specification supertype preA ∗→ postA is also verifiable for the same
code, we need to derive ` {preA∧N} e {postA}. We conclude based on the following steps:
` {preB∧N} e {postB} premise
` {preB∧N∗∆} e {postB∗∆} frame rule
` {preA∧N} e {postB∗∆} precondition strengthening
` {preA∧N} e {postA} postcondition weakening 2
The above proof uses the following Consequence Lemma stating the soundness of precon-
dition strengthening and postcondition weakening:
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Lemma 6.10.2 (Consequence Rule). The following verification holds:
P ′`P ` {P} e {Q} Q`Q′
` {P ′} e {Q′}
Proof Sketch: Based on the premise, we have a set of s, h such that 〈s, h, e〉↪→∗〈s1, h1, v〉 and
s, h |= P ∧ s1+[res 7→v], h1 |= Post(Q). By Galois connection, we have s1+[res 7→v], h1 |= Post(Q′).
Thus, for all s, h |= P ′, we have ` {P ′} e {Q′}. 2
We extract the post-state of a heap constraint by:
Definition 6.10.1 (Poststate). Given a constraint ∆, Post(∆) captures the relation between
primed variables of ∆. That is :
Post(∆) =df ρ (∃V·∆), where
V = {v1, .., vn} denotes all unprimed program variables in ∆
ρ = [v′1 7→v1, .., v′n 7→vn]
The next two lemmas state some results on statically-inherited methods for which re-verification
is proven not to be needed.
Lemma 6.10.3 (Equivalence of Statically-Inherited Methods).
Consider a method mn from class A that satisfies the conditions of being statically-inherited into
a B subclass. Assuming that









Proof Sketch : Using the conditions of Defn 6.7.2, we can prove the above by an induction on
the dynamic semantics (see Fig. 2.7) over execution of the body of statically-inherited methods.
2
Lemma 6.10.4 (Soundness of Statically-Inherited Specifications). Consider a method mn
from class A that has been successfully verified against its static specification preSA ∗→ postSA,
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and a subclass B that statically-inherits mn with static specification preSB ∗→ postSB. Assum-
ing that a specification subsumption relation of the form preSA ∗→ postSA <: preSB ∗→ postSB
holds, then B.mn is guaranteed to verify successfully against its specification preSB ∗→ postSB.
Proof Sketch : Follows from Lemmas 6.10.3 and 6.10.1. 2
We shall now show a result regarding behavioral subtyping.
Lemma 6.10.5 (Soundness of Behavioral Subtyping). Consider a method mn from class A
with dynamic specification preDA ∗→ postDA and that
∧
s, h1 |= preDA
h1=h+[s(o)7→A(v∗)]
〈s, h1, o.mn(p∗)〉↪→∗〈s3, h3, v〉
s3 + [res 7→v], h3 |= Post(postDA)
If we assume a similar object from a subclass B such that
∧ s, h2 |= preDA
h2=h+[s(o) 7→B(v∗, w∗)]
and we call the overriding method, then we obtain :
∧ 〈s, h2, o.mn(p∗)〉↪→∗〈s4, h4, v〉
s4 + [res 7→v], h4 |= Post(postDA)
Proof Sketch : Follows from Defn 6.7.1 of the behavioral subtyping requirement and Lemma
6.10.1. 2
Lastly, we prove the soundness of our verification system using preservation and progress
lemmas.
Lemma 6.10.6 (Preservation). If
` {∆} e {∆2} s, h |= Post(∆) 〈s, h, e〉↪→〈s1, h1, e1〉
Then there exists ∆1 such that s1, h1 |= Post(∆1) and ` {∆1} e1 {∆2}.
Proof Sketch: By induction on e. 2
Lemma 6.10.7 (Progress). If ` {∆} e {∆1}, and s, h |= Post(∆), then either e is a value, or
there exist s1, h1, and e1, such that
〈s, h, e〉↪→〈s1, h1, e1〉.
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Proof Sketch: By induction on e. 2
Theorem 6.10.8 (Soundness of Verification). Consider a closed term e without free variables
in which all methods have been successfully verified. Assuming that ` {true} e {∆}, then
either 〈[], [], e〉↪→∗〈[], h, v〉 terminates with a value v such that the following ([res7→v], h) |= ∆
holds, or it diverges 〈[], [], e〉6↪→∗.
Proof Sketch: Follows from Lemma 6.10.6 and Lemma 6.10.7. 2
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class Cnt { int val;
Cnt(int v) static true ∗→ res::Cnt〈v〉
{this.val:=v}
void tick() static this::Cnt〈v〉 ∗→ this::Cnt〈v+1〉;
dynamic this::Cnt〈v〉$∧v≥0 ∗→ this::Cnt〈w〉$∧v+1≤w≤v+2
{this.val:=this.val+1}
int get() static this::Cnt〈v〉 ∗→ this::Cnt〈v〉∧res=v
dynamic this::Cnt〈v〉$∧v≥0 ∗→ this::Cnt〈v〉$
{this.val}
void set(int x) static this::Cnt〈v〉 ∗→ this::Cnt〈x〉;
dynamic this::Cnt〈v〉$∧x≥0 ∗→ this::Cnt〈x〉$
{this.val:=x}
}
class FastCnt extends Cnt {
FastCnt(int v) static true ∗→ res::FastCnt〈v〉
{this.val:=v}
void tick() static this::FastCnt〈v〉 ∗→
this::FastCnt〈v+2〉 {this.val:=this.val+2}
}
class PosCnt extends Cnt
inv this.val≥0 {
PosCnt(int v) static v≥0 ∗→ res::PosCnt#I〈v〉
{this.val:=v}
void tick() static this::PosCnt#I〈v〉 ∗→ this::PosCnt#I〈v+1〉
dynamic this::PosCnt#I〈v〉$ ∗→ this::PosCnt#I〈v+1〉$
int get() static this::PosCnt#I〈v〉 ∗→ this::PosCnt#I〈v〉∧res=v
void set(int x) static this::PosCnt〈v〉∧x≥0 ∗→ this::PosCnt#I〈x〉
dynamic this::PosCnt〈v〉$∧x≥0 ∗→ this::PosCnt#I〈x〉$
{if x≥0 then this.val:=x else error()}
}
class TwoCnt extends Cnt { int bak;
TwoCnt(int v, int b) static true ∗→ res::TwoCnt〈v, b〉
{this.val:=v; this.bak:=b}
void set(int x) static this::TwoCnt〈v, 〉 ∗→ this::TwoCnt〈x, v〉
{this.bak:=this.val; this.val:=x}
void switch(int x) static this::TwoCnt〈v, b〉 ∗→ this::TwoCnt〈b, v〉
{int i:=this.val; this.val:=this.bak; this.bak:=i}
}
Figure 6.3: Static and Dynamic Specifications given for Cnt and its Subes
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, we aimed at enhancing the specification apparatus in order to achieve more pre-
cise and concise specifications that also assist in improving the precision and efficiency of the
verification process. More specifically, we proposed three new specification mechanisms:
• Immutability annotations : We show new application of immutability annotation, for
verifying and reasoning of sequential programs. Our solution is tailored towards more
flexible alias analysis, supports partial immutability, better cut-points preservation for
modular analysis through immutable predicates within both pre and post-conditions. The
new specification mechanism enables the design of a more concise and more precise ver-
ification/analysis system, with finer controls over accesses to resources (data structures).
In order to promote immutability as part of the verification methodology, this thesis shows
three main advantages of its use in a sequential setting through data from a set of small
experiments:
– more concise specifications
(38% reduction in shape predicates, and 28% reduction in aliasing scenarios)
– more precise analysis/verification
(62% immutability annotations that increase precision by helping to preserve cut-
points across method boundary)
– capability for finer-grained immutability.
• Structuring constructs : Some existing theorem provers use tactics as a way to au-
tomate or semi-automate proofs, and verification systems can take advantage of them
through lower-level proofs. However, for Hoare-style specification and verification, we
have chosen to design a structured specification (rather than another tactic language) for
the following reasons:
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– It can be provided at a higher-level that users can understand more easily, since it is
closer to specification mechanism rather than the (harder) verification process.
– It is more portable, as specification is tied to program codes, while tactic language
tend to be prover-specific, requiring the invoked prover to understand the relevant
commands. Our approach basically breaks down larger proofs into smaller (simpler)
proofs that provers could more easily and more effectively handle, as confirmed by
our experiments.
The current thesis tackles two key problems of verification, namely better modularity and
better completeness through a new form of structured specification. Our proposal has
been formalized and implemented with a promising set of experimental results.
• Static and dynamic specifications : We present an enhanced approach to OO verifica-
tion based on the co-existence of both static and dynamic specifications, together with a
principle that each static specification be a subtype of its corresponding dynamic specifi-
cation. Our approach attempts to track the actual type of each object, where possible, to
allow static specifications to be preferably used. We have designed a new object format
that allows each object to assume the form of its superclass via lossless casting. Another
useful feature of our proposal is a new specification subsumption relation for pre/post
specifications that is novel in using the residual heap state from precondition checking to
assist in postcondition checking.
By making each static specification be a subtype of its dynamic specification, we can limit
code verification to only static specifications.
7.1 Future Work
We conclude this thesis by outlining a series of possible future works.
7.1.1 Declaration-Site vs. Use-Site Immutability Annotations
In Chapter 4, we made use of predicate (or points-to fact) instances that have been annotated for
immutability which corresponds to use-site annotation. It is also possible to annotate the entire
data and predicate definition for immutability, so that all instances of the particular points-to
fact or predicate are automatically marked as immutable. This corresponds to declaration-site
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annotation. This immutability annotation scheme may be suitable if a functional programming
discipline is to be adopted. Two examples of declaration-site annotation are illustrated below:
data node@I { int val; node next}
ll〈n〉@I ≡ root=null ∧ n=0
∨ root::node〈 , q〉 ∗ q::ll〈q, n−1〉
inv n≥0;
Note the presence of @I annotation immediately after the name of the data or predicate defini-
tions. This signifies that all instances of this data or predicate definition will always be marked
as being immutable.
7.1.2 Selective Immutability
Throughout Chapter 4, the immutability annotations can scope over an entire data node/shape
predicate. We are interested in supporting more selective immutability through the use of field
annotations at either the point of declaration or the point of use. For example, at the point of a
specific node declaration, we could mark its next field as being immutable, as shown below:
data node { int val; node@I next}
This means that all next field instances of node type are always immutable after each node
instances have been constructed. This manner of marking just the pointer field as immutable has
the effect of always preserving the original shape, but not the contents of the data structures. For
this example, the val field remains mutable, whereas the shape formed through pointer fields
has been frozen. Such partial immutability can be used to enforce shape immutability, whereby
the shape of linked-structures (as well as properties that are derived from such shapes) are being
marked as immutable. Once a linked structure has been constructed, its existing shape remains
unchanged but its data contents may still be modified. A corresponding predicate definition for
shape immutable is given below:
ll〈n〉 ≡ root=null ∧ n=0
∨ root 7→ node〈 , q@I〉 ∗ q::ll〈n−1〉
inv n≥0;
where the next field of nodes captured by any ll predicate is not allowed to be modified.
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7.1.3 Inferring Immutability Enhanced Specifications
As a future direction for the work presented in Chapter 4, we intend to offer the user the possi-
bility of automatically inferring immutability enhanced specifications. This capability would be
particularly useful for legacy code. Given a specification without immutability annotations, this
inference process will consist of two steps:
• inferring the immutability annotations for each data node and shape predicate in the spec-
ification.
• relaxing the specifications such that they allow heap sharing whenever aliasing informa-
tion is not critical.
7.1.4 Inferring Structured Specifications
With respect to the work on structured specifications presented in Chapter 5, one future work
is heuristically inferring structured specifications from unstructured counterparts. Though the
inferred specifications may not be as good as those provided by expert users, they can never-
theless be used to handle most of the straightforward cases for legacy code, while leaving the




` {∆} e {S2} S2 6={} s, h |= Post(∆) 〈s, h, e〉↪→〈s1, h1, e1〉
Then there exists S1 6={}, such that ∀∆1 ∈ S1· s1, h1 |= Post(∆1) and ` {∆1} e1 {S3} S3⊆S2.
Proof: By structural induction on e.
• Case v := e3. There are two cases according to the dynamic semantics:
– e3 is not a value. Then, from [FV−ASSIGN] in Sec 2.3, if ` {∆}e3{S3}, then
S2=∃res·S3∧{v}v′=res. From dynamic rules, if 〈s, h, e3〉↪→〈s4, h4, e4〉, then
〈s, h, v:=e3〉↪→〈s4, h4, v:=e4〉.
From 〈s, h, e3〉↪→〈s4, h4, e4〉 and ` {∆}e3{S3}, by induction hypothesis, we have
that there exists S4 such that:
∀∆4 ∈ S4·s4, h4 |= Post(∆4)
and
` {∆4}e1{S3}.
Then, from verification rule [FV−ASSIGN] in Sec 2.3:
∀∆4 ∈ S4·` {∆4}v:=e1{S2}.
The proof is complete for h1=h4, s1=s4, and S1=S4.
– e3 is a value. Let:
∗ e1=(),
∗ S1=S2={(∆ ∧ v′=e3)},
∗ h1=h2=h, and s1=s2=s[v 7→ e3].
Straightforward.
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– h1=h2=h[s(v1)7→Mr], where r=h(s(v1))[f 7→s(v2)],
– s1=s2=s.
Hence, it is straightforward that:
∀∆1 ∈ S1·{∆1} e1 {S2}.
Now, we must show that:
∀∆1 ∈ S1·s1, h1 |= Post(∆1).
From the rule [FV−FIELD−UPDATE] in Sec 4.6, we have ∆`κV v′1::c〈w1, .., wf, .., wn〉@M ∗S3,
S3 6=∅ and S1 = ∃w1..wn·(S3 ∗ [v′2/wf ]v′1::c〈w1, .., wn〉) (*).
From the hypothesis, we know that s, h |= Post(∆) (**).
From (*) and (**), by Theorem 4.7.4, ∀∆3 ∈ S3.s, h |= Post(∆3).
The conclusion follows from s=s1 and h1=h[s(v1)7→ @Mr], where r=h(s(v1))[f 7→s(v2)].
• Case new c(v∗). From verification rule [FV−NEW] in Sec 2.3, we have ` {∆}new c(v∗){S2},
where S2 = {∆∗res::c〈v′1, .., v′n〉@M}. Let S1 = S2. From the dynamic semantics, we
have:
〈s, h, new c(v∗)〉↪→〈s, h+[ι 7→ @Ir], ι〉,
where ι /∈ dom(h). From s, h |= Post(∆), we have:
∀∆1 ∈ S1.s, h+[ι 7→I r] |= Post(∆1).
Moreover, ` {S1}ι{S2}.
• Case e1; e2. We consider the case where e1 is not a value (otherwise it is straightforward).
From the dynamic semantics, we have 〈s, h, e1〉↪→〈s1, h1, e3〉. From verification rule
[FV−SEQ] in Sec 2.3, we have ` {∆}e1{S3}. By induction hypothesis, there exists S1
s.t. ∀∆1 ∈ S1.s1, h1 |= Post(∆1) and ` {S1}e3{S3}. By rule [FV−SEQ] in Sec 2.3, we
have ` {S1}e3; e2{S2}.
• Case if v then e1 else e2. There are two possibilities in the dynamic semantics:
– s(v)=true. We have 〈s, h, if v then e1 else e2〉↪→〈s, h, e1〉. Let S1 = {∆∧v′}.
It is obvious that ∀∆1 ∈ S1.s, h |= Post(∆1). By the rule [FV−IF] in Sec 2.3, we
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have ` {∆∧v′} e1 {S1}. From the same rule S2 = S1 ∨ S2, where ` {∆∧¬v′} e2 {S2}.
By weakening the postcondition (rule FV−POST−WEAKENING in Sec 2.7), we get
` {∆∧¬v′} e1 {S2}, which is ` {S1} e1 {S2}.
– s(v) = false. Analogous to the above.
• Case t v; e. Let S1 = {∆}. From the dynamic rules in fig 4.9, we have e1 = ret(v, e),
s1 = [v 7→⊥]+s, h1 = h. We conclude immediately from the assumption and the rules
[FV−LOCAL] and [FV−RET] in Sec 2.3 and Sec 2.7, respectively.










From the hypothesis and Theorem 4.7.4, we have:
∀∆1 ∈ S1.s1, h1 |= Post(∆1).
From rule [FV−CALL−IMM], we have:
S2 =
⋃p
i=1 Si ∗ Φipo,
while from the dynamic semantics we have:
e1 = ret({wj}nj=m, [vj/wj ]m−1j=1 e).
From rule [FV−METH−IMM] in Sec 4.6, we have
` {ρΦipr∗Si} e1 {Si∗Φipo},
which concludes.
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• Case ret(v∗, e). There are two cases:
– e is a value k. Let S1 = {∃v′∗ ·∆}. It concludes immediately.
– e is not a value. 〈s, h, ret(v∗, e)〉↪→〈s1, h1, ret(v∗, e1)〉. By [FV−RET] and induc-
tion hypothesis, there exists S1 s.t. ∀∆1 ∈ S1.s1, h1 |= Post(∆1) and ` {S1} e1 {S3},
and S2 = ∃v′∗·S3. By rule [FV−RET] again, we have ` {S1} ret(v∗, e1) {S2}.
• Case null | k | v | v.f | assert Φ. Straightforward.
Theorem. 4.7.2(Progress)
If
` {∆} e {S1} S1 6={} s, h |= Post(∆)
then either e is a value, or there exist s1, h1, and e1, such that 〈s, h, e〉↪→〈s1, h1, e1〉.
Proof: By structural induction on e.
• Case v := e. There are two cases:
– e is a value k. We conclude.
– e is not a value. By [FV−ASSIGN] in Fig 2.3, we have ` {∆} e {S2}. By induc-
tion hypothesis, there exist s1, h1, e1, such that 〈s, h, e〉↪→〈s1, h1, e1〉. We conclude
immediately from the dynamic semantics.
• Case v1.f := v2. for fresh v1, .., vn. Follows from:
– e1 = (),
– s1 = s,
– h1 = h[s(v1)7→Mr], where r = h(s(v1))[f 7→s(v2)].
• Case new c(v1···n). Let ι be a fresh location, r denotes the object value
c[f1 7→s(v1), .., fn 7→s(vn)].
Take:
– s1 = s,
– h1 = h+[ι 7→Ir],
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– e1 = ι.
We conclude.
• Case e1; e2. If e1 is a value (), we conclude immediately by taking s1 = s, h1 = h. Other-
wise, by induction hypothesis, there exist s1, h1, e3 s.t. 〈s, h, e1〉↪→〈s1, h1, e3〉. We then
have 〈s, h, e1; e2〉↪→〈s1, h1, e3; e2〉 from the dynamic semantics.
• Case if v then e1 else e2. It concludes immediately from a case analysis (based on
value of v) and the induction hypothesis.
• Case t v; e. Let:
– s1 = [v 7→⊥]+s,
– h1 = h,
– e1 = ret(v, e).
We conclude immediately.
• Case mn(v1..n). Suppose v1, .., vm are pass-by-reference, while others are not. Take:
– s1 = [wj 7→s(vj)]nj=m+s,
– h1 = h,
– e1 = ret({wj}nj=m, [vj/wj ]m−1j=1 e), where wj are from method specification
t0 mn((ref tj wj)m−1j=1 , (tj wj)
n
j=m) where {requires Φipr ensures Φipo}pi=1 {e}.
From hypothesis, we have:
s, h |= Post(∆).
From [FV−CALL−IMM] rule in Sec 4.6, we know:
∆`ρΦipr ∗i Si.
By Theorem 4.7.4, we have:
s, h |= Φipr.
From the dynamic semantics, [FV−METH−IMM] rule in Sec 4.6 and Theorem 4.7.4, we
have:
s1, h1 |= Φipo.
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We conclude by the dynamic semantics.
• Case ret(v∗, e). If e is a value k, let:
– s1 = s− {v∗},
– h1 = h,
– e1 = k.
We conclude. Otherwise, by induction hypothesis, there exist s1, h1, e1 such that:
〈s, h, e〉↪→〈s1, h1, e1〉.
We then have:
〈s, h, ret(v∗, e)〉↪→〈s1, h1, ret(v∗, e1)〉.
• Case null | k | v | v.f | assert Φ. Straightforward.
Theorem. 4.7.3(Safety)
Consider a closed term e without free variables in which all methods have been successfully ver-
ified. Assuming unlimited stack/heap spaces and that ` {true} e {∆}, then either 〈[], [], e〉↪→∗〈[], h, v〉
terminates with a value v that is subsumed by the postcondition ∆, or it diverges 〈[], [], e〉6↪→∗.
Before we present the proof for Theorem 4.7.3, we state and prove the following lemma:
Lemma .1.1. For any s, h, e, if 〈s, h, e〉↪→∗〈sˆ, hˆ, ν〉 for some sˆ, hˆ, ν, where ν is a value, and
all free variables of e are already in the domain of the stack s, i.e. free-vars(e)⊆dom(s), then
dom(sˆ) = dom(s).
Proof: By structural induction over e.





• v.f = v1
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• assert Φ
The conclusion is obvious as the stack remains unchanged during the evaluation of e.
Inductive cases:
• e is v := e1. By the operational semantics, we know that
〈s, h, e1〉↪→∗〈s1, h1, ν1〉
for some s1, h1, ν1, and
〈s1, h1, v := ν1〉↪→〈sˆ, hˆ, ν〉.
Note that
free-vars(e1)⊆free-vars(e)⊆dom(s),
by induction hypothesis, we have dom(s1) = dom(s). The conclusion follows since
dom(sˆ) = dom(s1).
• e is e1; e2. By the operational semantics, there are s1, h1 such that
〈s, h, e1〉↪→∗〈s1, h1, ()〉,
〈s1, h1, (); e2〉↪→〈s1, h1, e2〉,
〈s1, h1, e2〉↪→∗〈sˆ, hˆ, ν〉.
Note that, for i=1, 2, we have
free-vars(ei)⊆free-vars(e)⊆dom(s).
By induction hypothesis, we have
dom(sˆ) = dom(s1) = dom(s).
• e is t v; e1. By the operational semantics, we have
〈s, h, e〉↪→〈[v 7→ ]+s, h, ret(v, e1)〉,
and
〈[v 7→ ]+s, h, e1〉↪→∗〈s1, h1, ν〉
for some s1, h1, and
〈s1, h1, ret(v, ν)〉↪→〈sˆ, hˆ, ν〉,
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where sˆ = s1−{v}. Note that
free-vars(e1)⊆dom([v 7→ ]+s),
by induction hypothesis, we have
dom(s1) = dom([v 7→ ]+s).
So dom(sˆ) = dom(s1)−{v} = dom([v 7→ ]+s)−{v} = dom(s).
• e is mn(u∗; v∗), where v∗ are arguments for call-by-value parameters w∗. By the opera-
tional semantics, we have
(1)〈s, h, e〉↪→〈[w∗ 7→v∗]+s, h, ret(w∗, emn)〉,
where emn is the body of the method mn, and
(2)〈[w∗ 7→v∗]+s, h, emn〉↪→∗〈s1, h1, ν〉
for some s1, h1, and
(3)〈s1, h1, ret(w∗, ν)〉↪→〈sˆ, hˆ, ν〉,
where sˆ = s1−{w∗}. Note also that we have
free-vars(emn)⊆dom([w∗ 7→v∗]+s),
by induction hypothesis, we have
dom(s1) = dom([w∗ 7→v∗]+s).
So dom(sˆ) = dom(s1)−{w∗} = dom(s). 2
Proof of Theorem 4.7.3: If the evaluation of e does not diverge (is not infinite), it will
terminate in a finite number of steps (say n): 〈[], [], e〉↪→〈s1, h1, e1〉↪→· · ·↪→〈sn, hn, en〉, and
there are no further reductions possible. By Theorem 4.7.1, there exist ∆1, ..,∆n such that,
si, hi |= Post(∆i), and ` {∆i} ei {∆}.
By Theorem 4.7.2, The final result en must be some value v (or it will make another reduc-
tion). The conclusion that the stack sn in the final state is empty is drawn from Lemma .1.1 in
the above. 2
.1. PROOFS 145
Theorem. 4.7.4(Soundness of Heap Entailment)
If entailment check ∆1`∆2 ∗i S succeeds, we have: for all s, h, and ∆ ∈ S , if s, h |= ∆1 then
s, h |= ∆2 ∗i ∆.
Proof: Note that the entailment rules [ENT−MATCH−MUT] and [ENT−MATCH−IMM] in
Fig. 4.5 denote a match of two nodes/shape predicates between the antecedent and the conse-
quent. We apply induction on the number of such matches for each path in the entailment search
tree for E0.
Base case.
The entailment search succeeds requiring no matches, meaning that the consequent consists of
only a pure formula. It can only be the case where rule [ENT−EMP] in Fig. 2.5 is applied. It is
straightforward to conclude.
Inductive case.
Suppose a sequence of transitions E0 → · · · → En where no match transitions (due to rules
[ENT−MATCH−MUT] and [ENT−MATCH−IMM]) are involved in this sequence but En will
perform a match transition. These transitions can only be generated by the following rules:
[ENT−UNFOLD], [ENT−FOLD], [ENT−LHS−OR], [ENT−RHS−OR], [ENT−LHS−EX], [ENT−RHS−EX],
[ENT−SPLIT−RHS1], [ENT−SPLIT−RHS2], [ENT−SPLIT−LHS1], [ENT−SPLIT−LHS2]. A case
analysis on these rules shows that the following properties hold:
s, h |= LHS(Ei) =⇒ s, h |= LHS(Ei+1)
(LHS is always weakened by the entailment rules)
s, h |= RHS(Ei+1) =⇒ s, h |= RHS(Ei)
(RHS is always strengthened by the entailment rules)
(†)
Now suppose a match between the antecedent and the consequent. There can be two situations,
which we discuss below:







– ∆a=SH(∆′a, (p::c〈v∗〉@I, ha)), for some ha and ∆′a,
– ∆c = p::c〈v∗〉∗∆′c, for some ∆′c,
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– ∀∆r ∈ Sr.∃∆′r ∈ S′r.∆r=SH(∆′r, (p::c〈v∗〉@I, hr)), for some hr and S′r,
By induction, we have
∀s, h · s, h |= ∆′a =⇒ s, h |= ∆′c∗iS′r (‡)
Suppose s, h |= ∆a, then there exist h0, h1, h2, such that:
– h0⊥h1⊥h3,
– h = h0·h1·h3,
– s, h0·h3 |= p::c〈v∗〉@I ,
– s, h1·h3 |= ∆′a.
From (‡), we have:
s, h1·h3 |= ∆′c∗iS′r,
which yields:
s, h |= ∆c∗Sr.
We then conclude from (†).






for some ∆′a, ∆′c. By induction, we have:
∀s, h · s, h |= ∆′a =⇒ s, h |= ∆′c∗iSr (‡)




Suppose s, h |= ∆a, then there exist h0, h1, such that h = h0∗h1, s, h0 |= p::c〈v∗〉, and
s, h1 |= ∆′a. From (‡), we have:
s, h1 |= ∆′c∗iSr,
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which immediately yields:
s, h |= ∆c∗iSr.
We then conclude from (†).
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